發(fā)布時(shí)間：2018-05-15 21:44

  本文選題：電信產(chǎn)業(yè) + 產(chǎn)業(yè)價(jià)值鏈��； 參考：《西南財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)》2012年碩士論文

【摘要】：隨著通信技術(shù)的發(fā)展及人們對(duì)通信服務(wù)內(nèi)容和質(zhì)量要求的逐漸提高,數(shù)據(jù)通信業(yè)務(wù)已成為推動(dòng)運(yùn)營(yíng)商利潤(rùn)增長(zhǎng)的重要?jiǎng)恿υ?同時(shí)它的發(fā)展也帶來(lái)了傳統(tǒng)電信產(chǎn)業(yè)價(jià)值鏈模式的深刻變化,產(chǎn)業(yè)價(jià)值鏈中出現(xiàn)了各種新型的功能主體,如服務(wù)提供商(SP)、虛擬運(yùn)營(yíng)商、應(yīng)用集成商等,促使電信產(chǎn)業(yè)的分工進(jìn)一步細(xì)化,新型電信產(chǎn)業(yè)價(jià)值鏈在擴(kuò)展原有電信內(nèi)容的同時(shí),也產(chǎn)生新的細(xì)分性的裂變,擁有更多的價(jià)值環(huán)節(jié)和價(jià)值內(nèi)容。 隨著數(shù)據(jù)業(yè)務(wù)的發(fā)展,電信產(chǎn)業(yè)價(jià)值鏈結(jié)構(gòu)及主體之間的關(guān)系越來(lái)越復(fù)雜,整個(gè)價(jià)值鏈也逐漸暴露一些問(wèn)題：第一,價(jià)值主體之間的協(xié)調(diào)不順暢。數(shù)據(jù)業(yè)務(wù)不斷的發(fā)展使得越來(lái)越多的SP加入到價(jià)值鏈中來(lái),SP要通過(guò)運(yùn)營(yíng)商的網(wǎng)絡(luò)平臺(tái)向用戶提供信息、服務(wù),作為使用運(yùn)營(yíng)商網(wǎng)絡(luò)資源的代價(jià),SP必須向運(yùn)營(yíng)商支付通信費(fèi),另外運(yùn)營(yíng)商代SP收取信息費(fèi),SP需要向運(yùn)營(yíng)商支付一定比例的信息費(fèi),雙方之間的結(jié)算問(wèn)題成為了雙方的矛盾焦點(diǎn)；為了更好的推廣自己的數(shù)據(jù)業(yè)務(wù),運(yùn)營(yíng)商需要采取終端定制策略,盡管終端定制策略能夠解決終端與新業(yè)務(wù)的兼容性問(wèn)題,但是運(yùn)營(yíng)商面臨營(yíng)銷風(fēng)險(xiǎn)及成本補(bǔ)貼壓力,同時(shí)終端商也面臨自身品牌被淡化的風(fēng)險(xiǎn),如何解決雙方的矛盾,需要找到一種合適的激勵(lì)方案。第二,電信產(chǎn)業(yè)價(jià)值鏈上的主體發(fā)展不均衡。設(shè)備供應(yīng)商掌握了網(wǎng)絡(luò)技術(shù)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)、終端商擁有技術(shù)優(yōu)勢(shì),兩者共同引領(lǐng)技術(shù)市場(chǎng)的發(fā)展；運(yùn)營(yíng)商掌握了網(wǎng)絡(luò)資源,其他各中間服務(wù)環(huán)節(jié)需要利用運(yùn)營(yíng)商的網(wǎng)絡(luò)平臺(tái)才能向用戶提供中間服務(wù),運(yùn)營(yíng)商處于價(jià)值鏈的核心地位,電信產(chǎn)業(yè)的中間環(huán)節(jié)則處于相對(duì)弱勢(shì)的地位。為了解決上述電信業(yè)存在的問(wèn)題,必須理順電信產(chǎn)業(yè)價(jià)值鏈上各主體之間的關(guān)系。由此確定了本文的研究主題。 電信產(chǎn)業(yè)價(jià)值鏈發(fā)展到3G時(shí)代的融合網(wǎng)絡(luò)結(jié)構(gòu),電信產(chǎn)業(yè)價(jià)值鏈各主體為了保持住自身的優(yōu)勢(shì)及利益最大化,將不斷的向自身的上下游環(huán)節(jié)一體化轉(zhuǎn)型。3G時(shí)代增值業(yè)務(wù)市場(chǎng)潛力巨大,并且已經(jīng)成為了價(jià)值鏈參與主體的重要利潤(rùn)來(lái)源。在此情況下,運(yùn)營(yíng)商不再滿足于自己傳統(tǒng)的網(wǎng)絡(luò)平臺(tái)提供者的角色,逐步介入其他價(jià)值鏈環(huán)節(jié),比如中國(guó)移動(dòng)的移動(dòng)飛信業(yè)務(wù)成為運(yùn)營(yíng)商一體化轉(zhuǎn)型的典范。