發(fā)布時間：2018-06-01 22:29

  本文選題：稅收改革 + 智利�。� 參考：《北京外國語大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：上世紀(jì)七八十年代見證了世界經(jīng)濟(jì)的轉(zhuǎn)型。七十年代開始的經(jīng)濟(jì)減速以及財政收入減少威脅了福利國家模式并促使其對經(jīng)濟(jì)政策進(jìn)行調(diào)整。在財政政策領(lǐng)域,較為突出的是稅收改革,包括使用增值稅、降低收入稅等。這些措施的目的是簡化稅收結(jié)構(gòu)、增加公共收入并提高財政效率。在拉丁美洲國家,稅收收入歷史上一直處于較低水平,其主要原因是較低的直接稅收入。高比例的間接稅以及低比例的直接稅不僅限制了政府調(diào)整經(jīng)濟(jì)的能力,也損害了再分配以及社會公正。鑒于稅收對于財政平衡和社會發(fā)展的重要性,研究稅收政策的決定因素是很有意義的。直到不久之前,同很多拉美國家一樣,智利的稅收收入中直接稅占比較低而增值稅占比較高。2001年的稅收改革試圖轉(zhuǎn)變這一結(jié)構(gòu),然而最終結(jié)果僅僅是企業(yè)稅的微調(diào)。然而,從2010年開始,智利的稅收改革開始發(fā)生變化:直接稅收入和增值稅收入在總稅收中的占比開始趨同。長期以來的改革困境和近年來改革進(jìn)程的突然提速都是值得研究并需要合理的解釋的現(xiàn)象。探明決定稅收結(jié)構(gòu)改變和決定改革進(jìn)程的因素對于其他國家具有借鑒意義。應(yīng)用權(quán)力資源理論,我的論文認(rèn)為商業(yè)集團(tuán)和民眾之間的力量對比是決定稅收改革結(jié)果的因素。這兩個群體對于財政政策有不同的偏好,并擁有不同的權(quán)力資源。當(dāng)提高財政收入、開展稅收改革的必要性出現(xiàn)時,商業(yè)組織更希望增加增值稅而非企業(yè)稅。而民眾則更希望增加企業(yè)稅,并避免增加增值稅。如果稅收改革進(jìn)入了政治議程,雙方都將用自己具有的權(quán)力資源來達(dá)到自己的目標(biāo)、影響改革的進(jìn)程和結(jié)果。商業(yè)組織擁有工具性權(quán)力,即政治力量。他們通過同政客和政黨的聯(lián)系以及運用自己的金錢資源來增強(qiáng)其工具性權(quán)力。另一種權(quán)力資源是結(jié)構(gòu)性權(quán)力,即威脅減少投資、影響經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展的能力。在民眾的權(quán)力資源方面,在民主政體中,民眾擁有選舉權(quán)帶來的權(quán)力,即選出支持再分配的左翼政府。民眾還擁有社會動員的權(quán)力,即開展抗議活動、罷工、動亂的能力,直接對政府施壓。當(dāng)權(quán)力對比有利于商業(yè)組織時,稅收改革將十分有限,尤其是增加直接稅的改革;當(dāng)權(quán)力對比有利于民眾時,改革幅度將更大且具有再分配的效果。為證明這一論點,我將運用對比案例研究的方法。研究同一個國家不同時期的改革可以控制歷史、文化、制度等變量。兩個案例分別為2001年和2014年稅收改革。使用的數(shù)據(jù)包括學(xué)者做過的訪談、國會文件、商業(yè)組織的備忘錄等。此外我參考民族志作品來了解智利社會運動的變化。最后,參考媒體報道和報告用以了解改革進(jìn)程。在2001年,由于威權(quán)政府時期的制度遺留,商業(yè)組織的工具性權(quán)力較強(qiáng),由于經(jīng)濟(jì)減速,其結(jié)構(gòu)性權(quán)力也較強(qiáng)。另一方面,由于選舉制度不利于民眾的代表性,民眾的選舉權(quán)帶來的權(quán)力較弱;同時,由于民主轉(zhuǎn)型的去動員化效果,民眾的社會動員能力也處于較弱水平。雙方力量對比有利于商業(yè)組織,因而2001年大幅增加直接稅的改革難以進(jìn)入政治議程,改革幅度較小。相反,在2014年,稅收改革進(jìn)程突然提速,并損害了商業(yè)組織的核心利益。商業(yè)組織的權(quán)力雖然有小幅下降,但并不明顯。因而,這一結(jié)果主要是由于民眾力量的增加。中左翼在2013年選舉中同時控制了行政權(quán)和立法權(quán),同時,2011年開始的社會運動改變了智利的歷史進(jìn)程并重塑了政治議程。這兩個案例不同結(jié)果之間的對比支持了我的假說。論文主要有兩個貢獻(xiàn)。首先,我的理論相比于現(xiàn)有理論更具有解釋力。我的理論能夠解釋同一個國家不同時期改革的不同結(jié)果,并有助于理解政治是如何影響經(jīng)濟(jì)政策的。其次,我的理論不否認(rèn)制度的影響,但是卻提出了解釋制度變化的假說。根據(jù)我的論點,制度本身即是社會力量對比的結(jié)果。力量對比在短期內(nèi)的浮動不會對制度造成大的影響。然而,如果社會力量對比發(fā)生了長久性根本性的變化,這一變化會同時造成制度的變革。智利的例子顯示了社會力量的變化是如何同時導(dǎo)致了制度的改變和政策結(jié)果的改變。
[Abstract]:The 70s and 80s last century witnessed the transformation of the world economy. The economic slowdown and the decrease in fiscal revenue in 70s threatened the welfare state model and adjusted its economic policy. In the field of fiscal policy, the more prominent is the tax reform, including the use of VAT, and the reduction of income tax. The purpose of these measures is to Simplifying the tax structure, increasing public income and improving financial efficiency. In Latin American countries, the tax revenue has been at a lower level in history, mainly due to lower direct tax revenues. A high proportion of indirect taxes and low proportion of direct taxes not only restrict the government's ability to adjust the economy, but also damage redistribution and social public. In view of the importance of tax on fiscal balance and social development, it is meaningful to study the determinants of tax policy. Until recently, like many Latin American countries, Chile's tax revenue was low in tax revenue and the tax reform, which was higher in.2001 years, tried to change this structure, but the final result was only the result. However, since 2010, the tax reform in Chile began to change: the proportion of direct tax revenue and VAT income in the total tax revenue began to converge. The long-term Reform Dilemma and the sudden speed of the reform process in recent years are both worthy of study and a reasonable explanation. The factors that make changes and determine the process of reform are useful for other countries. Applying the theory of power resources, my thesis holds that the strength contrast between the commercial group and the public is the factor