本文關鍵詞： 退約 核不擴散 國際制度 社會網(wǎng)絡 朝核問題　出處：《外交學院》2013年碩士論文　論文類型：學位論文

【摘要】：2003年，朝鮮宣布退出《不擴散核武器條約》，成為迄今為止退出核不擴散機制的唯一國家。此文將具有分化傾向的國際制度視作一種外部壓力，認為不斷升高而又有區(qū)別的義務水平會增加成員退約的意愿。那么在現(xiàn)實中，一項制度為何被成員國放棄？又為何有國家在面臨制度壓力時選擇繼續(xù)留在制度內(nèi)（盡管同樣繼續(xù)違約）？此文從制度的社會網(wǎng)絡視角分析了制度成員的社會網(wǎng)絡特征與行為選擇之間的關聯(lián)，，指出在制度網(wǎng)絡中相對邊緣的朝鮮與相對中心的伊朗在行為選擇中存在的明顯差異。此文還通過對朝鮮退約之后美朝在核問題領域的互動過程的追蹤，說明大國承諾的履行對于小國行為約束的顯著影響。
[Abstract]:In 2003, the DPRK announced its withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear weapons (NPT) and became the only country so far to withdraw from the nuclear non-proliferation regime. This article regards the divisive international system as an external pressure. The idea that rising and differentiated levels of obligations would increase the willingness of members to withdraw. So why, in reality, is a system abandoned by member States? And why do countries choose to stay in the system when they face institutional pressure (even though they continue to default? This paper analyzes the relationship between the social network characteristics of institutional members and their behavior choices from the perspective of institutional social networks. The paper points out the obvious difference in behavior choice between North Korea, which is relatively marginal in the institutional network, and Iran, which is relatively central. This paper also tracks the interaction between the United States and North Korea in the field of nuclear issue after North Korea's withdrawal from the treaty. It shows the significant influence of the implementation of the great power commitment on the behavior restraint of the small country.
【學位授予單位】：外交學院
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2013
【分類號】：D815.2


本文編號：1468069