機(jī)構(gòu)投資者異質(zhì)性對(duì)高管變更影響的實(shí)證研究
[Abstract]:With the vigorous development of institutional investors in China's capital market and the rapid rise of their status, the role of institutional investors in the corporate governance mechanism has attracted more and more attention. At present, with the introduction of more and more formal professional institutions, whether the institutional investors can effectively drive their supervisory power will have a significant impact on the making of major decisions of the company. The change of executive position, especially the involuntary change of executive position, as a major event of the company, can reflect the change of the company's performance and the management of the company in a certain way. By making this decision, we can also reflect the attitude of corporate managers and regulators, so that we can further consider the enthusiasm of institutional investors, as the new forces of regulators, to participate in corporate governance. However, different types of institutional investors, due to their own characteristics and differences in investment preferences, are not willing or able to play their supervisory and managerial role. Therefore, what role does institutional investors play in corporate governance? What role does it play, and what kind of relationship does it have with listed companies? This article will carry on the empirical analysis research to the above question. In this paper, we choose the research perspective of senior management position change, and select listed companies with Shanghai and Shenzhen A shares which have changed executives involuntarily from 2011-2013 as the research sample, on the basis of classifying institutional investors as stress-sensitive and pressure-resistant. To further empirically study the actual impact of institutional investor participation in corporate governance on executive position change, which is a major decision of the company. After empirical analysis, the results show that the higher the proportion of institutional investors' overall ownership, the less likely it is for executives to change involuntarily as a result of performance decline. This shows that institutional investors usually do not play an active and effective regulatory role in corporate governance; The influence of pressure sensitive institutional investors is not significant, and pressure resistance institutional investors usually participate actively in corporate governance in the case of high shareholding ratio. To sum up, this paper believes that the enthusiasm and supervision of institutional investors to participate in corporate governance need to be further strengthened.
【學(xué)位授予單位】:遼寧大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】:碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】:2015
【分類號(hào)】:F272.91;F832.51
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