發(fā)布時(shí)間：2018-02-17 06:09

  本文關(guān)鍵詞： 德沃金 原則 規(guī)則 法律規(guī)范 情境　出處：《中國(guó)政法大學(xué)學(xué)報(bào)》2016年02期 　論文類型：期刊論文

【摘要】：關(guān)于原則與規(guī)則的區(qū)分,以德沃金為代表的傳統(tǒng)理論沒(méi)有提供有效的原則和規(guī)則的識(shí)別方法和標(biāo)準(zhǔn),存在一定的缺陷。原則與規(guī)則的區(qū)分應(yīng)置于普通法和特別法的框架下理解,法律規(guī)范有三個(gè)基本要素:情境、主體和行為規(guī)范,典型的原則是無(wú)情境的法律規(guī)范。原則在法律淵源等級(jí)中,既非強(qiáng)約束淵源,也非弱約束淵源,即可適用的法律淵源。
[Abstract]:With regard to the distinction between principles and rules, the traditional theory represented by Dworkin does not provide effective methods and standards for the identification of principles and rules, and there are certain shortcomings. The distinction between principles and rules should be understood within the framework of common law and Lex specialis. There are three basic elements of legal norms: situation, subject and behavior norm. The typical principle is situational legal norm. In the level of legal origin, the principle is neither a source of strong constraints nor a source of weak constraints, which can be applied as a source of law.
【作者單位】： 中國(guó)政法大學(xué)民商經(jīng)濟(jì)法學(xué)院;
【分類號(hào)】：D909.1

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