秘密交換的博弈模型及應(yīng)用研究
發(fā)布時(shí)間：2019-06-21 08:18
【摘要】：隨著云計(jì)算和大數(shù)據(jù)技術(shù)的迅速發(fā)展,用戶(hù)之間頻繁的數(shù)據(jù)交流和共享使得分布式計(jì)算得到了廣泛應(yīng)用,但是由于分布式環(huán)境下平臺(tái)開(kāi)放及資源共享的特點(diǎn),導(dǎo)致用戶(hù)之間的數(shù)據(jù)交換面臨著很多安全性挑戰(zhàn),而傳統(tǒng)秘密交換由于沒(méi)有考慮參與者的行動(dòng)動(dòng)機(jī),暴露出一些固有的缺陷,如只能發(fā)現(xiàn)欺騙而不能事先預(yù)防。針對(duì)秘密交換建立博弈模型屬于密碼學(xué)和博弈論的交叉研究領(lǐng)域,它將所有參與者看作是理性的,根據(jù)效用函數(shù)來(lái)決定是否遵守協(xié)議,能更好地解決協(xié)議的安全性問(wèn)題。研究了秘密交換的發(fā)展現(xiàn)狀,討論了現(xiàn)有理性秘密交換協(xié)議的安全性及存在的問(wèn)題,通過(guò)分析參與者的策略和效用,建立了參與者合作博弈模型、抵抗合謀博弈模型、公平兩方計(jì)算博弈模型,最后將博弈模型應(yīng)用到協(xié)議設(shè)計(jì)中,通過(guò)懲罰策略控制效用函數(shù)來(lái)激勵(lì)所有參與者遵守協(xié)議,使得參與者雖然傾向于自己是唯一得到秘密的人,他們也愿意為了各自的利益而選擇遵守協(xié)議。本文的主要研究成果如下:(1)針對(duì)傳統(tǒng)秘密共享協(xié)議中存在的只能發(fā)現(xiàn)參與者欺騙而無(wú)法阻止其行為的問(wèn)題,基于觸發(fā)策略構(gòu)建了參與者合作博弈模型。模型中將參與者收益函數(shù)和懲罰策略相結(jié)合,使得參與者在執(zhí)行過(guò)程中如果偏離協(xié)議將導(dǎo)致其收益函數(shù)減小,由于理性參與者希望得到最終的秘密,只能選擇合作,達(dá)到了預(yù)防欺騙的目的。(2)針對(duì)秘密共享中普遍存在的參與者合謀的問(wèn)題,基于聲譽(yù)機(jī)制構(gòu)建了預(yù)防參與者合謀的博弈模型。模型中詳細(xì)分析了理性參與者的合謀動(dòng)機(jī)和行為,通過(guò)參數(shù)設(shè)置使得參與者合謀時(shí)的收益只能增加可忽略的效用值,同時(shí)引入聲譽(yù)機(jī)制對(duì)背離協(xié)議的參與者進(jìn)行懲罰,因此模型可達(dá)到可計(jì)算防合謀均衡,保證了理性參與者具有遵守協(xié)議的動(dòng)機(jī)。(3)針對(duì)傳統(tǒng)安全兩方計(jì)算協(xié)議中存在的公平性問(wèn)題,基于激勵(lì)相容機(jī)制構(gòu)建了公平的兩方計(jì)算理想世界和現(xiàn)實(shí)世界博弈模型。根據(jù)模型中的公平性定義,給出了理性安全兩方計(jì)算的理想函數(shù)和理性安全兩方計(jì)算協(xié)議,通過(guò)對(duì)參與者的策略和效用函數(shù)設(shè)置,使得發(fā)送正確數(shù)據(jù)是參與者的占優(yōu)策略,保證了雙方能公平地得到計(jì)算結(jié)果,最后利用理想/現(xiàn)實(shí)范式證明了理性安全兩方計(jì)算協(xié)議能安全實(shí)現(xiàn)理想函數(shù),并分析了協(xié)議的納什均衡結(jié)果。(4)將秘密交換博弈模型應(yīng)用到協(xié)議中,設(shè)計(jì)了參與者具有合作動(dòng)機(jī)的理性秘密共享協(xié)議、可抵抗合謀的理性秘密共享協(xié)議和具有公平性的理性安全兩方計(jì)算協(xié)議,并首次將理性參與者的概念應(yīng)用到門(mén)限簽名中,針對(duì)簽名密鑰分發(fā)階段密鑰分發(fā)者不愿意分發(fā)正確子密鑰,以及簽名合成階段參與者的不合作行為,提出了理性門(mén)限簽名協(xié)議。將簽名看作是理性參與者的一種“權(quán)利”,同時(shí)又需要承擔(dān)相應(yīng)“責(zé)任”的角度出發(fā),運(yùn)用討價(jià)還價(jià)機(jī)制解決理性簽名密鑰分發(fā)問(wèn)題,采用隨機(jī)均勻分組方法構(gòu)造理性門(mén)限簽名合成機(jī)制,保證了各參與者能得到正確的子密鑰,同時(shí)有動(dòng)機(jī)完成對(duì)消息的簽名。
[Abstract]:With the rapid development of cloud computing and large-scale data technology, frequent data exchange and sharing among users make the distributed computing to be widely used, but due to the open and resource sharing of the platform under the distributed environment, The data exchange between users is faced with many security challenges, and the traditional secret exchange exposes some of the inherent defects due to the fact that the action motive of the participants is not taken into account, such as only finding fraud and not in advance. The establishment of game model for secret exchange belongs to the cross-research field of cryptography and game theory. It regards all the participants as rational, determines whether to comply with the protocol according to the utility function, and can better solve the security problem of the protocol. In this paper, the development status of the secret exchange is studied, the security and the existing problems of the existing rational secret exchange protocol are discussed. By analyzing the strategy and utility of the participants, the cooperative game model of the participants is established, the game model of the collusion game is resisted, and the game model is calculated on both sides. Finally, the game model is applied to the protocol design, and the utility function is controlled by the penalty strategy to encourage all the participants to abide by the agreement, so that the participants, while inclined to be the only person who is the only secret, are willing to choose to abide by the agreement for their own interests. The main research results of this paper are as follows: (1) A participant cooperation game model is built on the basis of the trigger strategy, aiming at the problem that only the participants can be cheated by the traditional secret sharing agreement and the behavior cannot be prevented. In the model, the participant income function and the penalty strategy are combined, so that the participants can only