本文關(guān)鍵詞： 倫理 道德 倫理-道德關(guān)系 馬克思的變革方式　出處：《遼寧大學(xué)》2013年博士論文　論文類(lèi)型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：本文主要以西方傳統(tǒng)倫理-道德關(guān)系的演進(jìn)邏輯作為理論聚焦的切入點(diǎn)，比較系統(tǒng)梳理了倫理道德關(guān)系的發(fā)展，目的是把倫理與道德關(guān)系的變化在西方哲學(xué)發(fā)展歷程中加以呈現(xiàn)，通過(guò)對(duì)這一發(fā)展過(guò)程的內(nèi)容及其實(shí)質(zhì)的解析，梳理出其演進(jìn)的階段及其基本走向，并且通過(guò)對(duì)其問(wèn)題的詮釋，，以彰顯馬克思對(duì)以往的傳統(tǒng)所進(jìn)行的批判和改造，并在人的感性活動(dòng)的基礎(chǔ)上實(shí)現(xiàn)倫理與道德的統(tǒng)一。以此加深我們對(duì)馬克思主義倫理學(xué)的理解，豐富馬克思主義哲學(xué)的理論研究。同時(shí)，在綜合國(guó)內(nèi)外研究現(xiàn)狀的基礎(chǔ)上，通過(guò)對(duì)馬克思原著中的倫理-道德思想的解讀，提煉出其倫理-道德思想的發(fā)展脈絡(luò)及內(nèi)在邏輯，展現(xiàn)出具體的、歷史的、實(shí)踐的倫理道德觀點(diǎn)，汲取當(dāng)前對(duì)馬克思倫理-道德思想研究的合理內(nèi)核，為我國(guó)當(dāng)前的社會(huì)主義道德建設(shè)提供理論借鑒。本文的主要內(nèi)容如下： 第一章，緒論。主要從問(wèn)題的提出、國(guó)內(nèi)外的研究現(xiàn)狀、論文的主要內(nèi)容及理論與現(xiàn)實(shí)意義四個(gè)方面進(jìn)行了概述。 第二章，主要以西方倫理-道德關(guān)系的早期嬗變?yōu)榉治鲋骶�，闡述從西方早期的倫理理性到道德理性再到二者統(tǒng)一的發(fā)展過(guò)程。在西方，早期的希臘哲學(xué)是以自然萬(wàn)物的本原為主要研究對(duì)象。它把人與人之間關(guān)系的思考“投射”到自然宇宙背景上，自然哲學(xué)實(shí)質(zhì)是一種倫理理性。然而這種理性缺乏主體的自我意識(shí)，缺少內(nèi)在的自我約束。智者們雖然把人自身的倫理生活作為思考的對(duì)象，可是由于他們樸素的經(jīng)驗(yàn)主義，使得這種道德反思走向了相對(duì)主義的道路，但卻為蘇格拉底追求自身內(nèi)在的原則奠定了基礎(chǔ)。希臘流變的經(jīng)驗(yàn)主義使得對(duì)道德的詮釋面對(duì)著相對(duì)主義的消解，同時(shí)使得蘇格拉底實(shí)現(xiàn)了對(duì)道德概念的理性堅(jiān)守。 蘇格拉底從自身主觀世界中追求內(nèi)在確定性原則，從外在的倫理規(guī)范轉(zhuǎn)向內(nèi)心的道德思考。柏拉圖把靈魂區(qū)分成理性部分和非理性部分，并提出了“善”的理念論，理念的世界才是最真實(shí)、最高的存在，并借助人類(lèi)本性“分有”“善的理念”構(gòu)建他的等級(jí)分工的理想國(guó)。亞里士多德反對(duì)柏拉圖的抽象、空洞的“善的理念”，認(rèn)為單一的、普遍的、絕對(duì)的善理念是不存在的。“至善”是亞里士多德倫理思想的出發(fā)點(diǎn)和歸宿。人對(duì)最高的善的追求就是一個(gè)自我實(shí)現(xiàn)的過(guò)程。這是需要內(nèi)心的自我活動(dòng)，是自我與抽象的道德原則不斷發(fā)生關(guān)系的過(guò)程。 第三章，主要闡述西方倫理-道德關(guān)系在近代所呈現(xiàn)的分化及黑格爾對(duì)二者的統(tǒng)一所開(kāi)辟的實(shí)現(xiàn)途徑。在中世紀(jì)倫理和哲學(xué)均成為神學(xué)的一部分，可以說(shuō)倫理、道德、政治、法律的發(fā)展均在神學(xué)的統(tǒng)治之下。隨著文藝復(fù)興運(yùn)動(dòng)的興起，人們開(kāi)始由對(duì)天國(guó)的關(guān)注，變成對(duì)世俗生活的關(guān)注。馬基雅維里提出政治應(yīng)該擺脫傳統(tǒng)的德性觀點(diǎn)和神學(xué)的束縛，以權(quán)力替代道德成為政治的基礎(chǔ)。馬基雅維里的理論及現(xiàn)實(shí)性和經(jīng)驗(yàn)性的研究方法直接影響16-17世紀(jì)倫理學(xué)的發(fā)展。 經(jīng)驗(yàn)主義的代表人物休謨認(rèn)為，倫理學(xué)不是以理性為基礎(chǔ)的，而是在觀察和實(shí)驗(yàn)的基礎(chǔ)上，運(yùn)用感覺(jué)經(jīng)驗(yàn)和心理分析方法，建構(gòu)情感主義道德學(xué)體系，使其成為一門(mén)實(shí)踐科學(xué)。休謨認(rèn)為道德的基礎(chǔ)只能是人的情感，不是理性。理性只能幫助我們辨別事情的真相，卻不能判斷善惡。顯然，休謨的道德學(xué)說(shuō)并未超出經(jīng)驗(yàn)科學(xué)的心理主義的范疇，他的哲學(xué)思考已然脫離人類(lèi)現(xiàn)實(shí)的社會(huì)道德生活實(shí)踐。 因此，康德認(rèn)為經(jīng)驗(yàn)的東西是個(gè)別的、偶然的不具有普遍必然性，而理性概念又是空泛的，兩者都不能引出道德的最高原則，而必須挖掘人的理性本質(zhì)�？档抡J(rèn)為有理性的存在者自己為自己立法，所以意志必須自律，而且因自律而自由。“實(shí)然”與“應(yīng)然”的完全割裂，使康德的道德法則與現(xiàn)實(shí)生活脫離，成為一種抽象的形式主義的東西。直到黑格爾，才真正地區(qū)分了道德和倫理，黑格爾認(rèn)為道德也是一種法或一種權(quán)利，是一種主觀意志法，是一種“應(yīng)當(dāng)”的東西。然而這種主觀意志的法或是“應(yīng)當(dāng)”的東西卻只能在倫理當(dāng)中才能成為現(xiàn)實(shí)。黑格爾把倫理階段作為客觀精神的實(shí)際發(fā)展過(guò)程,其中包括家庭、市民社會(huì)與國(guó)家。黑格爾用絕對(duì)理念代替了康德的實(shí)踐理性，并把道德發(fā)展置于客觀理性的歷史辯證體系中。黑格爾在絕對(duì)理性的基礎(chǔ)上實(shí)現(xiàn)了倫理理性和道德理性的統(tǒng)一。 第四章與第五章，主要闡述馬克思對(duì)黑格爾和費(fèi)爾巴哈倫理道德思想的反思批判及其理論變革。馬克思認(rèn)為黑格爾站在唯心主義的立場(chǎng)，以抽象的無(wú)人身的理性作為主體，這種形式上的“絕對(duì)精神”并不具備現(xiàn)實(shí)的人的機(jī)能，這種在絕對(duì)理性基礎(chǔ)之上的倫理與道德的統(tǒng)一，并不是真正意義上的統(tǒng)一。黑格爾的法哲學(xué)是從家庭、市民社會(huì)和國(guó)家來(lái)理解倫理道德問(wèn)題，法，經(jīng)濟(jì)和政治的全部領(lǐng)域都同道德緊密相聯(lián)，雖然形式上是唯心主義的，但內(nèi)容卻是實(shí)在的。因此，我們說(shuō)黑格爾的倫理學(xué)具有現(xiàn)實(shí)性的特征。