馬歇爾調(diào)停使命之東北調(diào)停
發(fā)布時(shí)間：2018-08-04 21:22
【摘要】：1946年是二戰(zhàn)勝利后的第一年,也是牽系中國(guó)前途與命運(yùn)的關(guān)鍵一年。這一年,中國(guó)面臨戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)與和平的歷史抉擇,國(guó)共關(guān)系的處理問(wèn)題深刻影響著中國(guó)的未來(lái)和當(dāng)時(shí)的遠(yuǎn)東國(guó)際關(guān)系格局。此時(shí)馬歇爾帶著和平的使命來(lái)調(diào)處國(guó)共之間可能引發(fā)的內(nèi)戰(zhàn),而馬歇爾調(diào)處使命的重點(diǎn)和難點(diǎn)是東北問(wèn)題。本文通過(guò)對(duì)1945年12月馬歇爾來(lái)華,到1947年1月離開(kāi)中國(guó)這段時(shí)間,馬歇爾對(duì)中國(guó)東北的調(diào)停過(guò)程作了簡(jiǎn)單的梳理,尤其是對(duì)調(diào)停開(kāi)始到東北六月停戰(zhàn)這一段時(shí)間馬歇爾對(duì)東北內(nèi)戰(zhàn)的態(tài)度和奉行的策略以及東北調(diào)停的成功與失敗作了粗淺的探討。 縱觀馬歇爾東北調(diào)停的過(guò)程,大致可分為三個(gè)階段。第一階段是1945年12月至3月,經(jīng)歷了馬歇爾與國(guó)共之間的初次會(huì)談、一月談判、政協(xié)會(huì)議和整軍談判幾個(gè)時(shí)期,簽署了一系列協(xié)議,使中國(guó)局勢(shì)包括東北局勢(shì)暫時(shí)得以穩(wěn)定,國(guó)共沖突得以控制,中國(guó)出現(xiàn)了前所未有的和平局面,在這一階段馬歇爾對(duì)東北的調(diào)停是積極有效的；第二階段是1946年3月至6月,從有名無(wú)實(shí)的東北軍調(diào)小組徒勞地調(diào)停到東北戰(zhàn)事愈演愈烈,直至于事無(wú)補(bǔ)的六月停戰(zhàn),在這一階段,協(xié)議不斷遭到踐踏,沖突逐步升級(jí),調(diào)停陷入僵局,最終爆發(fā)全面內(nèi)戰(zhàn)：最后一階段,1946年7月到1947年1月,表面是談判,實(shí)際是戰(zhàn)酣,所謂調(diào)停已并無(wú)實(shí)際意義。 本文在論述中,主要側(cè)重于對(duì)第一和第二階段的東北調(diào)停。筆者認(rèn)為馬歇爾在調(diào)停過(guò)程中始終愿意保持客觀公正的調(diào)處態(tài)度和方式,只不過(guò)馬歇爾的個(gè)人意愿和美國(guó)的政策之間存在無(wú)法調(diào)和的矛盾,使得馬歇爾越到調(diào)處后期越具有壓共助蔣的傾向。在調(diào)處過(guò)程中,東北若停戰(zhàn),則關(guān)內(nèi)相安無(wú)事,東北若大打,關(guān)內(nèi)就容易兵戎相見(jiàn),東北內(nèi)戰(zhàn)是國(guó)共內(nèi)戰(zhàn)的縮影也是影響全局的關(guān)鍵。無(wú)論國(guó)民黨還是共產(chǎn)黨都是一個(gè)獨(dú)立的政黨,在東北問(wèn)題上又都十分看重,都希望在停戰(zhàn)談判中獲得更多的權(quán)益,最終的結(jié)果是國(guó)民黨認(rèn)為馬歇爾沒(méi)有全力支持國(guó)民政府,共產(chǎn)黨責(zé)怪馬歇爾是促蔣挑起內(nèi)戰(zhàn)。在調(diào)處時(shí)期,大多數(shù)時(shí)期是共產(chǎn)黨處于優(yōu)勢(shì),國(guó)民黨自恃武力,經(jīng)常最先發(fā)難,導(dǎo)致馬歇爾在個(gè)人情感上往往同情共產(chǎn)黨,責(zé)怪國(guó)民黨,但出于美國(guó)戰(zhàn)略利益考慮,馬歇爾又實(shí)際上支持國(guó)民黨,逼迫共產(chǎn)黨。由此,形成了復(fù)雜的、矛盾的、變幻的東北局勢(shì)。值得注意的是,美國(guó)在東北問(wèn)題上支持國(guó)民黨,使得國(guó)民黨最終敢于發(fā)動(dòng)內(nèi)戰(zhàn)。蘇聯(lián)采取不干預(yù)政策,對(duì)中共也有很大助力,它在一定程度上牽制了美國(guó)對(duì)東北國(guó)民黨軍隊(duì)的援助,也提供了中共要求美國(guó)完全退出中國(guó)的有力借口。總之,東北問(wèn)題是中國(guó)的內(nèi)政,但在當(dāng)時(shí)國(guó)際環(huán)境中,在馬歇爾所代表的美國(guó)的影響下,又成為美蘇角力的場(chǎng)所。
[Abstract]:1946 was the first year after the victory of World War II and a crucial year for China's future and destiny. This year, China was faced with the historical choice of war and peace. The handling of the relationship between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party had a profound impact on the future of China and the pattern of international relations in the far East at that time. At this time, Marshall took the mission of peace to mediate the possible civil war between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, and the focus and difficulty of Marshall's mission was the Northeast issue. In this paper, Marshall made a brief combing of the mediation process in Northeast China during the period of Marshall's coming to China in December 1945 and leaving China in January 1947. In particular, Marshall's attitude and strategy to the Northeast Civil War during the period from the beginning of mediation to the armistice in June in Northeast China and the success and failure of mediation in Northeast China were discussed. The process of Marshall's mediation in Northeast China can be divided into three stages. The first stage was from December to March 1945. After the initial talks between Marshall and the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, the January talks, the CPPCC session and the military integration negotiations, a series of agreements were signed, so that the situation in China, including the situation in the Northeast, was temporarily stabilized. The conflict between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party was brought under control, and there was unprecedented peace in China, during which Marshall's mediation in