choose the cooperation if the deviation agreement will lead to the reduction of the gain function in the course of the execution, because the rational participant wants to get the final secret, only the cooperation can be selected, and the purpose of preventing and cheating is achieved. (2) The game model for preventing participants' collusion is constructed based on the reputation mechanism, aiming at the problem of the collusion of the participants in the secret sharing. In the model, the complicit motivation and behavior of the rational participant are analyzed in detail. By setting the parameter, the gain of the participant's collusion can only increase the negligible utility value, and the reputation mechanism is introduced to punish the participants departing from the agreement, so that the model can be used to calculate the anti-collusion equilibrium, The motivation of the rational participant to abide by the agreement is ensured. (3) In view of the fairness problem existing in the traditional security two-party computing agreement, a fair and two-party computing ideal world and a real world game model are constructed based on the incentive compatible mechanism. according to the definition of the fairness in the model, the ideal function and the rational safety two-party calculation protocol of the two-way calculation of the rational safety are given, and the strategy and utility function of the participants are set, so that the sending right data is the dominant strategy of the participants, It is ensured that both parties can obtain the results fairly, and finally, the ideal/ realistic paradigm is used to prove the safe and ideal function of the two-party calculation protocol of the rational safety, and the Nash equilibrium result of the protocol is analyzed. (4) the secret exchange game model is applied to the protocol, the rational secret sharing protocol with the cooperative motivation of the participants is designed, And the concept of the rational participant is applied to the threshold signature for the first time, the key distributor in the signing key distribution stage is unwilling to distribute the correct sub-key and the non-cooperative behavior of the participants in the signature synthesis stage, and a rational threshold signature protocol is proposed. taking the signature as a "rights" of the rational participant, and at the same time, taking the angle of the corresponding "RESPONSIBILITY", using the bargaining mechanism to solve the problem of the distribution of the rational signature key, and adopting a random uniform grouping method to construct a rational threshold signature synthesis mechanism, Ensures that each participant can obtain the correct sub-key, and simultaneously has the motivation to complete the signature of the message.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：北京工業(yè)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2016
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：TP309
[Abstract]:With the rapid development of cloud computing and large-scale data technology, frequent data exchange and sharing among users make the distributed computing to be widely used, but due to the open and resource sharing of the platform under the distributed environment, The data exchange between users is faced with many security challenges, and the traditional secret exchange exposes some of the inherent defects due to the fact that the action motive of the participants is not taken into account, such as only finding fraud and not in advance. The establishment of game model for secret exchange belongs to the cross-research field of cryptography and game theory. It regards all the participants as rational, determines whether to comply with the protocol according to the utility function, and can better solve the security problem of the protocol. In this paper, the development status of the secret exchange is studied, the security and the existing problems of the existing rational secret exchange protocol are