本文選題：地方政府 + 環(huán)保職能�。� 參考：《上海交通大學(xué)》2012年博士論文

【摘要】：“經(jīng)濟(jì)人”假設(shè)是近代西方經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)研究中常用的一塊重要理論基石。二十世紀(jì)五、六十年代，美國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家詹姆斯.M.布坎南等人將“經(jīng)濟(jì)人”假設(shè)引入到政治領(lǐng)域，來(lái)分析政治活動(dòng)中人的行為選擇，提出了政治的經(jīng)濟(jì)理論，即公共選擇理論。該理論認(rèn)為政治活動(dòng)中的參與人，即政治家、政府官員和選民類(lèi)似于市場(chǎng)中參與主體，都有著“經(jīng)濟(jì)人”的行為動(dòng)機(jī)。從“經(jīng)濟(jì)人”的視覺(jué)考察地方政府，地方政府是這樣一類(lèi)組織，即由一類(lèi)理性自利的、把經(jīng)濟(jì)利益放在首位、追求自身利益最大化、具有機(jī)會(huì)主義傾向的個(gè)人組成的集合。 地方政府是環(huán)保法律關(guān)系中的一個(gè)重要主體，地方政府環(huán)保履職的好壞直接關(guān)系著國(guó)家環(huán)保法律、政策目的的實(shí)現(xiàn)情況。然而，在我國(guó)實(shí)踐中，一些地方政府為了地方利益和官員個(gè)人利益，長(zhǎng)期只顧“政績(jī)工程”、追求地方經(jīng)濟(jì)粗放式增長(zhǎng)，而環(huán)保執(zhí)法不到位、監(jiān)管不得力的現(xiàn)象比較普遍。近年來(lái)我國(guó)發(fā)生的多起重大環(huán)境污染案件都與地方政府在履行環(huán)保職責(zé)方面的失職直接相關(guān)，這種做法已經(jīng)成為影響國(guó)家環(huán)保法律、政策目標(biāo)實(shí)現(xiàn)的最大困境。 制度經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)的理論告訴我們，制度作為規(guī)范人們行為動(dòng)機(jī)的社會(huì)規(guī)范框架，對(duì)人們的行為直接起著激勵(lì)導(dǎo)向作用。仔細(xì)分析地方政府行為背后的原因，會(huì)發(fā)現(xiàn)這與我國(guó)現(xiàn)行法律框架下，地方政府面臨的激勵(lì)機(jī)機(jī)制有關(guān)。首先，從正激勵(lì)機(jī)制上來(lái)說(shuō)，針對(duì)多任務(wù)目標(biāo)的地方政府，財(cái)政分權(quán)、行政分權(quán)、以GDP為核心的干部晉升考核制度起到的是激勵(lì)地方政府追求經(jīng)濟(jì)利益最大化的導(dǎo)向作用。行政分權(quán)、財(cái)政分權(quán)創(chuàng)造出了這樣一個(gè)激勵(lì)格局：轄區(qū)經(jīng)濟(jì)越發(fā)展，財(cái)政收入越高，地方政府所能分享的財(cái)力就越多。同時(shí)，財(cái)政分權(quán)和行政分權(quán)，賦予了地方政府很大的經(jīng)濟(jì)管理權(quán)。地方政府在發(fā)展本地經(jīng)濟(jì)過(guò)程中，有相當(dāng)大的決策自由裁量權(quán)。這些權(quán)力與GDP政績(jī)考核制度結(jié)合，使地方政府對(duì)于發(fā)展地方經(jīng)濟(jì)、做大GDP有著強(qiáng)烈的沖動(dòng)。也正是這種制度安排促進(jìn)了我國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)的快速發(fā)展。然而，這三方面的制度都存在著不利于地方政府履行環(huán)保職能的因素：財(cái)權(quán)、事權(quán)不對(duì)等的矛盾給地方政府履職造成相當(dāng)大的財(cái)政壓力。在多種任務(wù)的委托下，地方政府作為理性經(jīng)濟(jì)人，往往會(huì)把精力放到那些容易被上級(jí)觀察到的任務(wù)上，從而減少或完全放棄在其他任務(wù)上的努力。而長(zhǎng)期以來(lái)，在地方政府政績(jī)考核中，環(huán)保指標(biāo)是軟指標(biāo)，這就造成地方政府不重視環(huán)保職能。同時(shí)，在地方政府的稅源結(jié)構(gòu)、轉(zhuǎn)移支付制度、土地財(cái)政等方面的法律制度缺陷使地方政府可以根據(jù)自己的利益偏好不重視環(huán)保職能。在負(fù)激勵(lì)機(jī)制上，監(jiān)督問(wèn)責(zé)立法滯后；現(xiàn)行法律缺乏對(duì)地方政府的環(huán)保責(zé)任、問(wèn)責(zé)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)、問(wèn)責(zé)程序等內(nèi)容的明確規(guī)定；內(nèi)部監(jiān)督軟約束；人大、公眾、司法等外部監(jiān)督乏力；缺乏事前監(jiān)督機(jī)制。