運(yùn)營(yíng)商轉(zhuǎn)型首先是不再滿足于自身的平臺(tái)提供者的角色,其次必須要在自身網(wǎng)絡(luò)資源及用戶資源優(yōu)勢(shì)的基礎(chǔ)上實(shí)現(xiàn)業(yè)務(wù)的創(chuàng)新。電信運(yùn)營(yíng)商向內(nèi)容服務(wù)環(huán)節(jié)一體化轉(zhuǎn)型,面對(duì)自己戰(zhàn)略合作伙伴SP,兩者之間又多了一層競(jìng)爭(zhēng)關(guān)系,從而形成競(jìng)爭(zhēng)合作的復(fù)雜關(guān)系。運(yùn)營(yíng)商向內(nèi)容服務(wù)環(huán)節(jié)一體化轉(zhuǎn)型,為了推廣自己的數(shù)據(jù)業(yè)務(wù),終端的兼容支持顯得尤為重要,終端定制成為了運(yùn)營(yíng)商策略選擇的必然趨勢(shì)。在終端定制過(guò)程中,雙方均希望自身利益的最大化,雙方之間戰(zhàn)略競(jìng)合關(guān)系指雙方在心里上存在競(jìng)爭(zhēng)關(guān)系,是一種利益的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)心理,在業(yè)務(wù)上進(jìn)行合作,雙方由此產(chǎn)生競(jìng)爭(zhēng)合作的委托代理關(guān)系。在目前的理論文獻(xiàn)的研究中,主要集中在電信產(chǎn)業(yè)價(jià)值鏈的構(gòu)成、價(jià)值鏈模式、價(jià)值鏈發(fā)展趨勢(shì)及價(jià)值鏈上各主體之間的合作策略等方面的研究上,對(duì)價(jià)值鏈上各主體之間的競(jìng)合關(guān)系的研究比較少。本文除了研究?jī)r(jià)值鏈縱向主體之間供給的合作關(guān)系之外,還對(duì)主體之間的利益競(jìng)爭(zhēng)關(guān)系進(jìn)行研究。 本文對(duì)電信產(chǎn)業(yè)價(jià)值鏈主體的一體化轉(zhuǎn)型趨勢(shì)進(jìn)行了分析,由此證明了電信產(chǎn)業(yè)價(jià)值鏈主體之間的關(guān)系由原來(lái)單純的上下游供給關(guān)系變成了你中有我、我中有你的合作競(jìng)爭(zhēng)關(guān)系。在此基礎(chǔ)上,分析了價(jià)值鏈各主體合作競(jìng)爭(zhēng)關(guān)系的選擇,即以運(yùn)營(yíng)商為核心與其他主體形成共生共贏關(guān)系。為下文以運(yùn)營(yíng)商為核心與SP、終端商之間競(jìng)合關(guān)系研究奠定基礎(chǔ)。 運(yùn)營(yíng)商與SP之間的復(fù)雜關(guān)系源于運(yùn)營(yíng)商的轉(zhuǎn)型趨勢(shì)。運(yùn)營(yíng)商轉(zhuǎn)型基于以下兩點(diǎn)原因：一是運(yùn)營(yíng)商自身發(fā)展需要及技術(shù)、需求與產(chǎn)業(yè)價(jià)值鏈主體趨同化競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的推動(dòng)；二是增值業(yè)務(wù)的發(fā)展空間巨大客觀上刺激了運(yùn)營(yíng)商向SP增值業(yè)務(wù)領(lǐng)域的滲透。運(yùn)營(yíng)商轉(zhuǎn)型進(jìn)入增值業(yè)務(wù)市場(chǎng),面對(duì)既是合作伙伴又是競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手的SP,雙方關(guān)系微妙和不確定。本文建立了運(yùn)營(yíng)商與SP競(jìng)爭(zhēng)與合作模型。在競(jìng)爭(zhēng)模型中,指出運(yùn)營(yíng)商以推出替代業(yè)務(wù)介入SP增值業(yè)務(wù)市場(chǎng),運(yùn)營(yíng)商是市場(chǎng)的追隨者,SP是市場(chǎng)的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者,運(yùn)營(yíng)商只能部分分流SP收益,兩者達(dá)到競(jìng)爭(zhēng)均衡時(shí),運(yùn)營(yíng)商的業(yè)務(wù)量與收益均小于SP。在合作模型中,借鑒Stackelberg模型在供應(yīng)鏈中收入共享合同方面的應(yīng)用,分別建立了各自利益最大化及整體利益最大化的合作模型。對(duì)模型進(jìn)行求解,得到當(dāng)其他條件不變,信息服務(wù)費(fèi)價(jià)格、信息收入分成比例以及雙方利潤(rùn)與市場(chǎng)需求量正相關(guān),與價(jià)格彈性系數(shù)負(fù)相關(guān),在整體利益最大化模型下的合作能夠?qū)崿F(xiàn)合作雙方利益的帕累托改進(jìn)。