本文選題：網絡投資　切入點：競爭結構　出處：《北京郵電大學》2012年博士論文

【摘要】：電信業(yè)作為基礎設施產業(yè),網絡投資水平和網絡績效表現(xiàn)在市場競爭中起決定性作用。以往研究認為壟斷經營會導致網絡投資不足和效率低下,全球范圍內的改革實踐也表明電信業(yè)私有化和市場化改革可以同時促進網絡投資和提升效率。我國電信業(yè)雖然己進行了部分上市私有化和市場化改革,但市場競爭行為卻發(fā)生在同一國有投資主體內的電信運營商間,這樣的市場化改革模式在全球電信市場中尚屬特例。雖然該模式帶來了我國電信業(yè),特別是移動通信業(yè)的高速發(fā)展,但移動通信市場“競爭結構失衡”和“網絡過度投資”兩大問題也日益凸顯。然而,我國作為全球最大的移動通信市場,其市場競爭、網絡投資和網絡效率間關系尚未被研究,而我國電信運營商特有的同一國有投資主體的所有權性質的潛在影響也未被考慮。 本文在產業(yè)組織理論S-C-P范式——即市場結構(Market Structure)、市場行為(Market Conduct)、市場績效(Market Performance)——三者間關系基礎上納入所有權性質因素構建整體研究框架,并利用2003-2010年我國電信業(yè)省際移動通信發(fā)展數(shù)據構建實證分析模型,分析我國移動通信市場競爭結構、網絡投資行為、網絡資源利用效率三者間關系,并深入分析所有權對三者間關系的影響機理。 首先,結合國有電信運營商預算軟約束理論和以往電信業(yè)競爭與投資間關系研究結論,本文首次提出同一國有投資主體下電信運營商市場競爭結構和網絡投資關系的理論假設,并通過構建基于固定效應的靜態(tài)面板數(shù)據和基于廣義矩估計(GMM)的動態(tài)面板數(shù)據回歸模型對假設進行驗證。結果一致表明：我國移動通信市場競爭結構集中度與移動網絡投資正相關。相關實證結果驗證了本文所提出理論假設的正確性,即在同一國有投資主體內引入競爭時,不均衡的市場競爭結構會導致移動網絡投資規(guī)模增加。這與以往均衡性市場結構有利于網絡投資的理論和基于其他國家及地區(qū)的實證研究結果均相悖。本文分析指出,我國移動市場競爭結構和網絡投資行為間所表現(xiàn)出的特殊關系,根源在于同一國有投資主體下的國有電信運營商引入競爭后,不均衡的市場競爭結構會使電信運營商固有的預算軟約束問題顯性化,預算軟約束問題會提升非主導運營商擴大投資來提升網絡覆蓋以爭奪市場份額的激勵,而政府對主導運營商施加的政策性干預反而會使主導運營商同樣出現(xiàn)預算軟約束甚至棘輪效應問題,最終使電信運營商陷入“網絡投資戰(zhàn)”。 其次,本文進一步分析同一國有投資主體下電信運營商間市場競爭結構失衡所引發(fā)網絡投資的資源利用效率,即分析市場競爭結構和網絡資源利用效率之間的關系�？紤]到移動網絡特有的多層結構特征以及核心網(交換機)和接入網(基站和話音信道)投資需求的差異性,本文首次利用基于松弛變量測度的數(shù)據包絡分析模型(DEA-SBM)構建移動網絡整體效率和各層網絡要素利用率測度。測度結果顯示：我國移動網絡整體效率不高,投入要素核心網利用率較高,而接入網利用率偏低,且均具有明顯的東中西部經濟區(qū)域差異性,東部地區(qū)各項效率值均顯著高于中西部地區(qū)。此后,在移動網絡整體效率和各層網絡要素利用率評價結果基礎上,通過構建固定效應和Tobit面板數(shù)據回歸模型檢驗市場競爭結構與各類網絡效率的關系。實證結果顯示：市場競爭結構失衡不利于移動網絡整體效率；分層來看,市場競爭結構失衡也不利于核心網利用率,但有利于接入網利用率。 最后,研究結論表明：在同一國有投資主體下不均衡的市場競爭結構雖激發(fā)網絡投資但網絡效率低下,意味著嚴重失衡的移動市場競爭結構和移動網絡過度投資與重復建設現(xiàn)象間存在一定程度的關聯(lián),即當前市場競爭結構未能在促進網絡投資與提升資源效率間實現(xiàn)平衡。因此,在既定所有權結構下繼續(xù)促進市場競爭結構均衡與公平有效是必要的；但考慮當前移動市場互不共享的數(shù)網競爭模式,均衡競爭結構反而會導致接入網利用率降低,因此需同時加強網絡共建共享特別是3G大規(guī)模建設初期；長期來看,推動電信業(yè)投資主體多元化以及實現(xiàn)網業(yè)分離,以此削弱國有電信運營商在競爭中對網絡資源的依賴,并不斷完善電信管制機制與政策將有利于提升電信業(yè)長遠發(fā)展。
[Abstract]:As the telecommunications infrastructure industry, network investment and network performance play a decisive role in the market competition. Previous studies that monopoly will lead to insufficient investment and low efficiency of the network, the practice of reform within the scope of the global telecommunications industry also shows that privatization and marketization reform can also promote the network investment and improve the efficiency of China Telecom. Although the industry has been listed part of privatization and marketization reform, but the market competition behavior has occurred in the same state-owned investment entities within the telecom operators, so the market reform is the special pattern in the global telecommunications market. Although this model has brought China's telecom industry, especially the rapid development of mobile communication industry, but the mobile communication market competition structure imbalance "and" network over investment "two big problems have become increasingly prominent. However, in China as the world's largest mobile. The relationship between credit market, market competition, network investment and network efficiency has not been studied yet, and the potential impact of China's telecom operators on the ownership nature of the same state-owned investment entity has not been considered.
Based on the S-C-P paradigm of industrial organization theory, the market structure, market behavior (Market Structure) (Market Conduct), market performance (Market Performance) - the relationship between the three on the basis of the nature of ownership into the factors of constructing the overall research framework, and using empirical analysis model of mobile telecommunication industry of our country provincial communications development 2003-2010 years of data, analysis the competition structure of mobile communication market in China, the efficiency of network investment behavior, the relationship between the three use of cyber source, and in-depth analysis of the mechanism of effect of ownership on the relationship between the three.