這為一些地方政府只顧“政績(jī)工程”、濫用自由裁量權(quán)追求自身利益最大化而環(huán)保履職不力提供了空間。 針對(duì)這種情形，我們需要完善法律政策、加強(qiáng)地方政府環(huán)保履職的正負(fù)激勵(lì)。首先，在行政分權(quán)上，從行政性分權(quán)走向法治分權(quán)、讓地方政府對(duì)自己的權(quán)益有穩(wěn)定的預(yù)期。合理界定政府的權(quán)力邊界，進(jìn)一步完善環(huán)保管理體制，提升環(huán)保部門(mén)在地方政府中的地位、加強(qiáng)縣、鄉(xiāng)（鎮(zhèn)）級(jí)地方環(huán)保部門(mén)的履職能力。其次，在財(cái)政分權(quán)上，通過(guò)合理劃分各級(jí)政府間的事權(quán)與財(cái)權(quán)，減輕地方政府的負(fù)擔(dān)；完善環(huán)境保護(hù)轉(zhuǎn)移支付制度、加大對(duì)地方政府環(huán)保履職的財(cái)政支持；完善資源稅制、環(huán)境稅制，發(fā)揮其經(jīng)濟(jì)調(diào)節(jié)和增加收入功能；規(guī)范土地財(cái)政，建立合理的土地收入制度，約束地方政府濫用土地管理權(quán)力破壞環(huán)境的行為。再次，要在干部晉升考核制度中增加環(huán)保指標(biāo)權(quán)重，讓地方官員通過(guò)積極保護(hù)環(huán)境來(lái)獲得自己的收益。最后，完善監(jiān)督問(wèn)責(zé)制度來(lái)約束地方政府的“經(jīng)濟(jì)人”動(dòng)機(jī)，，促使其積極履行環(huán)保職責(zé)。通過(guò)環(huán)保立法明確、細(xì)化地方政府的環(huán)保責(zé)任。加強(qiáng)事前監(jiān)督、外部監(jiān)督、對(duì)抽象行政行為的監(jiān)督。立法建立如重大決策失誤的問(wèn)責(zé)制度、地方政府環(huán)保工作人大監(jiān)督制度、對(duì)地方政府行為的環(huán)境影響評(píng)價(jià)制度、環(huán)境公民訴訟制度等一批具體制度，來(lái)約束地方政府不顧環(huán)境公共利益、而只顧追求經(jīng)濟(jì)利益最大化的行為動(dòng)機(jī)。地方政府環(huán)保履職的動(dòng)力來(lái)源于有效的激勵(lì)機(jī)制，這種激勵(lì)機(jī)制一方面尊重地方政府的自利動(dòng)機(jī)，尊重其自由選擇的自由權(quán)利，同時(shí)，通過(guò)制度的激勵(lì)約束功能的發(fā)揮，使地方政府的自主選擇基礎(chǔ)上的自主行動(dòng)，能夠在實(shí)現(xiàn)自我利益最大化的同時(shí)，實(shí)現(xiàn)環(huán)境公共利益的最大化，實(shí)現(xiàn)環(huán)境公共利益和私人利益的完美和諧。
[Abstract]:The hypothesis of "economic man" is an important theoretical cornerstone commonly used in modern western economics. In twentieth Century, five and 60s, American economist James.M. Buchanan introduced the hypothesis of "economic man" into the political field to analyze the choice of human behavior in political activities, and put forward the political economic theory, that is, public choice. The theory holds that the participants in the political activities, namely the politicians, the government officials and the voters, are similar to the participants in the market. They all have the behavior motivation of the "economic man". From the visual inspection of the "economic man", the local government is such a kind of organization, that is, a kind of rational self-interest, putting the economic interests in the first place, and pursuing the pursuit of the economic interests. Self interest maximization and opportunistic tendencies of individuals.
