【摘要】：真值函項(xiàng)的蘊(yùn)含面臨著所謂的"蘊(yùn)含悖論",它也是"烏鴉悖論"、"經(jīng)驗(yàn)意義標(biāo)準(zhǔn)"難題、葛第爾問題等一系列認(rèn)識論難題的邏輯根源。認(rèn)知蘊(yùn)含定義了一種非真值函項(xiàng)的蘊(yùn)含關(guān)系。如果"如果p那么q"是一種認(rèn)知蘊(yùn)含,那么這個(gè)蘊(yùn)含式是真的,當(dāng)且僅當(dāng)在p為真的條件下,q的概率是1。因此,認(rèn)知蘊(yùn)含表達(dá)一種特殊的條件概念。相應(yīng)地,部分認(rèn)知蘊(yùn)含可以基于概率論建立起來。引入認(rèn)知蘊(yùn)含,可以消解上述認(rèn)識論難題,普通認(rèn)知條件句和虛擬條件句(反事實(shí)條件句)也能以同樣的方式來處理,而不必求助于"可能世界"。
[Abstract]:The implication of truth function is faced with the so-called "paradox of implication", which is also the logical root of a series of epistemological problems, such as the "Raven Paradox", the "Standard of empirical meaning" and the Gerdil problem. Cognitive implication defines the implication of nontruth-valued functions. If "if p then Q" is a cognitive implication, then the implication is true, if and only if p is true, the probability of Q is 1. Therefore, cognitive implication expresses a special conditional concept. Accordingly, part of the cognitive implication can be established on the basis of probability theory. With the introduction of cognitive implication, the above epistemological problems can be solved, and the common cognitive conditional sentence and the virtual conditional sentence (counter-factual conditional sentence) can be dealt with in the same way, without resorting to the "possible world".
【作者單位】： 武漢大學(xué)哲學(xué)學(xué)院;
【基金】：國家社會科學(xué)基金項(xiàng)目“自然主義哲學(xué)與唯物主義的當(dāng)代形態(tài)研究”(14AZX011)
【分類號】：B842.1
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本文編號：2408663