應(yīng)用中國(guó)移動(dòng)與騰訊的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)合作案例做了實(shí)證分析。 運(yùn)營(yíng)商為了發(fā)展自己的增值業(yè)務(wù)采取終端定制策略,終端商的努力水平不能夠被運(yùn)營(yíng)商觀察到,雙方存在委托代理關(guān)系。根據(jù)終端業(yè)務(wù)定制的深淺程度,運(yùn)營(yíng)商與終端的委托代理關(guān)系也存在差別,為了研究的簡(jiǎn)便,本文研究運(yùn)營(yíng)商采取淺層終端定制策略下雙方的委托代理模型。在運(yùn)營(yíng)商采取淺層終端定制策略下的委托代理模型中確定了運(yùn)營(yíng)商對(duì)終端廠商的最佳激勵(lì)強(qiáng)度及其影響因素,因此運(yùn)營(yíng)商應(yīng)該給予終端廠商適當(dāng)?shù)募?lì)強(qiáng)度。最后應(yīng)用中國(guó)移動(dòng)的終端定制的案例進(jìn)行了實(shí)證研究 本文具體章節(jié)構(gòu)成如下： 第一章為緒論部分。首先分析了本文的研究背景及意義,將電信產(chǎn)業(yè)價(jià)值鏈發(fā)展過(guò)程中存在的問(wèn)題歸結(jié)為一個(gè)根源性問(wèn)題：電信產(chǎn)業(yè)價(jià)值鏈的各主體發(fā)展不均衡、各主體之間協(xié)調(diào)不順暢等問(wèn)題而導(dǎo)致整體價(jià)值創(chuàng)造效率低下。據(jù)此提出研究電信產(chǎn)業(yè)價(jià)值鏈各主體合作競(jìng)爭(zhēng)關(guān)系予以解決,然后扼要介紹了本文的研究?jī)?nèi)容及解決的關(guān)鍵問(wèn)題,明確本文的研究方法。 第二章為相關(guān)理論基礎(chǔ)及文獻(xiàn)綜述。介紹了本文應(yīng)用的理論基礎(chǔ)及文獻(xiàn)綜述,主要包括博弈論與委托代理理論,產(chǎn)業(yè)鏈融合一體化理論等,并對(duì)電信產(chǎn)業(yè)價(jià)值鏈的國(guó)內(nèi)外研究現(xiàn)狀進(jìn)行了綜述,總結(jié)了理論研究的不足。 第三章為電信產(chǎn)業(yè)價(jià)值鏈構(gòu)成、演進(jìn)與國(guó)內(nèi)外現(xiàn)狀對(duì)比分析。介紹了電信產(chǎn)業(yè)價(jià)值鏈的構(gòu)成、演進(jìn)歷程及影響因素,并對(duì)比分析了國(guó)內(nèi)外電信產(chǎn)業(yè)價(jià)值鏈模式。 第四章分析了電信產(chǎn)業(yè)價(jià)值主體一體化轉(zhuǎn)型趨勢(shì)及各主體合作競(jìng)爭(zhēng)關(guān)系選擇模式。通過(guò)對(duì)電信產(chǎn)業(yè)價(jià)值鏈各主體向其他價(jià)值環(huán)節(jié)一體化轉(zhuǎn)型的研究,確定各主體之間由原來(lái)單純的上下游供給關(guān)系轉(zhuǎn)變?yōu)楹献鞲?jìng)爭(zhēng)關(guān)系。并且以運(yùn)營(yíng)商為例從理論和實(shí)際兩方面分析其轉(zhuǎn)型的原因及轉(zhuǎn)型的方向。在明確了價(jià)值主體之間存在合作競(jìng)爭(zhēng)關(guān)系的情況下,借鑒現(xiàn)有文獻(xiàn)的研究成果,將電信產(chǎn)業(yè)比作生態(tài)系統(tǒng),并指出在電信產(chǎn)業(yè)生態(tài)系統(tǒng)中存在關(guān)鍵種——電信運(yùn)營(yíng)商,電信產(chǎn)業(yè)各主體之間的關(guān)系是以運(yùn)營(yíng)商為核心與其他價(jià)值主體之間形成合作共贏的關(guān)系。從而為下文以運(yùn)營(yíng)商為核心與SP、終端商之間的競(jìng)合關(guān)系研究奠定基礎(chǔ)。 第五章主要運(yùn)用Stackelberg模型理論,以電信產(chǎn)業(yè)價(jià)值鏈的主體——電信運(yùn)營(yíng)商與SP之間關(guān)系為對(duì)象,研究了兩者的合作競(jìng)爭(zhēng)關(guān)系；應(yīng)用委托代理理論分析了電信產(chǎn)業(yè)價(jià)值鏈的主體——電信運(yùn)營(yíng)商與終端廠商之間合作競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的委托代理關(guān)系。運(yùn)用博弈論建立運(yùn)營(yíng)商與SP的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)與合作模型,分析了運(yùn)營(yíng)商對(duì)SP的分流比例以及雙方合作的分成系數(shù),并結(jié)合實(shí)際案例驗(yàn)證了理論模型的合理性。