the Northeast was active and effective; the second stage was from March to June 1946. From the vain mediation of the nominal Northeast military Coordination Group to the intensification of the northeast war, until the futile June armistice, the agreement was constantly trampled on, the conflict escalated, and the mediation reached an impasse. Finally, a full-scale civil war broke out: the last stage, from July 1946 to January 1947, was ostensibly a negotiation, but in fact a war of war, and the so-called mediation had no practical meaning. In this paper, the main focus on the first and second stages of Northeast mediation. The author believes that Marshall is willing to maintain an objective and impartial attitude and manner in the process of mediation, but there is an irreconcilable contradiction between Marshall's personal will and American policy. The more Marshall to the later period of mediation, the more pressure to help Chiang. In the process of mediation, if the Northeast armistice, there will be peace within the Northeast, if the Northeast to fight, it is easy to battle, the Northeast Civil War is the epitome of the KMT civil war is also the key to the overall situation. Neither the Kuomintang nor the Communist Party is an independent political party, and they all attach great importance to the issue of the Northeast and all hope to gain more rights and interests in the armistice negotiations. The final result is that the KMT believes that Marshall did not fully support the National Government. The Communists blamed Marshall for provoking civil war. During the period of mediation, most of the time the Communist Party was in the ascendancy, and the Kuomintang, relying on military force, often made the first attack, which led Marshall to sympathize with the Communist Party and blame the Kuomintang on his personal feelings, but in view of the strategic interests of the United States, Marshall actually supported the Kuomintang and forced the Communist Party. As a result, a complex, contradictory, changing situation in the Northeast. It is worth noting that the United States supported the Kuomintang on the northeast issue, making the Kuomintang finally dare to launch a civil war. The Soviet Union's policy of non-intervention has also helped the Chinese Communists greatly. To a certain extent, it has restrained the United States' assistance to the Kuomintang troops in the Northeast and provided a powerful excuse for the Chinese Communists to demand that the United States withdraw completely from China. In short, the Northeast issue was China's internal affairs, but in the international environment at that time, under the influence of the United States represented by Marshall, it became the arena for the United States and the Soviet Union to wrestle.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：安徽大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類號(hào)】：K266;K712.54
本文編號(hào)：2165188
[Abstract]:1946 was the first year after the victory of World War II and a crucial year for China's future and destiny. This year, China was faced with the historical choice of war and peace. The handling of the relationship between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party had a profound impact on the future of China and the pattern of international relations in the far East at that time. At this time, Marshall took the mission of peace to mediate the possible civil war between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, and the focus and difficulty of Marshall's mission was the Northeast issue. In this paper, Marshall made a brief combing of the mediation process in Northeast China during the period of Marshall's coming to China in December 1945 and leaving China in January 1947. In particular, Marshall's attitude and strategy to the