本文選題：費用索賠　切入點：索賠戰(zhàn)略決策　出處：《西南科技大學》2015年碩士論文　論文類型：學位論文

【摘要】：索賠是建設(shè)工程中正常的經(jīng)濟現(xiàn)象,是承發(fā)包雙方維護自身合法權(quán)益的正當手段,但由于建設(shè)工程索賠在我國起步較晚,索賠管理仍然是工程項目管理中的一個薄弱環(huán)節(jié),在索賠管理中,費用索賠又是其核心內(nèi)容。而索賠決策做為工程索賠管理的關(guān)鍵,直接關(guān)系到索賠的成功與否,科學的決策能使索賠雙方在實現(xiàn)利益最大化的情況下,就索賠結(jié)果協(xié)商一致,而不至于引發(fā)訴訟。因此,文章應(yīng)用博弈論,研究了業(yè)主與承包商在費用索賠全過程中的一系列決策問題,并將建設(shè)工程費用索賠分為三個階段:索賠決策前分析、索賠戰(zhàn)略性決策以及索賠協(xié)商戰(zhàn)術(shù)性決策階段。在索賠決策前階段,文章首先通過合同狀態(tài)分析來引入索賠機會的概念,并分析總結(jié)了承包商在索賠決策前的必要準備工作,包括索賠機會識別、索賠事件分析、索賠依據(jù)搜集;在索賠戰(zhàn)略性決策階段,文章基于博弈論,建立了完全且完美信息條件下的索賠戰(zhàn)略決策動態(tài)博弈模型,應(yīng)用逆推歸納法,研究了業(yè)主與承包商關(guān)于索賠與不索賠、協(xié)商與不協(xié)商、接受協(xié)商與選擇訴訟等戰(zhàn)略性決策問題,并求出雙方在不同得益情況下的均衡路徑;在索賠協(xié)商戰(zhàn)術(shù)性決策階段,文章建立了業(yè)主與承包商索賠討價還價戰(zhàn)術(shù)決策的雙邊博弈模型,應(yīng)用貝葉斯(Bayes)理論和Zeuthen談判策略,研究了業(yè)主與承包商在進一步選擇協(xié)商情況下的具體討價還價協(xié)商過程,并求出了雙邊博弈的均衡解。最后,文章通過具體的案例應(yīng)用,驗證了討價還價雙邊博弈的均衡解符合帕累托最優(yōu),說明文章建立的博弈模型可以為現(xiàn)實中的工程索賠提供一定的參考和借鑒作用。
[Abstract]:The claim for compensation is a normal economic phenomenon in the construction project and a proper means for both the contracting parties to safeguard their legitimate rights and interests. However, because the claim for construction project started relatively late in our country, claim management is still a weak link in the project management. In the claim management, the cost claim is the core content, and the claim decision, as the key of the engineering claim management, is directly related to the success of the claim. Therefore, the paper applies game theory to study a series of decision-making problems between the owner and the contractor in the whole process of claim for expenses. The claim for construction project cost is divided into three stages: the analysis before the claim decision, the strategic decision of the claim and the tactical decision of the claim negotiation. Firstly, this paper introduces the concept of claim opportunity through contract state analysis, and analyzes and summarizes the necessary preparation work of contractor before claim decision, including claim opportunity identification, claim event analysis and claim basis collection. In the strategic decision-making stage of claim, based on game theory, this paper establishes a dynamic game model of claim strategic decision under complete and perfect information, and applies the method of inverse induction to study the claims and non-claims of the employer and contractor. Consultation and non-negotiation, acceptance of strategic decision-making issues such as consultation and selection litigation, and finding out the balanced path of both parties in different situations of benefit; in the tactical decision-making stage of claim negotiation, In this paper, a two-sided game model of bargaining tactical decision between employer and contractor is established. By applying Bayesian Bayes theory and Zeuthen negotiation strategy, the concrete bargaining negotiation process between owner and contractor is studied under the condition of further selection and negotiation. Finally, the paper verifies that the equilibrium solution of bilateral bargaining game accords with Pareto optimal. It shows that the game model established in this paper can provide a certain reference and reference for engineering claims in reality.
【學位授予單位】：西南科技大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2015
【分類號】：TU723.3

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本文編號：1628733