在運(yùn)營(yíng)商與終端商關(guān)系研究中,分析了終端定制中的委托代理關(guān)系,針對(duì)運(yùn)營(yíng)商采取淺層終端定制策略建立運(yùn)營(yíng)商對(duì)終端商激勵(lì)的委托代理模型,計(jì)算了運(yùn)營(yíng)商對(duì)終端商的激勵(lì)強(qiáng)度,并結(jié)合實(shí)際案例論證了理論分析。第六章為結(jié)論與啟示。對(duì)本文的主要研究成果進(jìn)行了歸納總結(jié)。 本文可能的創(chuàng)新點(diǎn)有： 第一,運(yùn)用產(chǎn)業(yè)鏈融合一體化理論分析了電信產(chǎn)業(yè)價(jià)值鏈各主體的一體化轉(zhuǎn)型發(fā)展趨勢(shì)。價(jià)值鏈主體不斷向其他價(jià)值環(huán)節(jié)一體化轉(zhuǎn)型使得各主體之間的關(guān)系由原來(lái)單純的上下游供給關(guān)系變成了既合作又競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的關(guān)系。 第二,運(yùn)用改進(jìn)的Stackelberg模型構(gòu)造了電信運(yùn)營(yíng)商與SP之間的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)模型。目前的文獻(xiàn)對(duì)于運(yùn)營(yíng)商和SP之間的合作關(guān)系中的利益分配問(wèn)題研究較多,而對(duì)兩者之間競(jìng)爭(zhēng)關(guān)系研究較少。針對(duì)運(yùn)營(yíng)商進(jìn)入SP領(lǐng)域并且推出替代性業(yè)務(wù)的情況,本文借鑒Stackelberg模型建立了以運(yùn)營(yíng)商作為業(yè)務(wù)的追隨者、SP作為領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)模型。建立了運(yùn)營(yíng)商與SP合作的收入分成的合作模型,在合作模型中,借鑒了目前文獻(xiàn)將Stackelberg模型運(yùn)用與供應(yīng)鏈?zhǔn)杖牍蚕砟Ｐ头治龅难芯砍晒?分別研究了各自利益最大化及協(xié)商后整體利益最大化的合作模型,指出經(jīng)協(xié)商后合作雙方的利益能夠得到帕累托改進(jìn)。 第三,將運(yùn)營(yíng)商和終端商之間的關(guān)系抽象為競(jìng)爭(zhēng)合作的委托代理關(guān)系。本文運(yùn)營(yíng)商和終端廠商之間競(jìng)爭(zhēng)合作關(guān)系主要是指雙方都希望各自利益最大化,因此在合作中存在競(jìng)爭(zhēng)心理,在本文這種競(jìng)爭(zhēng)心理不是指業(yè)務(wù)競(jìng)爭(zhēng),而是從各自利益角度的一種復(fù)雜的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)心理。本文將電信產(chǎn)業(yè)價(jià)值鏈上主體——運(yùn)營(yíng)商與終端商之間的關(guān)系作為研究對(duì)象,通過(guò)建立委托代理模型解決雙方的矛盾心理。
[Abstract]:With the development of communication technology and the increasing demand for the content and quality of communication services, the data communication service has become an important power source to promote the profit growth of the operators. At the same time, the development of the telecom industry has also brought about the profound changes in the traditional telecom industry value chain model. Service providers (SP), virtual operators, application integrators and so on, promote the division of labor in the telecommunications industry further refinement. The new telecom industry value chain, while expanding the original telecommunications content, also produces new subdivision fission, and has more value links and value content.