discussed. By analyzing the strategy and utility of the participants, the cooperative game model of the participants is established, the game model of the collusion game is resisted, and the game model is calculated on both sides. Finally, the game model is applied to the protocol design, and the utility function is controlled by the penalty strategy to encourage all the participants to abide by the agreement, so that the participants, while inclined to be the only person who is the only secret, are willing to choose to abide by the agreement for their own interests. The main research results of this paper are as follows: (1) A participant cooperation game model is built on the basis of the trigger strategy, aiming at the problem that only the participants can be cheated by the traditional secret sharing agreement and the behavior cannot be prevented. In the model, the participant income function and the penalty strategy are combined, so that the participants can only choose the cooperation if the deviation agreement will lead to the reduction of the gain function in the course of the execution, because the rational participant wants to get the final secret, only the cooperation can be selected, and the purpose of preventing and cheating is achieved. (2) The game model for preventing participants' collusion is constructed based on the reputation mechanism, aiming at the problem of the collusion of the participants in the secret sharing. In the model, the complicit motivation and behavior of the rational participant are analyzed in detail. By setting the parameter, the gain of the participant's collusion can only increase the negligible utility value, and the reputation mechanism is introduced to punish the participants departing from the agreement, so that the model can be used to calculate the anti-collusion equilibrium, The motivation of the rational participant to abide by the agreement is ensured. (3) In view of the fairness problem existing in the traditional security two-party computing agreement, a fair and two-party computing ideal world and a real world game model are constructed based on the incentive compatible mechanism. according to the definition of the fairness in the model, the ideal function and the rational safety two-party calculation protocol of the two-way calculation of the rational safety are given, and the strategy and utility function of the participants are set, so that the sending right data is the dominant strategy of the participants, It is ensured that both parties can obtain the results fairly, and finally, the ideal/ realistic paradigm is used to prove the safe and ideal function of the two-party calculation protocol of the rational safety, and the Nash equilibrium result of the protocol is analyzed. (4) the secret exchange game model is applied to the protocol, the rational secret sharing protocol with the cooperative motivation of the participants is designed, And the concept of the rational participant is applied to the threshold signature for the first time, the key distributor in the signing key distribution stage is unwilling to distribute the correct sub-key and the non-cooperative behavior of the participants in the signature synthesis stage, and a rational threshold signature protocol is proposed. taking the signature as a "rights" of the rational participant, and at the same time, taking the angle of the corresponding "RESPONSIBILITY", using the bargaining mechanism to solve the problem of the distribution of the rational signature key, and adopting a random uniform grouping method to construct a rational threshold signature synthesis mechanism, Ensures that each participant can obtain the correct sub-key, and simultaneously has the motivation to complete the signature of the message.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：北京工業(yè)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2016
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：TP309
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