發(fā)布時(shí)間：2018-02-13 21:57

  本文關(guān)鍵詞： 地方政府行為 技術(shù)選擇指數(shù) 政府收入份額 勞動(dòng)收入份額　出處：《浙江大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：伴隨我國以經(jīng)濟(jì)增長為主的錦標(biāo)賽式政績考核體系,地方政府官員為了個(gè)人晉升的政治利益及經(jīng)濟(jì)利益紛紛選擇大力發(fā)展轄區(qū)經(jīng)濟(jì),尤其是致力于提升地區(qū)生產(chǎn)總值,并且盡可能獲取更多資源以發(fā)展經(jīng)濟(jì)。1994年分稅制改革后,地方政府成為了相對獨(dú)立的利益主體。然而,既定轄區(qū)內(nèi)的資源是有限的,地方政府為了擴(kuò)大自身利益就要爭取更多生產(chǎn)要素。以國企改制、非公有制經(jīng)濟(jì)為代表的市場化改革提升了生產(chǎn)要素的流動(dòng)性,從而地方政府的生產(chǎn)要素之爭具備了操作層面的可行性。由于地方政府擁有對土地的控制權(quán),因此為了招商引資,地方政府通常采取增加土地供給、低價(jià)提供土地的手段來吸引投資者;此外,地方政府還會(huì)通過提供各種形式的補(bǔ)貼來吸引投資者。通過上述方式,地方政府吸引更多資本進(jìn)入本轄區(qū),實(shí)現(xiàn)經(jīng)濟(jì)增長和擴(kuò)大財(cái)政收入的目標(biāo),從而助力職位晉升。但是,這種經(jīng)濟(jì)增長方式本身卻存在問題,尤其是給收入分配造成了不可忽視的負(fù)面影響。首先,地方政府以較低價(jià)格來吸引資本,降低了企業(yè)的成本,資本收益率提高。在勞動(dòng)價(jià)格不變的情況下,勞動(dòng)收入份額降低,資本收入份額增加。同時(shí)由于資本密集型產(chǎn)業(yè)通常具有較長的產(chǎn)業(yè)鏈,對區(qū)域經(jīng)濟(jì)的拉動(dòng)作用更加明顯,地方政府也更加傾向于對資本密集型產(chǎn)業(yè)給予優(yōu)惠,因而資本密集型企業(yè)成長更快,導(dǎo)致資本收入份額提高。另外,勞資的議價(jià)能力存在差異,更加不利于收入分配。本文通過Acemoglu渠道檢驗(yàn)方法對該傳導(dǎo)機(jī)制進(jìn)行了檢驗(yàn),結(jié)果表明地方政府通過控制土地來影響技術(shù)選擇,最終對勞動(dòng)收入份額產(chǎn)生影響。然而,大力招商引資發(fā)展經(jīng)濟(jì)的時(shí)代背景已經(jīng)改變,而且收入分配不均問題已不容忽視。我國的這種基于地方政府競爭行為的特殊的經(jīng)濟(jì)增長方式嚴(yán)重扭曲了收入分配狀況。因此,由發(fā)展型政府轉(zhuǎn)型為服務(wù)型政府非常迫切,政府改革現(xiàn)有的官員激勵(lì)機(jī)制,并且因地制宜發(fā)展經(jīng)濟(jì),實(shí)現(xiàn)經(jīng)濟(jì)健康發(fā)展。
[Abstract]:Along with our country's tournament-type performance appraisal system, which is mainly based on economic growth, local government officials have chosen to develop the economy of the jurisdiction one after another for the political and economic interests of personal promotion, especially in promoting the regional gross domestic product. And get as much resources as possible to develop the economy. After the tax distribution reform in 1994, local governments became relatively independent stakeholders. However, resources in established jurisdictions were limited. In order to expand their own interests, local governments must strive for more factors of production. The market-oriented reform, represented by the reform of state-owned enterprises and the non-public sector of the economy, has enhanced the mobility of production factors. As a result, the argument over factors of production by local governments is feasible at an operational level. Because local governments have control over land, in order to attract investment, local governments usually increase the supply of land. In addition, local governments attract investors by offering various forms of subsidies. In this way, local governments attract more capital into their jurisdictions. Achieving the goal of economic growth and expanding fiscal revenue, thereby contributing to the promotion of posts... however, this pattern of economic growth itself has problems, especially with regard to the negative impact on income distribution that cannot be ignored... first of all, Local governments attract capital at lower prices, reducing the cost of enterprises and raising the rate of return on capital. The share of labor income decreases when the price of labor remains unchanged. At the same time, because capital-intensive industries usually have a longer industrial chain, the pull effect on regional economy is more obvious, and local governments are more inclined to give preferential treatment to capital-intensive industries. As a result, capital-intensive enterprises grow faster, leading to the increase of capital income share. In addition, there are differences in bargaining power between labor and capital, which is even more detrimental to income distribution. This paper tests the transmission mechanism through Acemoglu channel test method. The results show that local governments influence the choice of technology by controlling land, and ultimately affect the share of labor income. However, the background of vigorously attracting investment to develop the economy has changed. Moreover, the problem of uneven income distribution can not be ignored. The special economic growth mode based on the competitive behavior of local governments in China has seriously distorted the income distribution situation. Therefore, it is very urgent to transform from a developmental government to a service-oriented government. The government reforms the existing official incentive mechanism, and develops the economy according to the local conditions, realizes the economic healthy development.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：浙江大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：D630;F812.41

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