With the development of data business, the structure of telecom industry value chain and the relationship between the main body are becoming more and more complex, and the whole value chain has gradually exposed some problems. First, the coordination between the value subjects is not smooth. The continuous development of the data business makes more and more SP join the value chain, and SP must pass through the network platform of the operator. The user provides information, service, as the cost of using the operator's network resources, SP must pay the communication fee to the operator. In addition, the business generation SP charges the information fee. SP needs to pay a certain amount of information to the operators. The settlement problem between the two sides has become the focus of the two sides. The battalion needs to adopt the terminal customization strategy, although the terminal customization strategy can solve the compatibility problem between the terminal and the new business, the operators face the marketing risk and the cost subsidy pressure, and the terminal merchants also face the risk of their own brand being desalinated. How to solve the contradiction between the two sides, we need to find a suitable incentive scheme. Second The main body development on the value chain of the credit industry is uneven. The equipment supplier has mastered the network technical standard, the terminal business has the technical advantage, both lead the development of the technology market together; the operators master the network resources, and the other intermediate service links need to use the operator's network platform to provide the intermediate service to the user, the operator's Office In the core position of the value chain, the middle link of the telecom industry is in a relatively weak position. In order to solve the problems existing in the telecommunications industry, we must straighten out the relationship between the various subjects on the value chain of the telecommunication industry.
