發(fā)布時間：2018-05-08 23:37

  本文選題：憲政經(jīng)濟學(xué) + 腐敗��； 參考：《東北財經(jīng)大學(xué)》2010年碩士論文

【摘要】：腐敗問題從古至今一直困擾著人們,它不僅損害公民的利益,更是對政治的穩(wěn)定造成嚴(yán)重的影響。世界各國的學(xué)者們一直努力的尋求治理腐敗的方法,但是從根本上解決腐敗問題仍然是條漫長的道路。憲政經(jīng)濟學(xué)的理論的發(fā)展,使人們對制度的選擇回歸到元規(guī)則上,這或許可以為治理腐敗問題提供新的思路。 首先,腐敗是公職人員運用公共權(quán)力來謀取個人或小集團的私利,并侵害公共利益和個人合法利益的行為。腐敗帶來的效應(yīng),學(xué)術(shù)界仍一定的爭論。本文認(rèn)為,腐敗現(xiàn)象是不應(yīng)該被容忍的。腐敗會使市場失靈更加惡化,并帶來嚴(yán)重的政府失靈。如果任由腐敗蔓延,政治穩(wěn)定也將受到影響。所以,對腐敗的治理一刻也不能松懈。這是本文研究的出發(fā)點。 接著,本文回顧了憲政經(jīng)濟學(xué)思想的理論形成。從亞當(dāng)·斯密對政府權(quán)力與公民利益沖突的研究,到哈耶克的自由和法治模型的形成,最后到布坎南憲政經(jīng)濟學(xué)理論的確立,憲政經(jīng)濟學(xué)所倡導(dǎo)的核心思想就是限制政府權(quán)力和保護公民權(quán)利。憲政經(jīng)濟學(xué)認(rèn)為限制政府權(quán)力應(yīng)該改革憲法,建立民主政府模型。公民權(quán)利相對政府權(quán)力始終處于劣勢,需要以契約的方式進行保護,從而使公民獲得自由和安全感。這種契約即為憲法,只有憲法確立的公民基本權(quán)利得到有效實現(xiàn),才能算真正實現(xiàn)憲政。 從政府權(quán)力和公民權(quán)利的兩個角度出發(fā),本文對腐敗產(chǎn)生的原因展開了深入的研究。在政府權(quán)力的方面,政府權(quán)力和腐敗之間有著必然的聯(lián)系,政府權(quán)力過大和分配失衡為腐敗的發(fā)生提供了條件。政府官員用手中的權(quán)力通過干預(yù)市場資源配置,尋租必然發(fā)生；行政權(quán)力的過分集中使少數(shù)官員的權(quán)力遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)超出了職務(wù)權(quán)力,為領(lǐng)導(dǎo)腐敗提供了“方便之門”。行政權(quán)力運行缺乏法制化規(guī)定,使權(quán)力的運行得不到有效地制約。對政府權(quán)力的監(jiān)督不到位,也使得腐敗分子有機可乘。在公民權(quán)利保護方面,公民權(quán)利意識淡薄,不僅助長了公共權(quán)力濫用的勢頭,更導(dǎo)致“潛規(guī)則”在市場橫行；在憲法制度上,對公民權(quán)利保障也存在一定的缺陷,使公民在受到利益侵害時,不能有效地用法律保護自己。本文通過對公民選舉問題的探討,指出選舉中的腐敗問題,強調(diào)了保護公民權(quán)利的重要。 最后,本文提出了治理腐敗問題的幾點建議。構(gòu)建權(quán)力制衡的分權(quán)政府,通過權(quán)力約束遏制腐敗行為發(fā)生；推進政務(wù)公開,實行聽證制度,使權(quán)力的運行更加陽光透明；完善權(quán)力監(jiān)督機制,讓腐敗現(xiàn)象無法滋生；建立違憲審查制度,使公民的權(quán)利真正得到憲法保障。
[Abstract]:Corruption has been troubling people since ancient times. It not only damages the interests of citizens, but also has a serious impact on political stability. Scholars all over the world have been trying to find ways to deal with corruption, but it is still a long way to solve the problem of corruption. The development of the theory of constitutional economics makes people's choice of system return to the meta-rule, which may provide a new way of thinking for dealing with the problem of corruption. Firstly, corruption is the behavior of public officials to use public power to seek private interests of individuals or groups, and to infringe on public interests and legitimate interests of individuals. The effect of corruption is still controversial in academia. This paper argues that corruption should not be tolerated. Corruption exacerbates market failures and leads to serious government failures. If corruption is allowed to spread, political stability will also be affected. Therefore, the governance of corruption can not be lax for a moment. This is the starting point of this study. Then, this paper reviews the formation of the theory of constitutional economics. From Adam Smith's research on the conflict between government power and citizen's interests, to the formation of Hayek's model of freedom and rule of law, and finally to the establishment of Buchanan's theory of constitutional economics. The core idea advocated by constitutional economics is to limit government power and protect civil rights. Constitutional economics holds that restricting government power should reform the constitution and establish a democratic government model. Civil rights are always at a disadvantage relative to government power and need to be protected by contract so that citizens can obtain freedom and security. This kind of contract is the constitution. Only when the basic rights of citizens established by the constitution are effectively realized, can constitutionalism be truly realized. From the two angles of government power and civil right, this paper makes an in-depth study on the causes of corruption. In the aspect of government power, there is an inevitable connection between government power and corruption. The excessive power of government and the imbalance of distribution provide the conditions for the occurrence of corruption. Government officials use their power to interfere with the allocation of market resources, rent-seeking will inevitably occur; the excessive concentration of administrative power makes the power of a small number of officials far beyond the power of office, and provides a "convenient door" for leading corruption. The operation of administrative power is not regulated by law, and the operation of power can not be restricted effectively. Oversight of government power is not in place, and corrupt elements can also take advantage of it. In the protection of civil rights, the weak awareness of civil rights not only contributes to the momentum of abuse of public power, but also leads to the "hidden rules" in the market; in the constitutional system, there are also some defects in the protection of civil rights. So that citizens in the interests of infringement, can not effectively use the law to protect themselves. This paper points out the problem of corruption in election and emphasizes the importance of protecting citizens' rights. Finally, this paper puts forward some suggestions on how to deal with corruption. To build a decentralized government with checks and balances of power, to curb corruption through power restraint, to promote the openness of government affairs, to implement the hearing system, to make the operation of power more sunny and transparent, to perfect the mechanism of power supervision, and to make corruption impossible to breed; The establishment of unconstitutional review system, so that citizens' rights are truly guaranteed by the Constitution.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：東北財經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2010
【分類號】：D911;D035.4

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本文編號：1863608