【摘要】：研究在需求和產(chǎn)量均為隨機變量的情況下,帶有損失規(guī)避偏好的零售商之間的博弈.當多個相同的零售商向同一供應商訂購時,如果總需求按照每個零售商的訂購量在總訂購量中所占比例進行分配,則該博弈中存在唯一的對稱性Nash均衡,且總均衡訂購量關于損失規(guī)避水平遞減,關于零售商數(shù)量遞增.此外,如果損失規(guī)避水平(零售商數(shù)量)高于(低于)臨界值,則競爭情況下供應鏈總庫存水平比集中管理情況下的低.仿真實驗驗證了上述結(jié)果.
[Abstract]:This paper studies the game between retailers with loss aversion preference under the condition that demand and output are both random variables. When multiple same retailers order from the same supplier, if the aggregate demand is allocated according to the proportion of the order volume of each retailer, there is a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium in the game. And the total equilibrium order level of loss-aversion decline, about the number of retailers increasing. In addition, if the level of loss avoidance (the number of retailers) is above (below) the critical value, the total inventory level of the supply chain under competition is lower than that under centralized management. Simulation results verify the above results.
【作者單位】： 軍事經(jīng)濟學院基礎部;清華大學自動化系;湖北經(jīng)濟學院工商管理學院;
【基金】：國家自然科學基金項目(61273233) 高等學校博士點基金項目(20120002110035,20130002130010)
【分類號】：F274
，

本文編號：2144704