【摘要】：現(xiàn)代公司制企業(yè)制度下,兩權(quán)分離導(dǎo)致股東和管理者之間的利益發(fā)生沖突,進(jìn)而促使其產(chǎn)生了委托代理關(guān)系。為了在股東和管理者的利益之間尋求一個(gè)平衡點(diǎn),使管理者在為自己的利益努力奮斗的同時(shí)更加關(guān)注公司的利益,從而解決委托代理問題,股權(quán)激勵(lì)則應(yīng)運(yùn)而生。股權(quán)激勵(lì)作為一種長期的激勵(lì)機(jī)制,從本質(zhì)上來說,是通過授予高管一定量的股份,使高管能夠?qū)⒆陨淼睦婧腿w股東的利益緊密地聯(lián)系在一起,從而降低代理成本,促使企業(yè)價(jià)值達(dá)到最大化。本文分析了股權(quán)激勵(lì)對企業(yè)績效影響的相關(guān)基礎(chǔ)理論,通過對國內(nèi)外文獻(xiàn)的梳理得出了股權(quán)激勵(lì)對企業(yè)績效影響的不同結(jié)論,為進(jìn)一步實(shí)施實(shí)證研究奠定了基礎(chǔ)。此研究結(jié)論為我國上市公司實(shí)施股權(quán)激勵(lì)制度的研究與實(shí)施提供了經(jīng)驗(yàn)數(shù)據(jù)和指引,也為相關(guān)部門推進(jìn)和完善股權(quán)激勵(lì)提供了有益參考。
[Abstract]:Under the modern corporation system, the separation of the two rights leads to the conflict of interests between shareholders and managers, which leads to the principal-agent relationship. In order to find a balance between the interests of shareholders and managers, so that managers pay more attention to the interests of the company while striving for their own interests, so as to solve the principal-agent problem, equity incentive came into being. Equity incentive as a long-term incentive mechanism, essentially, through granting a certain amount of shares to senior executives, so that executives can closely link their own interests and the interests of all shareholders, thereby reducing agency costs. To maximize the value of the enterprise. This paper analyzes the basic theory of the impact of equity incentive on enterprise performance, and draws different conclusions on the impact of equity incentive on enterprise performance by combing the literature at home and abroad, which lays a foundation for further empirical research. This conclusion provides empirical data and guidance for the research and implementation of equity incentive system for listed companies in China, and also provides a useful reference for relevant departments to promote and improve equity incentive.
【作者單位】： 東北師范大學(xué);
【分類號】：F275;F832.51

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