然而黑格爾的思辨哲學(xué)卻又是唯心主義的，他認(rèn)為精神存在于物質(zhì)世界之前，他所承認(rèn)的勞動(dòng)就只有精神勞動(dòng)，他的哲學(xué)思考始終是在追求著他的“絕對(duì)精神”，他把世界歷史看成是“精神的歷史”。因此，我們又說(shuō)黑格爾的哲學(xué)是非現(xiàn)實(shí)的，是純思辨的。費(fèi)爾巴哈雖然在感性自然人的基礎(chǔ)上恢復(fù)了唯物主義的權(quán)威性。然而，他不是把人看作社會(huì)的人，而是看成抽象的、生物學(xué)上的“人”，把人的本質(zhì)理解為單個(gè)人所固有的抽象物。費(fèi)爾巴哈哲學(xué)的根本局限在于它的感性直觀性，所以只能把對(duì)人的現(xiàn)實(shí)性的理解置于肉體的現(xiàn)存，而無(wú)法上升到實(shí)踐的批判性。只能以感性方式建立一種抽象愛(ài)的倫理學(xué)。 馬克思在對(duì)黑格爾和費(fèi)爾巴哈倫理道德思想反思批判的基礎(chǔ)上，反對(duì)一切抽象的、空洞的倫理說(shuō)教，主張道德研究要以實(shí)際的社會(huì)存在和人們現(xiàn)實(shí)生活作為基礎(chǔ)，并把人的感性活動(dòng)納入到歷史中進(jìn)行考察。馬克思認(rèn)為，道德是人的一種本質(zhì)力量，在實(shí)踐基礎(chǔ)上生成和發(fā)展的。道德與人的現(xiàn)實(shí)生活密不可分，歸根到底是生活實(shí)踐的產(chǎn)物。而倫理作為一種社會(huì)規(guī)范是在實(shí)踐基礎(chǔ)上道德觀念外化的產(chǎn)物。因此只有在感性活動(dòng)的基礎(chǔ)上才能達(dá)到倫理和道德的真正合一。 第六章主要從改革開(kāi)放的實(shí)踐中來(lái)理解馬克思倫理道德思想的現(xiàn)實(shí)意義，改革開(kāi)放使當(dāng)代社會(huì)處于新的轉(zhuǎn)型期，在此期間必然會(huì)出現(xiàn)道德觀念的變化和一些不良現(xiàn)象。如何克服不良道德以確立有利于實(shí)踐發(fā)展的新道德是值得我們思考和研究的。因此，我們的倫理規(guī)范必然要以實(shí)踐為基礎(chǔ)，向生活世界回歸，塑造理想人格，真正實(shí)現(xiàn)外在倫理規(guī)范和內(nèi)在道德自由的統(tǒng)一。為我國(guó)的社會(huì)主義道德建設(shè)提供指導(dǎo)與借鑒意義。
[Abstract]:This paper mainly by western traditional ethics moral evolution logic relationship as a starting point in theory focusing, systematically reviews the development of the relationship between ethics and morality, the purpose is to change the relationship between ethics and morality to be present in the development of western philosophy, through the analysis of the development process of the content and essence of the analysis, combs out the evolution the stage and the basic trend, and the problem of interpretation, in order to highlight the criticism and transformation of Marx to the tradition of the past, and based on human perceptual activities on the unity of ethics and morality. In order to deepen our understanding of Marx's ethics, enrich the theoretical study of Marx's philosophy. At the same time. Based on the current research, through the interpretation of Marx's original ethics moral thought, refine the ethical thought of development And the internal logic, showing the specific historical and practical ethical views, and drawing on the reasonable core of Marx's ethical and moral research, providing theoretical reference for our current socialist moral construction.
In the first chapter, the introduction, mainly from the question, the research status at home and abroad, the main content of the thesis and the four aspects of the theoretical and practical significance.
The second chapter, mainly in the early evolution of western ethical relations as the main line of analysis, elaborated from the early western ethical rationality to moral rationality to the development process of the two uniform. In the west, early Greek philosophy is the origin of all things in the nature as the main research object. It put on "the relationship between people projected to the natural cosmic background, natural philosophy is a kind of ethical rationality. However this kind of rational lack of subject consciousness, lack of discipline within. The wise men although the ethical life itself as object of thinking, but because of their simple empiricism, the moral reflection towards relativism, but but for Socrates to pursue their own intrinsic principle of the foundation. The face of the Greek empirical rheological relativism digestion on the moral interpretation, the su Grady realized the rational insisting on the concept of morality.
