本文選題：高管薪酬 + 公司治理�。� 參考：《華東政法大學(xué)》2011年碩士論文

【摘要】：本論文針對美國高管所獲薪酬“虛高虛漲”、“脫離業(yè)績”、“背離價值”的失控狀態(tài),旨在反思制度背后廣泛性、系統(tǒng)性的問題根源,并期望以此為鑒,為中國的薪酬制度及公司治理提供參考路徑。 全文共計3萬字,主體部分分為四大部分。 第一部分,重在現(xiàn)狀與危機(jī),即高管薪酬相關(guān)問題的提出。本部分旨在描述現(xiàn)狀與發(fā)現(xiàn)問題,因此先以一系列切實數(shù)據(jù)勾勒了全文研究對象——美國高管薪酬的現(xiàn)狀。從中可以看到它自20世紀(jì)90年代持續(xù)的牛市開始飛速增長、拉開差距的現(xiàn)實。再通過與公司業(yè)績數(shù)據(jù)、金融危機(jī)背景等的對應(yīng)比較,發(fā)現(xiàn)高管薪酬與經(jīng)營者業(yè)績并不匹配,出現(xiàn)公司倒閉等經(jīng)營惡果時只能股東和經(jīng)營者買單等不合理現(xiàn)象,而通過對美國國際集團(tuán)(AIG)案例的解析,更可以發(fā)現(xiàn)美國高管薪酬“無功受祿”的失控趨勢。 第二部分,重在批判與維護(hù),即高管薪酬制度的基本理論分析。本部分意圖闡明,高管薪酬制度雖備受質(zhì)疑,但亦有著強(qiáng)大的維護(hù)者。他們通過薪酬合同扎實的理論根基、演變的制度革新來證明,盡管高管薪酬制度有種種瑕疵,但它依然不失為一種良善制度,且有著不斷改進(jìn)的趨勢。同時他們篤信的核心理論認(rèn)為,任何看似“天價”的報酬都是通過市場力量經(jīng)由董事會與高管進(jìn)行公平議價后得出,是程序正當(dāng)、實體合理的安排。這一長期以來顛撲不破的通行觀點也是下文重點的反思與批駁之處。 第三部分,重在反思與癥結(jié),即美國高管薪酬制度問題的內(nèi)因分析。本部分亦是本文的核心,首先將薪酬制度的支持理歸納為六點,其次進(jìn)行了逐一的質(zhì)疑與批駁,并特別指出,通行觀點所堅信不疑的“董事與高管進(jìn)行公平議價”事實上已經(jīng)淪落為“董高相護(hù)”,成為高管薪酬失控的根源。再次,本部分還對“董高相護(hù)”現(xiàn)象的原因,進(jìn)行了多角度、跨學(xué)科的分析。 第四部分,重在借鑒與反思:即中國高管薪酬制度的進(jìn)路分析。對美國這一典型公司制度的研究不僅是為理論的探索,更是為我國相關(guān)制度提供反思與借鑒。因此本部分從我國的特殊國情出發(fā),嫁接由美國高管薪酬制度反思中所得出的思路,繼而提出了包括完善信息披露、強(qiáng)調(diào)市場績效評估、引入董事情感制約、增強(qiáng)董事會獨立性、改革訴訟問責(zé)機(jī)制等改革思路。
[Abstract]:This paper aims to reflect on the root causes of the widespread and systematic problems behind the system, aiming at the runaway state of the American executives' compensation, such as "fictitious rise", "disengagement from performance" and "deviation from value", and looks forward to learning from it. For China's compensation system and corporate governance to provide a reference path. The full text amounts to 30,000 words, the main part is divided into four parts. The first part, focuses on the current situation and crisis, that is, executive compensation related issues. The purpose of this part is to describe the current situation and problems, so a series of practical data is used to outline the current situation of executive compensation in the United States. It can be seen from the 90 s sustained bull market began to grow rapidly, the gap between the reality. Through the corresponding comparison with corporate performance data, financial crisis background and so on, it is found that executive compensation does not match the performance of managers, and only shareholders and operators can pay the bill when the company goes bankrupt and so on. And through the analysis of AIG case, we can find out that executive compensation in the United States is out of control. The second part focuses on the criticism and maintenance, that is, the basic theoretical analysis of executive compensation system. This part is intended to clarify that although the executive compensation system has been questioned, there are also strong defenders. Through the solid theoretical foundation of the compensation contract and the evolution of the system innovation, they prove that although the executive compensation system has all sorts of flaws, it is still a kind of good system, and has a trend of continuous improvement. At the same time, their core theory is that any seemingly "sky-high" reward is obtained through market forces after fair bargaining with executives through the board of directors, and is a due process and substantial arrangement. This long-standing point of view is also the focus of the following reflection and criticism. The third part focuses on reflection and crux, that is, the internal cause analysis of executive compensation system in the United States. This part is also the core of this paper. Firstly, the supporting principles of the pay system are summed up into six points. Secondly, the author questions and criticizes them one by one, and points out in particular that, The popular belief that "directors and executives negotiate fairly" has in fact been reduced to "Dong Gao's protection", which has become the root of executive compensation runaway. Thirdly, this part also carries on the multi-angle, cross-disciplinary analysis to the phenomenon of Dong Gao. The fourth part focuses on reference and reflection: the analysis of executive compensation system in China. The research on the typical corporate system of America is not only for the exploration of theory, but also for the reflection and reference of relevant systems in our country. Therefore, this part starts from the special situation of our country, grafts from the American executive compensation system introspection, then puts forward the idea, including perfecting the information disclosure, emphasizing the market performance appraisal, introducing the director emotion restriction. Strengthen the independence of the board of directors, reform litigation accountability mechanism and other reform ideas.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：華東政法大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2011
【分類號】：D922.291.91;D971.2

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