本文關(guān)鍵詞： 審計(jì)合謀治理 審計(jì)關(guān)系人 審計(jì)合謀利益關(guān)系主體 利益均衡　出處：《湖南大學(xué)》2008年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】： 現(xiàn)實(shí)審計(jì)環(huán)境的復(fù)雜性,導(dǎo)致了審計(jì)關(guān)系人的現(xiàn)實(shí)角色與理想角色的錯(cuò)位和扭曲,審計(jì)關(guān)系人的正當(dāng)利益失去應(yīng)有的保護(hù),進(jìn)而導(dǎo)致了審計(jì)合謀的產(chǎn)生,而審計(jì)合謀又進(jìn)一步加劇了審計(jì)關(guān)系失衡。審計(jì)合謀之所以一直未能得到有效的治理,究其原因關(guān)鍵還是在于審計(jì)關(guān)系人利益分割不公平或不合法及其權(quán)責(zé)利不明晰。審計(jì)合謀治理是一個(gè)世界性的難題。因此,研究審計(jì)合謀治理在理論上和實(shí)務(wù)上都具有重要意義。 本文以信息不對稱理論、有限政府理論、審計(jì)合謀共生理論和投資者保護(hù)的法律論等作為研究的理論基礎(chǔ)。本文首先對審計(jì)關(guān)系人的范疇予以重新界定,將預(yù)期審計(jì)報(bào)告使用者納入審計(jì)關(guān)系人范疇以取代傳統(tǒng)審計(jì)關(guān)系下的委托者。并且將作為監(jiān)管者的政府與新審計(jì)關(guān)系人一同納入審計(jì)合謀利益關(guān)系主體的范疇。認(rèn)為當(dāng)審計(jì)合謀泛濫時(shí),作為監(jiān)管者的政府應(yīng)當(dāng)承擔(dān)政策失誤和監(jiān)管無效的社會(huì)責(zé)任和行政責(zé)任。然后,結(jié)合我國的國情分析了審計(jì)關(guān)系人利益失衡的原因和審計(jì)合謀機(jī)理,認(rèn)為審計(jì)關(guān)系人的經(jīng)濟(jì)人特性和審計(jì)環(huán)境的復(fù)雜性決定了審計(jì)合謀是各方利益主體之間的一個(gè)長期共存和博弈的過程,并對此進(jìn)行博弈分析和案例分析。提出被審計(jì)者的信息權(quán)優(yōu)勢決定了其相對于審計(jì)者而言應(yīng)當(dāng)為審計(jì)合謀的后果承擔(dān)更大的責(zé)任,同時(shí)認(rèn)為預(yù)期審計(jì)報(bào)告使用者擁有獲取真實(shí)而完整的審計(jì)信息的權(quán)力和投資損失的有限求償權(quán)。本文通過利益均衡分析,最后立足于國情提出審計(jì)合謀治理應(yīng)當(dāng)遵循的思路是:被審計(jì)者和審計(jì)者有效自我約束、委托者有效監(jiān)督、政府有效監(jiān)管和投資者有效信賴。并提出審計(jì)合謀的“三維治理觀”,即動(dòng)機(jī)誘正、過程控制以及結(jié)果的監(jiān)督和懲戒。
[Abstract]:The complexity of the reality of audit environment, leads to the reality of the role of the auditors and the ideal role of dislocation and distortion of the legitimate interests of the auditors lose their protection, which led to the audit collusion, and audit collusion and further aggravate the imbalance of audit relationship. The audit collusion has not been effective governance, the key the reason is that the audit stakeholder segmentation of unfair or unlawful power and responsibility are not clear. Audit collusion is a worldwide problem. Therefore, research on the governance of audit collusion in theory and practice are of great significance.
Based on the information asymmetry theory, the theory of limited government, audit collusion symbiosis theory and investor protection law theory as the theoretical basis for research. This paper first category to redefine the relationship between the audit, the audit report users into the expected auditrelationshipparties category to replace the traditional auditing relationship under the client and will serve as the people. The relationship between the government and the new audit regulators into the audit subject interests collusion category. It is thought that when the audit collusion flood, the government as the regulator should undertake policy mistakes and non effective supervision of social responsibility and administrative responsibility. Then, combined with China's national conditions and analyzes the causes and mechanism of audit collusion audit stakeholder imbalance. That the complexity of the economic characteristics of people and the relationship between the audit environment audit determines the audit collusion is a long-term between the main interests of all parties The process of coexistence and game theory, and analyzes this game analysis and case. Put forward the audit information advantage of the right to determine its relative to the auditors should take greater responsibility for audit collusion, at the same time that the expected audit report users have access to real and complete the limited audit information of power and investment losses right. Through the interest equilibrium analysis, finally put forward based on the audit collusion governance should follow the ideas on the situation is: the audit and audit effective self-discipline, entrust the effective supervision, government supervision and effective investors trust. And put forward the "three audit collusion governance view, namely incentive, supervision and process control and the results and punishment.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：湖南大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2008
【分類號】：F239.0;F224

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