Socrates from their own subjective world in pursuit of the inherent uncertainty principle, from the external code of ethics to moral thinking of the heart. Platon put the soul into the rational and non rational part, and puts forward the concept of "good" theory, the concept of the world is the most true, the supreme being, and with the help of "human nature" the concept of "good" to construct his rank division of the Republic. Aristotle opposed Platon's abstract, empty the concept of "good", that a single, universal, absolute good idea. There is no "perfect" is the starting point and end result of Aristotle's ethics. The pursuit of the highest good is a process of self realization. It is the inner self, is a process of self and moral principles of the abstract relations continue to occur.
The third chapter mainly expounds the way of differentiation and Hagel West ethical relationship between modern unity of the two opened up. In the middle ages have become a part of ethical and philosophical theology, ethics, political ethics can be said that, the development of the law in the theology of rule. With the rise of the Renaissance the people of the Kingdom started by the attention turned to secular concerns of life. Machiavel put forward the political shackles should get rid of the traditional virtue and theology, to become a political power substitute moral foundation. The research methods of Machiavel theory and reality and experience directly affect the development of the 16-17 century ethics.
Empiricism representative Hume believes that ethics is not based on reason, but on the basis of observation and experiment, the use of sensory experience and psychological analysis, construct the emotionalism ethics system, make it become a practical science. Hume believed that moral foundation is only human emotions, not only rational reason. Help us tell the truth, but not the judgment of good and evil. Obviously, Hume's moral theory did not go beyond the experience of scientific psychological category, his philosophical thinking already from the human reality of social moral life practice.
Therefore, Kant believes that the experience of other things is a chance, do not have universal necessity, and rational concept is vague, neither of which leads to the highest principle of morality, and must be rational nature of people. Mining Kant thinks that rational beings for their own legislation, so the will must be self-discipline, self-discipline and because and free. "Completely separated" and the "ought", so that Kant's moral principles and the reality of life out, become a kind of abstract formalism. Until Hagel was really in a moral and ethical, Hagel believed that moral is a kind of method or a right, is a kind of subjective method that is a kind of "ought to be". But the subjective will of the law or "ought to be" something but only in ethics will become a reality. Hagel put the ethical stage as the actual development of the objective spirit Cheng included family, civil society and state. Hagel replaced the Kant's practical reason with the absolute idea and put the moral development in the dialectical system of objective rationality. Hagel realized the unity of ethical reason and moral reason on the basis of absolute rationality.
