【摘要】：康德在《論出自人類(lèi)之愛(ài)而說(shuō)謊的所謂權(quán)利》一文中認(rèn)為,說(shuō)真話是一種形式義務(wù),人們應(yīng)該無(wú)條件地履行這個(gè)義務(wù),不管由此導(dǎo)致什么后果。貢斯當(dāng)和科爾斯戈德分別從法學(xué)層面和倫理學(xué)層面對(duì)這個(gè)觀點(diǎn)進(jìn)行批評(píng),都認(rèn)為康德所謂的不說(shuō)謊義務(wù)在現(xiàn)實(shí)中缺少可行的條件,不可能得到普遍遵守,但是這并不能從理論上反駁康德的"應(yīng)當(dāng)不說(shuō)謊"觀點(diǎn)�？档碌慕^對(duì)不說(shuō)謊義務(wù)的理論困難主要在于,未能真正直面不同道德義務(wù)之間的沖突,未能指出解決不同道德義務(wù)沖突的依據(jù)。
[Abstract]:In the so-called right to lie out of human love Kant argues that telling the truth is a formal obligation that one should fulfil unconditionally no matter what the consequences. Gunstein and Colesgott criticized this view from the legal level and the ethical level, respectively, and both thought that Kant's so-called obligation not to lie lacked feasible conditions in reality and could not be universally adhered to. But this does not theoretically refute Kant's view that lies should not be told. The theoretical difficulty of Kant's obligation not to lie mainly lies in his failure to face up to the conflict between different moral obligations and to point out the basis for resolving the conflict between different moral obligations.
【作者單位】： 山東大學(xué)哲學(xué)與社會(huì)發(fā)展學(xué)院暨中國(guó)詮釋學(xué)研究中心;
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：B516.31

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1 侯振武;黃亞明;;康德啟蒙觀念中的知性與理性[J];內(nèi)蒙古大學(xué)學(xué)報(bào)(哲學(xué)社會(huì)科學(xué)版);2014年03期

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