【摘要】： 昭和天皇作為近代日本最高的精神權(quán)威和專制君主、陸海軍大元帥、無疑負(fù)有不可推卸的戰(zhàn)爭責(zé)任。但由于天皇免予起訴,逃脫了遠(yuǎn)東國際軍事法庭的審判,日本的右翼勢力便以“天皇無罪”來否定對外戰(zhàn)爭的侵略性,為天皇開脫。日本許多的歷史著作,也把對外戰(zhàn)爭的責(zé)任推給軍部或少壯派軍官,而把對外侵略的總舵手天皇掩蓋起來,從而使天皇的戰(zhàn)爭責(zé)任問題一直成為史學(xué)界爭論的焦點之一。加之中國是遭受日本對外侵略的重災(zāi)區(qū),所以各國史學(xué)界對天皇戰(zhàn)爭責(zé)任的研究大多集中在侵華方面,對太平洋戰(zhàn)爭中天皇的責(zé)任問題較少涉及,至今尚未見到系統(tǒng)全面論述這一問題的專著或論文。故此,本文擬就昭和天皇在太平洋戰(zhàn)爭前后的言行及作用逐一進(jìn)行探討,揭示天皇是如何積極參與戰(zhàn)爭的重大決策過程、指導(dǎo)和影響戰(zhàn)爭局勢的,并指出其應(yīng)負(fù)的責(zé)任,以此駁斥右翼勢力所謂的“天皇是虛君、和平主義者及日本對外發(fā)動戰(zhàn)爭合法性”的辯解。 正文主要由三部分組成。在第一部分昭和天皇與太平洋戰(zhàn)爭的爆發(fā)中,首先論述了太平洋戰(zhàn)爭爆發(fā)的原因,并指出主要責(zé)任在于日本天皇制政府的對外侵略擴(kuò)張,接著具體分析了天皇的言行在南進(jìn)政策確立、實施過程中的作用,特別是在制定和實施作戰(zhàn)計劃方面,天皇本人對作戰(zhàn)行動施加著決定性、控制性的影響,駁斥了那種認(rèn)為天皇在戰(zhàn)前并不了解偷襲珍珠港計劃的觀點。最后強(qiáng)調(diào)指出昭和天皇是在研究了各種情況,經(jīng)過與政府和軍部反復(fù)商討,又聽取了重臣們的意見,經(jīng)過種種考慮之后才做出的與英美開戰(zhàn)的“圣斷”。 第二部分重點講述了戰(zhàn)爭爆發(fā)后,昭和天皇是如何積極主動地參與戰(zhàn)爭決策的,揭穿了昭和天皇在戰(zhàn)爭中是個“無為之君”的假象。在戰(zhàn)爭初期,為勝利欣喜若狂的昭和天皇尚未預(yù)見到戰(zhàn)場局勢的轉(zhuǎn)折,對于中途島的慘敗仍處之泰然。在瓜達(dá)爾卡納爾島爭奪戰(zhàn)中,大元帥昭和天皇充分利用自己的神圣權(quán)威,不斷向軍部施加壓力,終于導(dǎo)致了損失慘重的消耗戰(zhàn)。隨著戰(zhàn)爭形勢的惡化,為調(diào)解統(tǒng)帥層內(nèi)部矛盾,解決戰(zhàn)略物資和船舶分配問題,昭和天皇不得不直接出面,在有關(guān)國務(wù)和軍事統(tǒng)帥問題上進(jìn)一步發(fā)揮積極作用。塞班島失陷后,面對國內(nèi)日益高漲的“反東條運(yùn)動”,天皇決定拋棄東條,繼續(xù)堅持戰(zhàn)爭。 在第三部分昭和天皇與日本投降的敘述中,分析了日本投降決策中的所謂“圣斷”及其真相:天皇在明知敗局已定的情況下,為了確保自己的統(tǒng)治地位,人為地拖延戰(zhàn)爭,使日本本土在此后半年中遭到本可避免的巨大破壞。在整個戰(zhàn)爭前后,幾乎所有的重大軍事行動與策劃,或是得到天皇的批準(zhǔn),或是天皇在御前會議上做出的,昭和天皇對戰(zhàn)爭負(fù)有直接的責(zé)任。在某種程度上可以說,天皇是日本戰(zhàn)爭機(jī)器的實際操縱者。但戰(zhàn)后日本政界戰(zhàn)爭史觀的右傾化使天皇的戰(zhàn)爭責(zé)任問題日益模糊。 最后,我們認(rèn)為既不能把昭和天皇看作是率先倡導(dǎo)開戰(zhàn)和積極推行開戰(zhàn)的好戰(zhàn)主義者,也不能因為昭和天皇對戰(zhàn)爭的一度猶豫而追認(rèn)為和平主義者,這也不是天皇的本來面貌。昭和天皇決不是草率,而是反復(fù)斟酌、躊躇、動搖,在多次聽取政府、軍部首腦及內(nèi)大臣、皇族的意見和情況介紹并一一確認(rèn)之后,最終由自己做出開戰(zhàn)的“圣斷”,而天皇“圣斷”的后果就是高達(dá)3000萬的各國國民被殘殺,310萬日本國民死亡,這當(dāng)然應(yīng)該追究天皇的戰(zhàn)爭責(zé)任。
[Abstract]:As the supreme spiritual authority and autocratic monarch of modern Japan, the Grand Admiral of the Army and Navy undoubtedly bears the unavoidable responsibility for war. But because the emperor was exempted from prosecution and escaped the trial of the Far East International Military Court, the Japanese right-wing forces denied the aggressiveness of the foreign war with "the emperor's innocence" and excused the emperor. Many historical writings have also shifted the responsibility for foreign wars to the military or junior officers, and concealed the chief helmsman of foreign aggression, the emperor's war responsibility, which has been one of the focuses of debate in the history circles. In addition, China is a disaster area suffered from Japan's foreign aggression, so the historians of various countries are responsible for the emperor's war. Ren's research mostly focuses on the invasion of China, but seldom touches on the responsibility of the emperor in the Pacific War. Up to now, no monographs or papers have been published on this issue systematically and comprehensively. The grand decision-making process guides and influences the war situation, and points out its responsibilities, in order to refute the right-wing forces so-called "Emperor is a virtual monarch, pacifists and Japan's legitimacy to wage war abroad" argument.
