發(fā)布時(shí)間：2018-01-22 03:22

  本文關(guān)鍵詞： 薪酬委員會(huì) 薪酬水平 薪酬差距 薪酬公平性 公司業(yè)績(jī)　出處：《四川師范大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文　論文類(lèi)型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：在以人為本的當(dāng)今社會(huì),高管作為企業(yè)重要的人力資本,在企業(yè)發(fā)展中起著舉足輕重的作用。薪酬契約是激勵(lì)高管的常見(jiàn)手段之一,如何實(shí)現(xiàn)對(duì)高管的有效激勵(lì)成為亟待解決的問(wèn)題。自2007年次貸危機(jī)引起金融危機(jī)以來(lái),多國(guó)政府相繼出臺(tái)各類(lèi)薪酬治理政策;我國(guó)也于2009年9月16日頒布“限薪令”,關(guān)于我國(guó)薪酬治理問(wèn)題的研究也進(jìn)一步引起學(xué)界關(guān)注。2007年12月,中國(guó)證監(jiān)會(huì)首次明確要求上市公司應(yīng)在2007年度報(bào)告中披露“董事會(huì)下設(shè)審計(jì)委員會(huì)的履職情況匯總報(bào)告和薪酬委員會(huì)的履職情況匯總報(bào)告”,進(jìn)一步強(qiáng)化了我國(guó)上市公司對(duì)薪酬委員的治理。薪酬委員會(huì)成員的特征在不同公司具有較強(qiáng)的多樣性,探究其對(duì)高管薪酬、乃至公司業(yè)績(jī)的影響方式有助于提高公司治理水平�；诖�,本文試圖探尋薪酬委員會(huì)成員特征對(duì)公司業(yè)績(jī)的影響路徑,并探索薪酬激勵(lì)在該路徑中發(fā)揮的作用。通過(guò)研究,本文得到以下結(jié)論。第一,具有審計(jì)背景薪酬委員會(huì)成員的公司,其高管薪酬水平較低、薪酬差距較小、公平性較強(qiáng),公司業(yè)績(jī)有一定程度下降;第二,具有高校背景薪酬委員會(huì)成員的公司,其高管薪酬水平較高、薪酬差距較大、公平性較弱,公司業(yè)績(jī)有一定程度提高;第三,具有女性薪酬委員會(huì)成員的公司,其高管薪酬水平較低、薪酬差距較小、公平性較強(qiáng),公司業(yè)績(jī)有一定程度降低。本文從薪酬委員會(huì)成員特征的新視角,從高管薪酬水平、薪酬差距和薪酬公平性等方面豐富了有關(guān)薪酬激勵(lì)的研究?jī)?nèi)容,進(jìn)而提出有助于為薪酬治理乃至公司治理提供人力資源配備、薪酬設(shè)計(jì)等方面的新思路。因此,本文不僅在理論層面有助于拓展與豐富薪酬委員會(huì)有關(guān)研究文獻(xiàn),在實(shí)踐方面也有助于加強(qiáng)與提高薪酬委員會(huì)治理效應(yīng)。
[Abstract]:In the people-oriented society, executives, as an important human capital, play an important role in the development of enterprises. The salary contract is one of the common means to motivate executives. Since 2007, the subprime mortgage crisis has caused the financial crisis, the governments of many countries have introduced various kinds of salary governance policies. Our country also issued the "salary restriction order" on September 16th 2009, and the research on the issue of salary governance in our country also aroused the attention of the academic circles further. December 2007. For the first time, CSRC explicitly requires listed companies to disclose in their 2007 annual reports "the summary report on the performance of duties of the audit committee under the board of directors and the summary report on the performance of duties of the remuneration committee". It further strengthens the governance of compensation committee members of listed companies in China. The characteristics of compensation committee members in different companies have a strong diversity, explore its executive compensation. Based on this, this paper tries to explore the impact of the characteristics of compensation committee members on corporate performance. And explore the role of compensation incentive in the path. Through the study, this paper draws the following conclusions. First, the executive pay level is lower and the pay gap is small for the companies with audit background compensation committee members. The fairness is strong, the company's performance has a certain degree of decline; Second, the company with college background compensation committee member, its executive compensation level is higher, the pay gap is bigger, the fairness is weaker, the company performance has the certain degree enhancement; Third, the company with female compensation committee members, its executive pay level is lower, pay gap is smaller, fairness is stronger, corporate performance has a certain degree of decline. This paper from a new perspective of the characteristics of compensation committee members. From the executive compensation level, pay gap and compensation fairness, etc., it enriches the research content of compensation incentive, and then proposes to help provide human resources for compensation governance and even corporate governance. Therefore, this paper not only helps to expand and enrich the relevant literature of compensation committee in theory, but also to strengthen and improve the governance effect of compensation committee in practice.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：四川師范大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：F272.92

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