【摘要】：研究在需求和產(chǎn)量均為隨機(jī)變量的情況下,帶有損失規(guī)避偏好的零售商之間的博弈.當(dāng)多個(gè)相同的零售商向同一供應(yīng)商訂購(gòu)時(shí),如果總需求按照每個(gè)零售商的訂購(gòu)量在總訂購(gòu)量中所占比例進(jìn)行分配,則該博弈中存在唯一的對(duì)稱性Nash均衡,且總均衡訂購(gòu)量關(guān)于損失規(guī)避水平遞減,關(guān)于零售商數(shù)量遞增.此外,如果損失規(guī)避水平(零售商數(shù)量)高于(低于)臨界值,則競(jìng)爭(zhēng)情況下供應(yīng)鏈總庫(kù)存水平比集中管理情況下的低.仿真實(shí)驗(yàn)驗(yàn)證了上述結(jié)果.
[Abstract]:This paper studies the game between retailers with loss aversion preference under the condition that demand and output are both random variables. When multiple same retailers order from the same supplier, if the aggregate demand is allocated according to the proportion of the order volume of each retailer, there is a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium in the game. And the total equilibrium order level of loss-aversion decline, about the number of retailers increasing. In addition, if the level of loss avoidance (the number of retailers) is above (below) the critical value, the total inventory level of the supply chain under competition is lower than that under centralized management. Simulation results verify the above results.
【作者單位】： 軍事經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)院基礎(chǔ)部;清華大學(xué)自動(dòng)化系;湖北經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)院工商管理學(xué)院;
【基金】：國(guó)家自然科學(xué)基金項(xiàng)目(61273233) 高等學(xué)校博士點(diǎn)基金項(xiàng)目(20120002110035,20130002130010)
【分類號(hào)】：F274
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本文編號(hào)：2144703