認(rèn)知分歧中的證據(jù)與合理性
發(fā)布時(shí)間:2018-07-24 08:18
【摘要】:在當(dāng)代知識(shí)論中,面對(duì)旗鼓相當(dāng)?shù)恼J(rèn)知伙伴之間產(chǎn)生的認(rèn)知分歧,如何做出恰當(dāng)?shù)姆磻?yīng)并保持合理性是一個(gè)重要議題。人們普遍承認(rèn),證據(jù)在認(rèn)知辯護(hù)的過程中發(fā)揮著重要作用。而根據(jù)"唯一性論題",同一證據(jù)集能夠確定關(guān)于特定命題的、合乎理性的命題態(tài)度是唯一的。因此,產(chǎn)生認(rèn)知分歧的各方中至少有一方是不合乎理性的,需要作出改變。折中主義與固執(zhí)己見論作為當(dāng)前兩種最流行的處理認(rèn)知分歧的立場,前者要求產(chǎn)生分歧的雙方各退一步,同時(shí)降低自身先前的主觀置信度,取一個(gè)中間值才合乎理性,而后者是指在沒有獲得壓倒性的證據(jù)對(duì)自身最初的命題態(tài)度構(gòu)成嚴(yán)重挑戰(zhàn)的情況下,人們有充分的理由堅(jiān)持原來的立場。事實(shí)上,上述兩種立場都不成立。原因在于,認(rèn)知合理性不是靜態(tài)的,而是會(huì)隨著證據(jù)的更新呈現(xiàn)動(dòng)態(tài)變化。在面對(duì)認(rèn)知分歧的時(shí)候,真正合理的反應(yīng)是及時(shí)更新并重估其掌握的全部證據(jù),由此決定是否以及如何調(diào)整命題態(tài)度。
[Abstract]:In contemporary knowledge theory, how to respond appropriately and maintain rationality is an important issue in the face of cognitive differences among cognitive partners. It is generally acknowledged that evidence plays an important role in the process of cognitive defense. According to the "uniqueness theory", the same evidence set can determine that the rational propositional attitude regarding a particular proposition is unique. As a result, at least one of the parties with cognitive differences is irrational and needs to change. Eclecticism and dogmatism are two of the most popular positions for dealing with cognitive differences. The former requires the two parties who are divided to step back, and at the same time reduce their previous subjective confidence and take an intermediate value to be rational. The latter means that people have good reasons to stick to their original position without obtaining overwhelming evidence to challenge their original propositional attitude seriously. In fact, neither of these positions holds true. The reason is that cognitive rationality is not static, but changes with the update of evidence. In the face of cognitive differences, the real and reasonable response is to update and reassess all the evidence available to them in time to decide whether and how to adjust their propositional attitude.
【作者單位】: 云南大學(xué)馬克思主義學(xué)院;
【基金】:云南大學(xué)2016年度“東陸中青年骨干教師”培養(yǎng)計(jì)劃(項(xiàng)目編號(hào):WX069051)資助
【分類號(hào)】:B017
本文編號(hào):2140784
[Abstract]:In contemporary knowledge theory, how to respond appropriately and maintain rationality is an important issue in the face of cognitive differences among cognitive partners. It is generally acknowledged that evidence plays an important role in the process of cognitive defense. According to the "uniqueness theory", the same evidence set can determine that the rational propositional attitude regarding a particular proposition is unique. As a result, at least one of the parties with cognitive differences is irrational and needs to change. Eclecticism and dogmatism are two of the most popular positions for dealing with cognitive differences. The former requires the two parties who are divided to step back, and at the same time reduce their previous subjective confidence and take an intermediate value to be rational. The latter means that people have good reasons to stick to their original position without obtaining overwhelming evidence to challenge their original propositional attitude seriously. In fact, neither of these positions holds true. The reason is that cognitive rationality is not static, but changes with the update of evidence. In the face of cognitive differences, the real and reasonable response is to update and reassess all the evidence available to them in time to decide whether and how to adjust their propositional attitude.
【作者單位】: 云南大學(xué)馬克思主義學(xué)院;
【基金】:云南大學(xué)2016年度“東陸中青年骨干教師”培養(yǎng)計(jì)劃(項(xiàng)目編號(hào):WX069051)資助
【分類號(hào)】:B017
【相似文獻(xiàn)】
相關(guān)期刊論文 前1條
1 宋榮;;當(dāng)代心靈哲學(xué)中的命題態(tài)度及其內(nèi)容[J];哲學(xué)動(dòng)態(tài);2010年04期
相關(guān)碩士學(xué)位論文 前1條
1 張千一;心靈哲學(xué)中的命題態(tài)度研究[D];吉林大學(xué);2015年
,本文編號(hào):2140784
本文鏈接:http://www.sikaile.net/zhexuezongjiaolunwen/2140784.html
教材專著