The telecom industry value chain has developed into the integrated network structure in the 3G era. In order to maintain its own advantages and maximize the benefits, the telecom industry value chain will constantly transform into its own upstream and downstream links to transform the.3G era value-added service market potential, and have become an important source of profit for the value chain to participate in the main body. In this case, the operator is no longer satisfied with the role of the traditional network platform provider and gradually intervened in other value chain links. For example, China Mobile's mobile flying letter service has become a model for the operators' integration transformation. On the basis of the advantages of collaterals and user resources, business innovation is realized. Telecom operators transform into the integration of content service link. Facing their strategic partner SP, there is another layer of competitive relationship between them, thus forming a complex relationship of competition cooperation. According to business, terminal compatibility support is particularly important. Terminal customization has become the inevitable trend of operator strategy selection. In the process of terminal customization, both sides hope to maximize their own interests. The strategic competing relationship between the two sides refers to the competitive relationship between the two parties in the heart, a competitive psychology of interest and cooperation in business. In the study of the current theoretical literature, the research on the composition of the value chain of the telecommunication industry, the model of value chain, the trend of the value chain and the cooperation strategy among the various subjects on the value chain are mainly focused on the research and comparison of the competing relations between the various subjects on the value chain. In addition to studying the cooperative relationship between the vertical subjects of value chain, this paper also studies the relationship of interest competition among the main bodies.
This paper analyzes the trend of the integration transformation of the main body of the telecom industry value chain, and proves that the relationship between the main bodies of the telecom industry value chain is transformed from the original simple upstream and downstream supply relationship to the relationship between you and you, and on the basis of this, the choice of the cooperation and competition relationship between the main body of the value chain is analyzed. That is to say, operators should be the core and form a symbiotic and win-win relationship with other subjects. This will lay a foundation for the study of the CO opetition relationship between the operators and the SP terminal operators.
The complex relationship between the operators and the SP stems from the transition trend of the operators. The operators' transformation is based on the following two reasons: first, the operators' own development needs and technology, demand and the assimilation competition of the industrial value chain, and two, the huge development space of the value-added services objectively stimulates the operators to the SP value-added service field. The operators transform into the value-added service market and face the SP with both partners and competitors. The relationship between the two parties is subtle and uncertain. In this paper, the competition and cooperation model of the operators and SP is established. In the competition model, the operators point out that the operators are involved in the SP value-added service market, the operators are the followers of the market, and SP is The market leader, the operator can only partially divert SP revenue, when both reach the competitive equilibrium, the business volume and profit of the operators are less than SP. in the cooperation model, and use the Stackelberg model to use the income sharing contract in the supply chain, and establish the cooperation model of the maximization of the interests and the maximum benefit of the whole. The model is solved with the same conditions, the price of information service fee, the proportion of information income, the positive correlation between the profit and the market demand, and the negative correlation with the price elasticity coefficient. The cooperation under the model of the overall profit maximization can improve the interests of the two parties in Pareto. The competition of China Mobile and the Tencent will be applied. A case study is made to make an empirical analysis.
In order to develop their own value-added services, the operators adopt a terminal customization strategy. The level of the end merchant's efforts can not be observed by the operators, and there is a principal-agent relationship between the two parties. According to the depth of the terminal business customization, the relationship between the operators and the terminal is also different. The principal-agent model of both sides under the shallow terminal customization strategy. In the principal-agent model of the operators under the shallow end customization strategy, the best incentive intensity and the influencing factors of the operators to the terminal vendors are determined. Therefore, the operators should give the terminal manufacturers appropriate incentive intensity. Finally, the terminal customization of China Mobile is applied. An empirical study is carried out in the case
The specific chapters of this article are as follows:
The first chapter is the introduction part. First, it analyzes the background and significance of the research, and sums up the problems in the process of the development of the telecom industry value chain as a root problem: the development of the main body of the value chain of the telecom industry is not balanced, and the coordination between the various subjects is not smooth and so on, which leads to the low efficiency of the overall value creation. This paper studies the cooperation and competition relationship between the main bodies of the telecom industry value chain, and then briefly introduces the research content and key problems to be solved in this paper, and makes clear the research methods of this article.
