【摘要】：從群體博弈和適應(yīng)角度,運(yùn)用演化博弈方法深入研究了PPP模式下的公私雙方在保障房建設(shè)中的合作機(jī)制。以地方政府和私人投資者只具有有限理性為前提,建立了PPP模式下保障房建設(shè)公私雙方合作的演化博弈模型,并利用復(fù)制動(dòng)態(tài)進(jìn)化機(jī)理分析了保障房建設(shè)中公私雙方合作中的群體博弈局勢的變化形態(tài)。研究得出,保證常規(guī)監(jiān)督—激勵(lì)機(jī)制的激勵(lì)約束效果是PPP模式下保障房項(xiàng)目公私雙方良性合作機(jī)制建立的基礎(chǔ)和先決條件;如果常規(guī)監(jiān)督—激勵(lì)機(jī)制效能不足,需要額外檢查來補(bǔ)充;當(dāng)常規(guī)和非常規(guī)約束機(jī)制都失效時(shí),雙方的合作必然滑向次劣或最劣均衡導(dǎo)致項(xiàng)目雙方及項(xiàng)目本身利益受損,并據(jù)此提出了公私雙方在保障房PPP項(xiàng)目中達(dá)成穩(wěn)定合作的對策建議。
[Abstract]:From the angle of group game and adaptation, this paper studies the cooperation mechanism of public and private parties in indemnificatory apartment construction under PPP mode by using evolutionary game method. Based on the premise that local governments and private investors have only limited rationality, an evolutionary game model of indemnificatory apartment's construction of public-private cooperation under PPP mode is established. The dynamic evolution mechanism of replication is used to analyze the changing form of group game situation in the construction of indemnificatory apartment. It is concluded that it is the foundation and prerequisite for the establishment of benign cooperation mechanism between public and private parties of indemnificatory apartment project under PPP mode to ensure the effect of incentive and restraint of conventional supervisory and incentive mechanism. If the conventional supervisory-incentive mechanism is not effective enough, additional checks are needed to supplement it; When both conventional and unconventional constraint mechanisms fail, the cooperation between the two sides will inevitably slip to the inferior or the worst equilibrium, which will damage the interests of both sides of the project and the project itself. Based on this, the author puts forward the countermeasures and suggestions for the stable cooperation between public and private parties in indemnificatory apartment PPP project.
【作者單位】： 河海大學(xué)商學(xué)院;金陵科技學(xué)院土木工程學(xué)院;
【基金】：國家社會(huì)科學(xué)基金重點(diǎn)項(xiàng)目(12AZD108)
【分類號】：F299.23;F224.32

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本文編號：2405438