股東和投資者被視為所有組織的神經(jīng)中樞,因?yàn)樗鼈兗瓤梢源_保組織的功能和可持續(xù)性,又可以為公司提供資本投入,并確定公司的價(jià)值�；诖酥R(shí),管理層需要通過質(zhì)量和可靠的收益報(bào)告向他們提供忠實(shí)的代表。獨(dú)立審計(jì)師的素質(zhì)和能力證明了這種保證應(yīng)是明顯的。公司審計(jì)流程的質(zhì)量將隱瞞的錯(cuò)誤陳述降低到可理解的保證水平的可能性,這嚴(yán)重影響了報(bào)告的收益和投資者對公司股票的信心。但是,操縱收益管理和低質(zhì)量收益的案例在全球市場上一直在增加,這使股東們對他們的投資前景和當(dāng)今審計(jì)流程的質(zhì)量產(chǎn)生疑問。因此,在尼日利亞上市的制造公司中,對審計(jì)質(zhì)量對股東收益和股票可預(yù)測性影響的實(shí)證研究已迫在眉睫。為了填補(bǔ)這一空白,這項(xiàng)工作試圖研究審計(jì)質(zhì)量對尼日利亞股東收益和股價(jià)可預(yù)測性的影響。具體而言,該工作研究了盈余質(zhì)量的持久性和定價(jià),以及審計(jì)質(zhì)量對股東盈余(以每股收益衡量)和股價(jià)可預(yù)測性(以每股未來市場價(jià)格衡量)的影響。該方法采用事后研究設(shè)計(jì)。從2009年至2018年之間在尼日利亞證券交易所上市的二十一家制造公司中選擇的十一家制造公司的已審計(jì)財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)表中收集的數(shù)據(jù)。審計(jì)質(zhì)量的數(shù)據(jù)包括審計(jì)公司規(guī)模,審計(jì)師任期和審計(jì)公司專業(yè)化。收益數(shù)據(jù)包括資產(chǎn)...

【文章頁數(shù)】：82 頁

【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士

【文章目錄】：
ABSTRACT
摘要
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION
    1.1 Background of the Study
    1.2 Statement of the problem
    1.3 Research Objectives
    1.4 Research Questions
    1.5 Scope of the Study
    1.6 Significance of the Study
        1.6.1 Theoretical Significance
        1.6.2 Practical Significance
    1.7 Research Innovation
CHAPTER2 LITERATURE REVIEW
    2.1 Conceptual Review
        2.1.1 The Concept of Audit Quality
        2.1.2 Audit Quality Measurements
            2.1.2.1 Audit Independence
            2.1.2.2 Audit Firm Size
            2.1.2.3 Auditor Tenure as the
            2.1.2.4 Audit Firm Specialization
        2.1.3 Concept of Earnings Quality
            2.1.3.1 Earnings Persistence
            2.1.3.2 Shareholders’Earnings and Audit Quality
        2.1.4 Stock Prices,Audit Quality and Earnings Quality
    2.2 Empirical Review
    2.3 Theoretical Framework
CHAPTER3 METHODOLOGY
    3.1 Research Design
    3.2 Population and Sample of the Study
    3.3 Sources of Data
    3.4 Techniques of Data Analysis
    3.5 Model Specification
    3.6 Variables Description
CHAPTER4 DATA PRESENTATION AND RESULTS
    4.1 Descriptive Statistics
    4.2 Correlation Analysis of Variables
    4.3 Regression Results/ Test of Hypotheses
        4.3.1 Audit independence(ADI)effect on EPS and MPS
        4.3.2 Audit firm size(AFS)effect on EPS and MPS
        4.3.3 Audit Tenure(ADT)effect on EPS and MPS
        4.3.4 Audit Firm Specialization effect on EPS and MPS
    ROBUSTNESS TEST
CHAPTER5 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION
    5.1 Conclusion
    5.2 Recommendations
REFERENCES
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
PUBLICATIONS
APPENDIX



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