本文選題：高鐵時代 + 城際通道��； 參考：《重慶交通大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：交通運輸業(yè)是國民經(jīng)濟發(fā)展中極為重要的載體之一,為社會經(jīng)濟發(fā)展創(chuàng)造了前提條件,雖然我國交通事業(yè)發(fā)展迅猛,但是目前我國的交通運輸業(yè)也還存在不少問題:基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施建設(shè)總體規(guī)模偏小,整個產(chǎn)業(yè)技術(shù)水平偏低,交通行業(yè)發(fā)展速度也和社會經(jīng)濟發(fā)展對交通運輸?shù)男枨蟛幌嗥ヅ?交通基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施的整體布局也不利于城市群和區(qū)域間的協(xié)調(diào)發(fā)展。為達(dá)到國家交通建設(shè)的長期目標(biāo)和要求,需增加交通輻射范圍,優(yōu)化運輸結(jié)構(gòu),提高運輸質(zhì)量,加大運輸能力,提高技術(shù)裝備水平。隨著鐵路建設(shè)的加快,公路客運必會受到強烈的沖擊,城際公路客運受影響更為嚴(yán)重,公路客運主體面臨如此強大的競爭對手,競爭壓力空前巨大。為了深入研究城際公鐵競爭,最終達(dá)到城際公鐵能夠協(xié)調(diào)發(fā)展的目的,本文重點研究了旅客出行規(guī)律和基于票價的非合作二人博弈。首先闡述了傳統(tǒng)城際間公鐵客運和高鐵時代背景下公鐵客運的技術(shù)經(jīng)濟特征,分析得到由于在高鐵時代影響下,特別是在城際客運市場中,公路客運愈發(fā)劣勢,鐵路客運重新占據(jù)了絕對優(yōu)勢。并對已開通高鐵的成渝和渝萬客運通道運行情況進(jìn)行分析,選擇渝萬運輸通道內(nèi)的客流,針對出行特征發(fā)起問卷調(diào)查,根據(jù)調(diào)查數(shù)據(jù),分析選擇產(chǎn)品特征、旅客主觀屬性、出行客觀特性,整理分析出城際通道內(nèi)的旅客的構(gòu)成以及偏好,并計算出影響因素權(quán)重。然后運用博弈論的相關(guān)知識對城際客運通道內(nèi)的公鐵客運博弈關(guān)系進(jìn)行分析,選擇非合作博弈的相關(guān)理論,建立非合作二人博弈模型,研究選取票價策略對客運量分擔(dān)率和收益的影響,并給出計算博弈模型的Lemke-Howson算法和實現(xiàn)算法的LINGO軟件。最后以重慶到萬州運輸通道為實例,對建立的模型和算法進(jìn)行驗證。對渝萬客運通道基本情況作簡單描述后,根據(jù)本文的理論基礎(chǔ)和模型算法,列出影響參數(shù),給出效應(yīng)函數(shù),最后運用LINGO實現(xiàn)Lemke-Howson算法,得出納什均衡結(jié)果,再對結(jié)果做出分析。為了實現(xiàn)城際運輸方式的供應(yīng)與客流需求的相適應(yīng),既要使得運輸通道內(nèi)客流在出行方式之間的優(yōu)化分配,也要使城際運輸方式自身保證市場平衡,除了價格策略外,文章末尾為城際公鐵客運協(xié)同發(fā)展提供了幾條參考策略。
[Abstract]:Transportation is one of the most important carriers in the development of the national economy, which has created the precondition for the social and economic development, although the transportation industry in our country has developed rapidly. However, at present, there are still many problems in China's transportation industry: the overall scale of infrastructure construction is small, the level of industry technology is on the low side, and the speed of development of transportation industry does not match with the demand of social and economic development for transportation. The overall layout of transportation infrastructure is not conducive to the coordinated development of urban agglomerations and regions. In order to achieve the long-term goal and requirement of national traffic construction, it is necessary to increase the range of traffic radiation, optimize the transportation structure, improve the quality of transportation, increase the capacity of transportation and raise the level of technical equipment. With the acceleration of railway construction, highway passenger transport will be strongly impacted, and the intercity highway passenger transport will be more seriously affected. The main body of highway passenger transport is facing such powerful competitors, and the competition pressure is unprecedented. In order to study the inter-city rail competition and finally achieve the goal of coordinated development of inter-city railway, this paper focuses on the study of passenger travel law and non-cooperative two-person game based on ticket price. Firstly, the technical and economic characteristics of traditional inter-city rail transport and high-speed railway passenger transport are expounded, and the analysis shows that road passenger transport becomes more inferior under the influence of high-speed rail era, especially in the inter-city passenger transport market. Railway passenger transport has regained its absolute advantage. It also analyzes the running situation of Chengdu-Chongqing and Yu-Wan passenger transport channels, selects the passenger flow in Yu-wan transport channel, carries out a questionnaire survey according to the travel characteristics, analyzes and selects the product characteristics and the subjective attributes of passengers according to the survey data. The objective characteristics of travel are analyzed, and the composition and preference of passengers in the intercity passage are analyzed, and the weight of the influencing factors is calculated. Then the game theory is used to analyze the game relationship between the public and railway passenger transport in the intercity passenger transport channel, and the non-cooperative two-person game model is established by selecting the relevant theory of non-cooperative game. This paper studies the influence of ticket price strategy on the share rate and income of passenger volume, and gives the Lemke-Howson algorithm for calculating game model and the LINGO software for implementing the algorithm. Finally, take Chongqing to Wanzhou transportation channel as an example to verify the established model and algorithm. After a brief description of the basic situation of Yu-Wan passenger transport corridor, according to the theoretical basis and model algorithm of this paper, the influence parameters are listed, and the effect function is given. Finally, the Lemke-Howson algorithm is implemented by using LINGO, and the Nash equilibrium result is obtained, and the result is analyzed. In order to adapt the supply of intercity transportation mode to the demand of passenger flow, it is necessary to optimize the distribution of passenger flow between travel modes in the transportation channel and to ensure the market balance of intercity transportation mode itself, except for price strategy. At the end of the article, several reference strategies are provided for the coordinated development of intercity railway passenger transport.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：重慶交通大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F512;U116

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本文編號：1965327