The main body consists of three parts. In the first part, the reasons for the outbreak of the Pacific War between Emperor Zhao and the Pacific Ocean were discussed, and the main responsibility was pointed out to be the invasion and expansion of the Japanese imperial government. Then the role of the emperor's words and deeds in the establishment and implementation of the South-marching policy was analyzed concretely. The Emperor himself exerted a decisive and controlling influence on the operation in formulating and implementing the plan of operations, refuting the view that the emperor did not understand the plan of the attack on Pearl Harbor before the war. Opinions, after various considerations, made the "holy break" in the war with Britain and the United States.
The second part focuses on how Emperor Zhao and Emperor Zhao took an active part in the war decision-making after the outbreak of the war, debunking the illusion that Emperor Zhao and Emperor Zhao were an "inactive king" in the war. In the battle for Guadalcanal Island, the Grand Marshal Zhao and the Emperor made full use of their sacred authority and kept exerting pressure on the Ministry of the Army, which eventually led to a costly war of attrition. After the fall of Saipan, the emperor decided to abandon the "Anti-Eastern Strip Movement" and continue to persist in the war.
In the third part of the narrative of the surrender between Emperor Zhao and Japan, the author analyzes the so-called "holy judgment" in the decision-making of Japanese surrender and its truth: the emperor, knowing that the defeat had been decided, delayed the war artificially in order to ensure his dominant position, thus causing the Japanese mainland to suffer tremendous damage which could have been avoided in the next six months. To some extent, the emperor was the actual operator of the Japanese war machine. But the right deviation of the Japanese political outlook on war history caused the emperor's war. The problem of responsibility is increasingly blurred.
Finally, we believe that the emperor can neither be regarded as a militarist who initiated and actively pursued war, nor as a pacifist because of his hesitation to war. This is not the true face of the emperor. After introducing and confirming the opinions and information of the government, the head of the army, the Minister of the interior and the Royal family, the emperor finally made a "sacred judgment" by himself. The consequence of the "sacred judgment" of the emperor was that as many as 30 million nationals were murdered and 3.1 million Japanese nationals died. Of course, the emperor should be held responsible for the war.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：曲阜師范大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2008
【分類號】：K313.45

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