The fourth chapter and the fifth chapter mainly elaborates Marx to Hagel and Feuerbach's ethical thought of critical reflection and theory change. Marx thinks that Hagel stood in the abstract idealism, no personal reason as the main body, this kind of "absolute spirit" does not have the function, the unity of ethics and morality on the absolute rational foundation, unified and not the real meaning of Hagel's philosophy of law is from the family, civil society and country to understand the ethical issues, law, economic and political fields are all closely related with morality, although the form of idealism, but the content is real. Therefore, we say that the characteristics of Hagel's ethics with reality. However, Hagel's speculative philosophy is idealism, he believes that the spirit exists in the physical world before him That labor is only mental labor, his philosophical thinking is always in pursuit of his "absolute spirit", he put the world history as a "spiritual history". Therefore, we say that Hagel's philosophy is not reality, is purely speculative. Although Feuerbach materialism restoration based on perceptual nature of people the authority. However, he is not the man as a social person, but as an abstract, biological "people", the essence of the abstraction inherent in a single individual. The fundamental limitation of Feuerbach's philosophy lies in its sense of intuition, so only the reality of human understanding in the flesh to rise to the existing practice. Only in a critical way to establish a perceptual abstraction of love ethics.
Marx Hagel and Feuerbach based on the ethical thought of the criticism, against all abstract, empty preaching ethics, advocate moral study should take the actual social existence and the real life people as the basis, and make the human perceptual activities into history study. Marx believes that morality is a kind of human nature the formation and development on the basis of practice. The moral and life are inseparable, after all is the product of life practice and ethics. As a kind of social norms is a product on the basis of practice of moral concepts. Therefore only based on perceptual activity can achieve the ethics and morality of true one.
The sixth chapter mainly from the practical significance of the practice of reform and opening up to understand the ethical thought of Marx's reform and opening up, the contemporary society in the new transition period, the inevitable changes of moral concept and some bad phenomena during this period. How to overcome the bad moral to establish new moral practice for development is worthy of our consideration and study. Therefore, our ethics must be based on practice to return to the world of life, ideal personality, realize the unification of external ethical norms and inner moral freedom. To provide guidance and reference for the construction of socialist morality in our country.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：遼寧大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：B82-091;A811

