本文選題：著作權(quán)性質(zhì) + 著作人身權(quán)　； 參考：《北京化工大學(xué)》2013年碩士論文

【摘要】：著作權(quán)作為圍繞著作品產(chǎn)生的一系列權(quán)利的集合體，其定性問題頗顯復(fù)雜，而且非常重要，因為這是研究著作權(quán)其他問題不可或缺的，也最富于理論性、最能夠展示著作權(quán)較之于其他財產(chǎn)權(quán)的不同之處的。本文將從人身權(quán)和財產(chǎn)權(quán)的角度來挖掘著作權(quán)之表土，探索性質(zhì)之真相。 在整個著作權(quán)體系中，被劃歸為“著作財產(chǎn)權(quán)”這部分子權(quán)利的性質(zhì)向來無甚爭議，，只有署名權(quán)在內(nèi)的幾種被稱為“著作人身權(quán)”的權(quán)利攪亂了一池春水。本文雖意在探討著作權(quán)的性質(zhì)，但只需令這個權(quán)利池內(nèi)具體的署名權(quán)、修改權(quán)等“待證著作權(quán)”的性質(zhì)蓋棺定論，整個著作權(quán)的性質(zhì)也就不言自明了。 文中，首先實證地考察了能體現(xiàn)著作權(quán)性質(zhì)立場的學(xué)理研究與立法實踐。通過對比分析發(fā)現(xiàn)，有關(guān)著作權(quán)性質(zhì)的學(xué)說形形色色，其中獨占鰲頭的是著作人身權(quán)說。但是通過聯(lián)系社會生活和學(xué)說理論的發(fā)展路徑，可知著作人身權(quán)說不過是歷史偶然地選擇了切合當(dāng)時社會利益取向的理論，其已經(jīng)喪失了最初存在的合理性基礎(chǔ)。但是這并非否定著作權(quán)體現(xiàn)的人身利益，本文在質(zhì)疑著作人身權(quán)說的同時也堅持著應(yīng)當(dāng)保護署名權(quán)等權(quán)利的立場。 文章接下來通過分析著作權(quán)的權(quán)利客體——“作品”得知，既然著作權(quán)的唯一客體是作品，且作品是由法律所庇護、規(guī)制的財產(chǎn)，則順理成章地推出著作權(quán)的性質(zhì)應(yīng)當(dāng)是無雜質(zhì)、單一的財產(chǎn)權(quán)，著作權(quán)之中不可能并存著人身權(quán)，否則是不符合對權(quán)利客體的分析的。 本文再進一步就發(fā)表權(quán)等權(quán)利一一做出具體分析，發(fā)現(xiàn)人身權(quán)并不存在于著作權(quán)的任何角落，這些權(quán)利并不適宜類比于民法基礎(chǔ)理論中的諸項人身權(quán)，據(jù)此排除了著作權(quán)法對民法人身權(quán)做出重復(fù)性規(guī)定的可能性。 通過探討著作權(quán)的本質(zhì)內(nèi)核，本文還原了著作權(quán)的財產(chǎn)性，這是一種不同于早期舊式古典著作財產(chǎn)權(quán)學(xué)說的新式定位，這樣不僅讓整個知識產(chǎn)權(quán)體系在邏輯上更加連貫統(tǒng)一，也能夠更好地解決實踐中著作人身權(quán)說顯現(xiàn)的諸多困境，從而激勵作者創(chuàng)作，使作品市場更加多姿多彩。
[Abstract]:As a collection of rights around the works, the qualitative problem of copyright is very complicated and important, because it is indispensable to the study of other issues of copyright, and is also the most theoretical. Best able to show the differences between copyright and other property rights. This paper will explore the nature of copyright from the perspective of personal rights and property rights. In the whole copyright system, the nature of the sub-rights classified as "the property right of works" has always been undisputed, only several kinds of rights, such as the right of authorship, which are called "personal rights of works", have disturbed a pool of spring water. Although the purpose of this paper is to explore the nature of copyright, it is only necessary to make the nature of "pending copyright", such as the right of signature and the right of amendment, to be finalized, so that the nature of the whole copyright is self-evident. In this paper, we first empirically investigate the theoretical research and legislative practice which can embody the position of copyright nature. Through comparative analysis, it is found that there are many kinds of theories about the nature of copyright, among which the author's personal right theory dominates. However, by connecting with the development path of social life and theory, we can see that the theory of personal right of works is only a theory which has been chosen by chance by history and which has lost the rational foundation of its initial existence. However, this is not to deny the personal interests of copyright, this paper questions the author's personal rights, but also insists on the position of protecting the rights of authorship and other rights. Next, by analyzing the right object of copyright-"work", the article finds out that since the only object of copyright is the work, and the work is protected by the law, it is regulated property. Therefore, the nature of the copyright should be impurity free, a single property right, and the personal right cannot coexist in the copyright, otherwise, it is not in conformity with the analysis of the object of the right. Further more, this paper makes a specific analysis of the rights of publication, and finds that the personal rights do not exist in any corner of copyright, and these rights are not suitable for analogy to the personal rights in the basic theory of civil law. Accordingly, it excludes the possibility of duplicative regulation of personal rights of civil law in copyright law. By discussing the essence of copyright, this paper restores the property of copyright, which is a new orientation different from the theory of property rights in the early classical works, which not only makes the whole intellectual property system more coherent and uniform in logic, It can also solve many dilemmas of the personal rights theory in practice, so as to encourage the author to create and make the work market more colorful.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：北京化工大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類號】：D913

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