The separation of ownership and control causes agency problems in many modern firms.Independent directors,who are often more objective than other board members,play an important role in corporate governance.Regulators around the world have introduced various policies,such as Cadbury Report and Sarbanes-Oxley Act,to encourage the adoption of an independent director system.In 2001,the China Securities Regulatory Commission（CSRC）issued the Guideline for Establishment of Independent Director System ... 

【文章來源】：上海交通大學(xué)上海市 211工程院校 985工程院校 教育部直屬院校

【文章頁數(shù)】：172 頁

【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：博士

【文章目錄】：
Abstract
Part Ⅰ Introduction
    Ⅰ Background
    Ⅱ Research Design
    Ⅲ Contributions
    Ⅳ Dissertation Structure
Part Ⅱ:Literature Review and Institutional Background
    Ⅰ Literature Review
    Ⅱ Institutional Background
Part Ⅲ:Voting Behavior of Independent Directors
    Ⅰ Introduction
    Ⅱ Theories and Research Design
        1 Voting Behavior
        2 Firm Value
        3 Firm-Level Determinants of Dissention
        4 Control Variables
    Ⅲ Results and Analysis
        1 Summary Statistics
        2 Voting Behavior and Firm Value
        3 Firm-Level Determinants of Dissention
        4 Robustness Check
    Ⅳ Conclusions and Policy Implications
Part Ⅳ:Individual Concerns Affecting Voting Behavior
    Ⅰ Introduction
    Ⅱ Theories and Research Design
        1 Voting Behavior
        2 Career Concern
        3 Compensation Concern
        4 Term Concern
        5 Reputation Concern
        6 Control Variables
    Ⅲ Results and Analysis
        1 Summary Statistics
        2 Career Concern
        3 Compensation Concern
        4 Term Concern
        5 Reputation Concern
        6 Robustness Check
    Ⅳ Conclusions and Policy Implications
Part Ⅴ:Heterogeneity across Firms
    Ⅰ Introduction
    Ⅱ Results and Analysis
        1 Summary Statistics
        2 Firm-Level Analysis
        3 Individual-Level Analysis
    Ⅲ Conclusions and Policy Implications
Part Ⅳ Conclusions and Policy Implications
    Ⅰ Conclusions
    Ⅱ Policy Implications
References
致謝
讀博期間學(xué)術(shù)成果


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期刊論文
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