本文關(guān)鍵詞： 上市公司收購(gòu) 收購(gòu)監(jiān)管 信息披露 杠桿收購(gòu) 持股預(yù)警制度　出處：《河北大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：信息披露制度在上市公司收購(gòu)監(jiān)管中發(fā)揮著重要作用,這源于擁有健全的上市公司信息披露制度同廣大投資者權(quán)益、上市公司利益和證券市場(chǎng)健全程度具有高度關(guān)聯(lián)性。中小投資者需要依靠披露的信息作出判斷,同時(shí)證券市場(chǎng)也需要信息披露得以有效運(yùn)行,在收購(gòu)過程中對(duì)于信息披露監(jiān)管什么、監(jiān)管的程度以及如何監(jiān)管,對(duì)維護(hù)證券市場(chǎng)的健康發(fā)展起著關(guān)鍵性作用。上市公司收購(gòu)信息披露監(jiān)管的立法雖然取得了較大成績(jī),但依舊存在著信息披露義務(wù)主體中的合意一致行動(dòng)人和目標(biāo)公司董事規(guī)定的漏洞,沒有結(jié)合我國(guó)實(shí)際情況設(shè)置持股預(yù)警制度,杠桿收購(gòu)中資金來源、實(shí)際投資者不清晰等信息披露問題。在違規(guī)操作后相關(guān)責(zé)任人未受到應(yīng)有的懲罰,且沒有保護(hù)好中小股東的利益。因此在收購(gòu)市場(chǎng)中的每個(gè)主體,即信息披露義務(wù)主體、中介機(jī)構(gòu)、媒體要各司其職,監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)也需要發(fā)揮“無形之手”的作用,以事前審查配合事中監(jiān)督、事后懲處來彌補(bǔ)監(jiān)管的不足,最終確保信息披露符合真實(shí)、準(zhǔn)確、完整、及時(shí)、有效的要求,這是監(jiān)管方的重要職責(zé)所在。本篇文章除了引言和結(jié)語(yǔ)兩個(gè)部分外,共分成四章,以下為具體章節(jié)內(nèi)容:第一章對(duì)上市公司收購(gòu)中信息披露的界定、分類、原則和內(nèi)容予以闡述,指出對(duì)其監(jiān)管的必要性;第二章研究了美國(guó)、歐洲等發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家及我國(guó)香港地區(qū)上市公司收購(gòu)信息披露的規(guī)定,從信息披露義務(wù)主體、持股預(yù)警制度、杠桿收購(gòu)等方面予以闡述,為后兩章找到我國(guó)上市公司收購(gòu)中信息披露監(jiān)管存在的問題以及如何解決奠定基礎(chǔ);第三章通過研究“萬科事件”等案例出現(xiàn)的問題,闡述了上市公司在收購(gòu)過程中信息披露監(jiān)管存在的問題;第四章針對(duì)第三章提到的實(shí)際問題,闡述了如何從信息披露義務(wù)主體、持股預(yù)警制度、杠桿收購(gòu)信息披露等方面著手完善監(jiān)管制度。
[Abstract]:The information disclosure system plays an important role in the takeover supervision of listed companies, which stems from having a sound information disclosure system of listed companies and the rights and interests of investors. The interests of listed companies and the soundness of the securities market are highly relevant. Small and medium-sized investors need to rely on the disclosure of information to make judgments, and the securities market also needs information disclosure to operate effectively. In the acquisition process of information disclosure regulatory what, the extent of regulation and how to regulate. It plays a key role in maintaining the healthy development of the securities market. Although the legislation on the regulation of acquisition information disclosure of listed companies has made great achievements. However, there are still loopholes in the subject of information disclosure obligations, such as the agreed and consistent action person and the director of the target company. It does not combine with the actual situation of our country to set up the stock ownership warning system and the source of funds in the leveraged buy-out. The actual investor is not clear and so on information disclosure problem. After the violation operation the relevant responsible person has not received the due punishment and has not protected the small and medium-sized shareholder's benefit. Therefore in the purchase market each main body. That is, the subject of information disclosure obligations, intermediary agencies, the media to perform their respective duties, the regulatory body also needs to play the role of "invisible hand", in order to prior review to cooperate with the supervision, afterwards punishment to make up for the deficiencies of supervision. Finally, to ensure that information disclosure meets the true, accurate, complete, timely and effective requirements, which is the important responsibility of the regulators. In addition to the introduction and conclusion, this article is divided into four chapters. The following are specific chapters: the first chapter describes the definition, classification, principles and contents of information disclosure in the acquisition of listed companies, and points out the necessity of supervision; The second chapter studies the provisions of information disclosure of listed companies in the United States, Europe and other developed countries and Hong Kong region of China, including the subject of information disclosure obligations, stock ownership warning system, leveraged buy-out and so on. For the latter two chapters to find out the problems of information disclosure supervision in the acquisition of listed companies in China and how to solve the problems laid a foundation; The third chapter discusses the problems existing in the information disclosure supervision of listed companies in the process of acquisition by studying the problems of Vanke incident and other cases. According to the practical problems mentioned in the third chapter, Chapter 4th expounds how to improve the supervision system from the aspects of the subject of information disclosure obligation, the stock ownership warning system, the information disclosure of leveraged buy-out, and so on.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：河北大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：D922.287

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