determining the result of the tax reform. These two groups have different preferences on fiscal policy and have different power resources. When it comes to the necessity of tax reform, business organizations want to increase VAT rather than corporate taxes. People prefer to increase corporate taxes and avoid increasing VAT. If tax reform enters the political agenda, both sides will use their own power resources to reach their own goals and affect the process and results of the reform. Industry organizations have instrumental power, that is, political power. They strengthen their instrumental power by linking with politicians and political parties and using their own money resources. Another power resource is structural power, that is, the ability to threaten to reduce investment and to affect economic development. In the democratic regime, the public owns the power resources. The power brought by the right to vote is to select the left-wing government that supports redistribution. The public also has the power of social mobilization, that is, the ability to carry out protests, strikes, and unrest, to pressure the government directly. When the power comparison is beneficial to commercial organizations, the tax reform will be very limited, especially the reform of increasing direct tax; when the power comparison is beneficial to the people, it is beneficial to the people. In order to prove this, I will use the method of comparative case study to study the reform of the same country at different times. The two cases are the tax reform in 2001 and 2014. The data used by the scholars include interviews with scholars. In addition, I refer to the ethnographic works to understand the changes in the social movement in Chile. Finally, I refer to the media reports and reports to understand the process of reform. In 2001, due to the legacy of the authoritarian regime, the commercial organizations have strong instrumental power, and their structural power is stronger because of economic slowdown. On the other hand, because the electoral system is not conducive to the representative of the people, the power of the people's right to vote is weak. At the same time, because of the mobilization effect of the democratic transformation, the social mobilization ability of the people is also weak. The comparison between the two sides is beneficial to the commercial organization, so the reform of the direct tax increase in 2001 is difficult to enter the political discussion. On the contrary, in 2014, the process of tax reform was suddenly accelerated and undermined the core interests of commercial organizations. The power of commercial organizations, although a small decline, was not obvious. Thus, this result was mainly due to the increase of the public power. The middle left wing controlled both the administrative and legislative power in the 2013 election, while at the same time, The social movement, which began in 2011, changed the historical process of Chile and reshaped the political agenda. The contrast between the results of the two cases supported my hypothesis. The thesis has two contributions. First, my theory is more explanatory than the existing theory. My theory can explain the reform of the same country at different times. The same results help to understand how politics affect economic policy. Second, my theory does not deny the influence of the system, but it puts forward a hypothesis that explains the changes in the system. According to my argument, the system itself is the result of the comparison of social forces. The changes in social forces have changed in a long and fundamental way. This change will also cause changes in the system. The example of Chile shows how the changes in social forces have resulted in changes in the system and the change of policy results.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：北京外國語大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：D778.4;F811.4