Northeast Civil War during the period from the beginning of mediation to the armistice in June in Northeast China and the success and failure of mediation in Northeast China were discussed. The process of Marshall's mediation in Northeast China can be divided into three stages. The first stage was from December to March 1945. After the initial talks between Marshall and the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, the January talks, the CPPCC session and the military integration negotiations, a series of agreements were signed, so that the situation in China, including the situation in the Northeast, was temporarily stabilized. The conflict between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party was brought under control, and there was unprecedented peace in China, during which Marshall's mediation in the Northeast was active and effective; the second stage was from March to June 1946. From the vain mediation of the nominal Northeast military Coordination Group to the intensification of the northeast war, until the futile June armistice, the agreement was constantly trampled on, the conflict escalated, and the mediation reached an impasse. Finally, a full-scale civil war broke out: the last stage, from July 1946 to January 1947, was ostensibly a negotiation, but in fact a war of war, and the so-called mediation had no practical meaning. In this paper, the main focus on the first and second stages of Northeast mediation. The author believes that Marshall is willing to maintain an objective and impartial attitude and manner in the process of mediation, but there is an irreconcilable contradiction between Marshall's personal will and American policy. The more Marshall to the later period of mediation, the more pressure to help Chiang. In the process of mediation, if the Northeast armistice, there will be peace within the Northeast, if the Northeast to fight, it is easy to battle, the Northeast Civil War is the epitome of the KMT civil war is also the key to the overall situation. Neither the Kuomintang nor the Communist Party is an independent political party, and they all attach great importance to the issue of the Northeast and all hope to gain more rights and interests in the armistice negotiations. The final result is that the KMT believes that Marshall did not fully support the National Government. The Communists blamed Marshall for provoking civil war. During the period of mediation, most of the time the Communist Party was in the ascendancy, and the Kuomintang, relying on military force, often made the first attack, which led Marshall to sympathize with the Communist Party and blame the Kuomintang on his personal feelings, but in view of the strategic interests of the United States, Marshall actually supported the Kuomintang and forced the Communist Party. As a result, a complex, contradictory, changing situation in the Northeast. It is worth noting that the United States supported the Kuomintang on the northeast issue, making the Kuomintang finally dare to launch a civil war. The Soviet Union's policy of non-intervention has also helped the Chinese Communists greatly. To a certain extent, it has restrained the United States' assistance to the Kuomintang troops in the Northeast and provided a powerful excuse for the Chinese Communists to demand that the United States withdraw completely from China. In short, the Northeast issue was China's internal affairs, but in the international environment at that time, under the influence of the United States represented by Marshall, it became the arena for the United States and the Soviet Union to wrestle.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：安徽大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類號(hào)】：K266;K712.54
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