The second chapter is the theoretical basis and literature review. It introduces the theoretical basis and literature review of this application, mainly including game theory and principal-agent theory, the integration theory of industrial chain integration, and summarizes the domestic and foreign research status of the telecom industry value chain, and the lack of theoretical research.
The third chapter is the composition of the telecom industry value chain. The evolution is compared with the domestic and foreign status. It introduces the composition, the evolution process and the influencing factors of the telecom industry value chain, and compares and analyzes the domestic and foreign telecom industry value chain model.
The fourth chapter analyzes the integration transformation trend of the telecom industry value subject and the selection mode of the cooperative competition relationship between the main bodies. Through the research on the integration of the various main bodies of the telecom industry value chain to the other value links, it is determined that the original supply relationship between the upper and lower reaches is transformed into the cooperative competition relationship between the main bodies and the operators. For example, the reasons for the transformation and the direction of transformation are analyzed from two aspects of theory and practice. In the case of the existence of cooperation and competition between the subject of value, the telecommunication industry is compared to the ecological system by reference to the research results of the existing literature, and the key species in the telecommunication industry ecosystem are pointed out, the telecom operators and the telecommunications industry are found. The relationship between the various subjects is a win-win relationship between the operators as the core and the other value subjects, thus laying the foundation for the research on the cooperation between the operators as the core and the SP and the terminal merchants.
The fifth chapter mainly uses the Stackelberg model theory to study the cooperation and competition relationship between the telecom operators and the SP. The principal agent theory is used to analyze the principal agent of the telecommunication industry value chain, the principal agent of the cooperative competition between the telecom operators and the terminal manufacturers. The model of competition and cooperation between operators and SP is established by game theory. The distribution ratio of operators to SP and the partition coefficient of cooperation are analyzed, and the rationality of the theoretical model is verified with actual cases. This paper takes the shallow layer terminal customization strategy to establish the principal agent model of the operator's incentive to the terminal merchants, calculates the incentive intensity of the operators to the terminal merchants, and demonstrates the theoretical analysis in combination with the actual cases. The sixth chapter is the conclusion and inspiration. The main research results of this paper are summarized.
The possible innovations in this article are as follows:
Firstly, the integration and integration theory of industrial chain integration is used to analyze the trend of the integration transformation of each subject in the value chain of the telecom industry. The integration of the subject of value chain to other value links makes the relationship between the main bodies become the relationship of both cooperation and competition from the original simple upstream and downstream supply relationship.
Second, the competitive model between telecom operators and SP is constructed by using the improved Stackelberg model. The current literature studies the problem of interest distribution in the cooperation relationship between operators and SP, but there is little research on the competition relationship between the two. Using the Stackelberg model as the followers of the business as the business, SP as the model of the leader's competition, the cooperation model of the revenue sharing between the operators and the SP is established. In the cooperation model, the research results of the current literature on the application of the Stackelberg model to the supply chain revenue sharing model are used for the study of the respective research results. After the maximization of interests and the maximization of the overall interests after negotiation, it is pointed out that after negotiation, the interests of the two parties can be improved by Pareto.
Third, the relationship between the operators and the terminal merchants is abstracted into the principal-agent relationship of competitive cooperation. The competition and cooperation relationship between the operator and the terminal manufacturer is mainly that both sides want to maximize their respective interests. Therefore, there is a competitive psychology in the cooperation. In this article, the competition psychology is not the business competition, but from their respective interests. In this paper, the relationship between the main body of the telecom industry value chain, the relationship between the operator and the terminal business, is taken as the research object, and the principal-agent model is established to solve the conflicting psychology of the two sides.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：西南財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類號(hào)】：F626

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本文編號(hào)：1894095