【參考文獻(xiàn)】

相關(guān)期刊論文 前10條

1 陳亞軍;道德的客觀性何以可能？──評(píng)普特南的道德客觀性思想及其與邏輯實(shí)證主義的分歧[J];北京大學(xué)學(xué)報(bào)(哲學(xué)社會(huì)科學(xué)版);1995年06期

2 冀艷麗;;淺析康德道德哲學(xué)中的“人”——以《道德形而上學(xué)的奠基》為例[J];重慶科技學(xué)院學(xué)報(bào)(社會(huì)科學(xué)版);2011年07期

3 王淑芹;道德的自律與他律──馬恩與康德的兩種不同的道德自律觀[J];道德與文明;1998年04期

4 歐陽(yáng)旭曦;義務(wù)·法則·自由的內(nèi)在統(tǒng)一——康德的道德客觀性思想述評(píng)[J];湖南大學(xué)學(xué)報(bào)(社會(huì)科學(xué)版);2003年03期

5 高尚榮;;現(xiàn)代性道德重構(gòu)的精神哲學(xué)進(jìn)路——黑格爾《精神現(xiàn)象學(xué)》的現(xiàn)代性道德批判及啟示[J];河南大學(xué)學(xué)報(bào)(社會(huì)科學(xué)版);2010年01期

6 孫利天;純粹理論生活的理想[J];吉林大學(xué)社會(huì)科學(xué)學(xué)報(bào);2000年06期

7 寇東亮;;從“階級(jí)的道德”到“真正人的道德”——馬克思恩格斯對(duì)道德演進(jìn)的一種詮釋[J];馬克思主義與現(xiàn)實(shí);2009年01期

8 丁凡;;走出黑格爾體系的青年馬克思——從《〈黑格爾法哲學(xué)批判〉導(dǎo)言》與《論猶太人問(wèn)題》看馬克思的思想起程[J];馬克思主義與現(xiàn)實(shí);2010年01期

9 張之滄;;西方馬克思主義倫理思想研究[J];馬克思主義與現(xiàn)實(shí);2010年02期

10 邵曉光;當(dāng)代實(shí)踐特點(diǎn)與哲學(xué)應(yīng)用[J];江海學(xué)刊;2002年05期

本文編號(hào)：1449288