地方龍頭企業(yè)的盈余質量：關系、政治聯(lián)系依賴還是市場壓力？
發(fā)布時間：2018-11-09 17:39
【摘要】：自關系基礎的經濟社會運行規(guī)則被提出,學者們便希望找出關系基礎與市場基礎的種種運行機制差異及相互替代作用。然而由于變量度量等原因,迄今為止少有文獻直接專注于此類研究。受Cheung、Rau和Stouraitis等(2005)研究的啟發(fā),本文認為,在關系型社會,尤其是在中國特殊的政治經濟制度安排下,除了Shleifer和Vishny提出的以公司CEO或董事長的個人從政經歷衡量公司政治聯(lián)系的經典度量方法,公司還可以有其他方式與當?shù)卣姷年P系和依賴。因此本文選取對地方經濟發(fā)展有重要影響的公司定義為地方龍頭企業(yè),以它們?yōu)榍腥朦c,對比關系和市場這兩種相反的力量對公司盈余質量的影響。一方面,地方龍頭企業(yè)與地方政府的利益綁定與關系依賴會削弱它們向市場傳遞良好公司治理、高質量財務信息等積極信號的動機。另一方面,來自市場的證券分析師和“四大”審計能在一定程度上約束公司的盈余管理行為,緩解信息不對稱。 本文選取2003年到2012年2084家上市公司的樣本,選用可操控性應計利潤、異常非核心盈余和盈余反應系數(shù)度量盈余質量,研究在關系和市場的共同影響下,地方龍頭企業(yè)對高質量外部審計的需求如何,其盈余質量又如何；以及何種程度的市場監(jiān)督機制設計才能制衡由關系導致的公司缺乏外部取信于投資者動機的現(xiàn)象。 研究結果表明,地方龍頭企業(yè)選擇“四大”審計的概率顯著低于非地方龍頭企業(yè),以可操控應計利潤度量的盈余管理程度顯著高于非地方龍頭企業(yè)。證實了地方龍頭企業(yè)與地方政府的利益綁定會削弱公司的外部取信需求。當引入分析師跟進和“四大”審計作為外部監(jiān)督力量之后,本文發(fā)現(xiàn),僅有證券分析師或“四大”審計不足以提高地方龍頭企業(yè)的盈余質量,但此時地方龍頭企業(yè)的盈余管理行為不再顯著高。而當進一步區(qū)分是否地方龍頭企業(yè)子樣本進行研究,本文發(fā)現(xiàn)分析師跟進與“四大”審計的共同作用,能顯著降低地方龍頭企業(yè)的盈余管理程度,提高地方龍頭企業(yè)的盈余質量。
[Abstract]:Since the rules of economic and social operation based on relationship have been put forward, scholars hope to find out the differences between the operation mechanism of the relationship foundation and the market basis and their mutual substitution. However, because of variable measurement and other reasons, so far few literatures have focused on this kind of research directly. Inspired by the study of Cheung,Rau and Stouraitis (2005), this paper argues that in a relational society, especially in China's special political and economic system arrangements, In addition to Shleifer and Vishny's classic measure of corporate political connections based on the company's CEO or chairman's personal political experience, companies can have other ways to build strong relationships and dependencies with local governments. Therefore, this article selects the company which has important influence to the local economic development to define as the local leading enterprise, takes them as the breakthrough point, contrasts the relationship and the market these two opposite forces to the company earnings quality influence. On the one hand, the interest binding and relationship dependence between local leading enterprises and local governments will weaken their motivation to transmit positive signals such as good corporate governance and high-quality financial information to the market. On the other hand, the securities analysts and the "Big four" audit from the market can restrain the earnings management behavior of the company to a certain extent and alleviate the information asymmetry. In this paper, 2084 listed companies from 2003 to 2012 are selected to measure earnings quality, including actionable accrual profit, abnormal non-core earnings and earnings response coefficient, under the influence of relationship and market. What is the demand of local leading enterprises for high-quality external audit, and what is the quality of their earnings; And the degree of market supervision mechanism design to counterbalance the lack of external credit to investors caused by the relationship phenomenon. The results show that the probability of selecting "four" audit by local leading enterprises is significantly lower than that of non-local leading enterprises, and the degree of earnings management with the measure of controllable accrual profits is significantly higher than that of non-local leading enterprises. Confirmed that the interests of local leading enterprises and local governments can weaken the company's external credit demand. After introducing the analyst follow-up and the "Big four" audit as the external supervisory force, this paper finds that only the securities analyst or the "Big four" audit is not enough to improve the earnings quality of the local leading enterprises. However, the earnings management behavior of local leading enterprises is no longer significantly higher. And when we further distinguish whether the sub-samples of local leading enterprises are studied, we find that the joint effect of analyst follow-up and "big four" audit can significantly reduce the degree of earnings management of local leading enterprises. Improve the surplus quality of local leading enterprises.
【學位授予單位】：廈門大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F275;F276.6
本文編號：2321107
[Abstract]:Since the rules of economic and social operation based on relationship have been put forward, scholars hope to find out the differences between the operation mechanism of the relationship foundation and the market basis and their mutual substitution. However, because of variable measurement and other reasons, so far few literatures have focused on this kind of research directly. Inspired by the study of Cheung,Rau and Stouraitis (2005), this paper argues that in a relational society, especially in China's special political and economic system arrangements, In addition to Shleifer and Vishny's classic measure of corporate political connections based on the company's CEO or chairman's personal political experience, companies can have other ways to build strong relationships and dependencies with local governments. Therefore, this article selects the company which has important influence to the local economic development to define as the local leading enterprise, takes them as the breakthrough point, contrasts the relationship and the market these two opposite forces to the company earnings quality influence. On the one hand, the interest binding and relationship dependence between local leading enterprises and local governments will weaken their motivation to transmit positive signals such as good corporate governance and high-quality financial information to the market. On the other hand, the securities analysts and the "Big four" audit from the market can restrain the earnings management behavior of the company to a certain extent and alleviate the information asymmetry. In this paper, 2084 listed companies from 2003 to 2012 are selected to measure earnings quality, including actionable accrual profit, abnormal non-core earnings and earnings response coefficient, under the influence of relationship and market. What is the demand of local leading enterprises for high-quality external audit, and what is the quality of their earnings; And the degree of market supervision mechanism design to counterbalance the lack of external credit to investors caused by the relationship phenomenon. The results show that the probability of selecting "four" audit by local leading enterprises is significantly lower than that of non-local leading enterprises, and the degree of earnings management with the measure of controllable accrual profits is significantly higher than that of non-local leading enterprises. Confirmed that the interests of local leading enterprises and local governments can weaken the company's external credit demand. After introducing the analyst follow-up and the "Big four" audit as the external supervisory force, this paper finds that only the securities analyst or the "Big four" audit is not enough to improve the earnings quality of the local leading enterprises. However, the earnings management behavior of local leading enterprises is no longer significantly higher. And when we further distinguish whether the sub-samples of local leading enterprises are studied, we find that the joint effect of analyst follow-up and "big four" audit can significantly reduce the degree of earnings management of local leading enterprises. Improve the surplus quality of local leading enterprises.
【學位授予單位】：廈門大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F275;F276.6
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