The local government is an important subject in the legal relationship of environmental protection. The quality of the local government's environmental protection is directly related to the national environmental protection law and the realization of the policy purpose. However, in the practice of China, some local governments, for the local interests and the personal interests of the officials, have long been looking at the "achievements project" for a long time to pursue the extensive increase of the local economy. In recent years, many major environmental pollution cases in China have been directly related to the failure of local governments to fulfill their duties in environmental protection. This practice has become the greatest predicament that affects the national environmental protection law and the policy objectives.
The theory of institutional economics tells us that as a social norm framework that regulates the behavior motivation of people, it plays an incentive and guiding role to people's behavior. The reasons behind the careful analysis of the behavior behind the local government will be related to the incentive mechanism facing the local government under the current legal framework of our country. On the basis of the system, the local government, fiscal decentralization, administrative decentralization, and the GDP as the core of the cadre promotion and assessment system, is the guiding role of encouraging local governments to pursue the maximization of economic benefits. The more financial resources the government can share. At the same time, the financial decentralization and administrative decentralization give the local government a great economic management power. The local government has a considerable discretion in decision-making in the process of developing the local economy. These powers are combined with the performance appraisal system of GDP to make the local government to develop the local economy and make a big GDP. It is a strong impulse. It is also the institutional arrangement that promotes the rapid development of our economy. However, the three aspects of the system are not conducive to the local government to perform environmental protection functions: financial power, the unequal conflict of power has caused considerable financial pressure to the local government to perform its duties. Under the Commission of a variety of tasks, the local government works For the rational economic people, they tend to put their efforts on tasks that are easily observed by their superiors, thereby reducing or completely abandoning their efforts on other tasks. For a long time, environmental indicators are soft indicators in the performance assessment of local governments, which causes local governments to ignore environmental protection functions. At the same time, the tax source structure of local governments, The legal system of transfer payment system, land finance and other aspects makes the local government not pay attention to the environmental protection function according to its own interest preference. In the negative incentive mechanism, the supervision of accountability legislation is lagging behind; the current law lacks the clear provisions on the environmental responsibility of the local government, the standards of accountability, the procedure of accountability and so on; the internal supervision is soft. The external supervision of the people's congresses, the public and the judiciary is weak and lack of the pre supervision mechanism. This provides some local governments with the "achievement project", and the abuse of discretion to pursue the maximization of its own interests and the inadequate environmental protection.
In this case, we need to improve the legal policy and strengthen the positive and negative incentives for the local government to perform their duties. First, in administrative decentralization, from administrative decentralization to the rule of law decentralization, the local government has a stable expectation of its own rights and interests. It defines the power boundary of the government reasonably, further perfected the environmental management system, and promoted the environmental protection department. In the local government, we should strengthen the ability of the local environmental protection departments of the county and township level. Secondly, on the fiscal decentralization, the burden of local governments can be reduced by reasonable division of the powers and financial rights between governments at all levels, the transfer payment system of environmental protection, the financial support for local government environmental protection and the improvement of the resource tax system are improved. Environmental tax system, play its economic adjustment and increase income function, standardize land finance, establish a reasonable land income system, restrain local government abuse of land management power to destroy the environment. Thirdly, we should increase the weight of environmental indicators in the cadre promotion assessment system, so that local officials can obtain their own environment through the active protection of the environment. In the end, the system of supervision and accountability should be perfected to restrict the motive of the local government's "economic man" and promote its environmental responsibility actively. Through the legislation of environmental protection, the environmental responsibility of local governments should be clarifies. The supervision of pre supervision, external supervision and the supervision of the abstract administrative act should be strengthened. The supervision system of the government's environmental protection working people's Congress, the environmental impact assessment system of local government behavior, the environmental citizen litigation system and so on, restrict the local government to ignore the environmental public interests, but only pursue the motive of maximizing the economic interests. The power of the local government's environmental protection comes from the effective incentive mechanism. On the one hand, the incentive mechanism respects the self-interest motive of the local government and respects the free right of the free choice. At the same time, through the exertion of the incentive and constraint function of the system, the autonomous action on the basis of the autonomous choice of the local government can maximize the public interest and realize the environmental public at the same time of realizing the maximization of the self interest. The perfect harmony between the interests and the private interests.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：上海交通大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：D625;D922.68

【引證文獻(xiàn)】

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