【相似文獻(xiàn)】

相關(guān)期刊論文 前10條

1 裘元倫;2001—2005年德國稅收改革的背景、內(nèi)容和影響[J];德國研究;2000年04期

2 ;適應(yīng)世貿(mào)規(guī)則 深化稅收改革[J];學(xué)理論;2002年02期

3 方志平;推進(jìn)稅收改革 加速工業(yè)化進(jìn)程[J];學(xué)習(xí)導(dǎo)報;2003年12期

4 胡國香;趙建;;走出中國稅收改革之誤區(qū)——稅務(wù)總局局長肖捷談“稅收·發(fā)展·民生”[J];祖國;2012年13期

5 劉悌和;;匈牙利的稅收改革[J];現(xiàn)代國際關(guān)系;1988年01期

6 肖劍;國家確定稅收改革重點[J];黨政干部學(xué)刊;1997年01期

7 ;“十一五”時期稅收改革七大目標(biāo)[J];黨政干部文摘;2006年04期

8 李永祥;;深化稅收改革 確保各項任務(wù)完成[J];山西政報;2001年16期

9 王保安;借鑒國際經(jīng)驗 深化稅收改革[J];稅務(wù)研究;1997年12期

10 涂龍力;涂京騫;;“十一五”時期的稅收改革與稅收立法[J];遼寧稅務(wù)高等�？茖W(xué)校學(xué)報;2007年05期

相關(guān)會議論文 前1條

1 徐佳賓;徐佳蓉;;案例1 韓國的產(chǎn)業(yè)結(jié)構(gòu)調(diào)整和稅收改革[A];2011城市國際化論壇——全球化進(jìn)程中的大都市治理（案例集）[C];2011年

相關(guān)重要報紙文章 前10條

1 郭瑞軒;把十八屆三中全會精神貫穿于稅收改革發(fā)展全過程[N];中國稅務(wù)報;2013年

2 本報記者 單曉宇;深化稅收改革專題研討會在京召開[N];中國稅務(wù)報;2014年

3 沈 安;智利宣布稅收改革措施[N];中國稅務(wù)報;2002年

4 裘元倫;2001年～2005年：德國的稅收改革[N];河北經(jīng)濟(jì)日報;2000年

5 中國社會科學(xué)院歐洲研究所所長 裘元倫;德國稅收改革的內(nèi)容和影響（上）[N];經(jīng)濟(jì)參考報;2000年

6 中國社會科學(xué)院歐洲研究所所長 裘元倫;德國稅收改革的內(nèi)容和影響[N];經(jīng)濟(jì)參考報;2000年

7 曹林;稅收改革中的公意正常表達(dá)[N];市場報;2005年

8 常士臣;諾貝爾獎經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家對中國稅收改革的啟示[N];黑龍江經(jīng)濟(jì)報;2012年

9 中國社會科學(xué)院歐洲研究所所長 裘元倫;德國稅收改革的內(nèi)容和影響[N];經(jīng)濟(jì)參考報;2000年

10 盧慧菲;日本稅收改革瞄準(zhǔn)經(jīng)濟(jì)振興[N];中國稅務(wù)報;2006年

相關(guān)碩士學(xué)位論文 前5條

1 劉未;從政治角度分析社會力量對比與智利稅收改革—應(yīng)用權(quán)力資源理論[D];北京外國語大學(xué);2017年

2 林拾根（LAM SAP KAN）;香港經(jīng)濟(jì)轉(zhuǎn)型與稅收改革研究[D];華僑大學(xué);2004年

3 張潔;基于A物流企業(yè)的稅收改革問題研究[D];河南大學(xué);2013年

4 李憲成;石油行業(yè)稅收問題研究[D];天津財經(jīng)學(xué)院;2002年

5 姚君;我國知識產(chǎn)權(quán)稅收改革研究[D];華中科技大學(xué);2006年

，

本文編號：1965952