First of all, combined with the conclusion of the relationship between competition and investment of state-owned telecom operators, the soft budget constraint theory and previous telecom industry, theoretical assumptions this paper proposes for the first time the same state-owned investment entities of telecom operators market competition structure and network investment relationship, and constructs the static panel data fixed effects based on the generalized moment estimation (GMM) the dynamic panel data regression model to verify the hypothesis. The results showed that: the competition structure of China mobile communication market concentration and mobile network investment correlation. The empirical results verify the correctness of the theoretical hypothesis, namely the introduction of competition in the same state-owned investment main body, market competition structure is not balanced the mobile network will lead to larger investment. This is conducive to the network investment and previous equilibrium market structure theory and Empirical Study Based on other countries and regions The results are inconsistent. This paper points out that the special relationship between China's mobile market competition structure and investment behavior between the network show, is the source of state-owned telecom operators with a state-owned investment entities under the introduction of competition, the soft budget constraint problem of market competition structure is not balanced will enable telecom operators inherent dominance that soft budget constraint will increase the non dominant operators to expand investment to improve the network coverage to compete for market share incentive, and government policy intervention of leading operators applied but will make the leading operators also budget constraint or ratchet effect, and ultimately enable telecom operators in the network investment war. "
Secondly, this paper further analyzes the telecom market competition between the investment structure imbalance caused by the network resource utilization efficiency of the same state-owned investment entities, namely the relationship between the efficiency analysis of market structure and cyber source. Considering the multi-layer mobile network specific structural features and core network (PBX) and access network (base station and voice channel) differences in investment demand, the data envelopment analysis model based on the measure of using slack variables for the first time (DEA-SBM) to construct the mobile network and the overall efficiency of each layer of network elements to measure utilization. The results showed that: China's mobile network overall efficiency is not high, input core network utilization rate is higher, and the access network utilization rate low, and there are differences in eastern and western economic area obviously, the efficiency of the eastern region were significantly higher than the Midwest. Since then, in the mobile network The overall efficiency and the utilization rate of each layer of network elements based on the evaluation results, through the construction of fixed effects and Tobit panel data regression model to test the market competition structure and efficiency of various types of network relationship. The empirical results show that: the market competition structure imbalance is not conducive to the overall efficiency of the mobile network; hierarchical view, market competition structure imbalance is not conducive to the core network utilization rate but, to access network utilization.
Finally, the conclusion of the study shows that: the market competition structure in the same state investors not balanced although stimulate network investment but the network efficiency is low, means that there exists a certain degree of correlation serious imbalance in the mobile market competition structure and mobile network over investment and repeated construction phenomenon, namely the market competition structure failed to promote the network investment and to achieve a balance between improving resource efficiency. Therefore, in the established ownership structure to continue to promote the balanced and fair and effective market competition structure is necessary; but considering the number of the current mobile network market mutual sharing competition mode, balanced competition structure will result in reduction of access network utilization, and therefore need to strengthen the network sharing especially 3G the large-scale construction period; the long term, to promote the diversification of investment subject and telecommunication network isolation, thus weakening the state-owned telecom operators The dependence on the network resources in the competition and the continuous improvement of the telecommunication control mechanism and policy will help to improve the long-term development of the telecommunication industry.

【學位授予單位】：北京郵電大學
【學位級別】：博士
【學位授予年份】：2012
【分類號】：F49;F626

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