本文選題：業(yè)主管理 + 激勵機(jī)制��； 參考：《華北電力大學(xué)(北京)》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：電力工程項目的建設(shè)是一項需要多方參與、多方協(xié)作的系統(tǒng)工程,因此,關(guān)于電力工程項目的費(fèi)用控制也會涉及到多個角色。設(shè)計階段作為工程項目的起始階段,業(yè)主方能否在此階段對費(fèi)用進(jìn)行合理有效的控制決定了整個工程的管控方向。在我國現(xiàn)階段的設(shè)計取費(fèi)模式下,設(shè)計單位優(yōu)化設(shè)計方案、降低設(shè)計概算的動力明顯不足,業(yè)主對設(shè)計承包商的管理方式需要創(chuàng)新。因此,建立激勵機(jī)制優(yōu)化業(yè)主與設(shè)計承包商之間天然存在的博弈關(guān)系,實(shí)現(xiàn)業(yè)主與設(shè)計承包商之間的互利共贏,進(jìn)而有效的控制工程建設(shè)的總體費(fèi)用是現(xiàn)階段亟需解決的問題。為了解決這一問題,本文在廣泛查找、閱讀、分析國內(nèi)外文獻(xiàn)的基礎(chǔ)上,研究了激勵理論的發(fā)展歷程及最新的研究成果,指出了現(xiàn)行激勵理論立足于“理性人”的假設(shè)并不能夠有效地解決工程中的激勵問題。在這些研究的基礎(chǔ)上,本文提出了運(yùn)用心理學(xué)的相關(guān)理論知識來完善現(xiàn)有的激勵機(jī)制。通過將目前心理學(xué)中比較前沿的前景理論引入激勵研究中,本文立足于業(yè)主角度,構(gòu)建了業(yè)主對設(shè)計承包商的激勵模型,并將研究成果應(yīng)用至合同條款中,用以指導(dǎo)工程實(shí)踐。在相關(guān)理論的研究基礎(chǔ)上,本文將業(yè)主對設(shè)計承包商的激勵階段劃分為招投標(biāo)階段、設(shè)計階段及施工階段三個階段。針對設(shè)計階段,構(gòu)建了設(shè)計進(jìn)度、設(shè)計質(zhì)量、經(jīng)濟(jì)合理三個激勵指標(biāo);針對施工階段,構(gòu)建了設(shè)計變更及設(shè)計服務(wù)兩個指標(biāo)。將各個指標(biāo)的獎懲費(fèi)用運(yùn)用前景理論轉(zhuǎn)換為人所感受到的得失效用,以效用為基礎(chǔ),立足于業(yè)主方的角度,對如何對設(shè)計承包商進(jìn)行激勵機(jī)制的設(shè)計進(jìn)行了研究,構(gòu)建了符合雙方心理預(yù)期的激勵機(jī)制。并根據(jù)研究成果,驗證了激勵條款的設(shè)定能夠幫助業(yè)主方在招投標(biāo)階段優(yōu)選設(shè)計承包商。在模型構(gòu)建的基礎(chǔ)上,本文對近年北京市110kV變電工程歷史數(shù)據(jù)進(jìn)行收集。通過利用數(shù)理統(tǒng)計的方法,得出了經(jīng)濟(jì)合理指標(biāo)樣本數(shù)據(jù)的概率頻度圖和累積概率曲線,隨后運(yùn)用國網(wǎng)公司通用造價及現(xiàn)行激勵模式的相關(guān)規(guī)定,求解得出經(jīng)濟(jì)合理指標(biāo)的獎懲基本點(diǎn)及激勵系數(shù),并細(xì)化至設(shè)計費(fèi)取費(fèi)累計費(fèi)率中。對于設(shè)計變更及設(shè)計服務(wù)指標(biāo),利用累計前景值及MATLAB中的遺傳算法工具箱分別求出相應(yīng)激勵參數(shù)的獎懲基本點(diǎn),并求解相應(yīng)的激勵系數(shù)及累計費(fèi)率。最后根據(jù)研究結(jié)果進(jìn)行了合同條款的設(shè)計,使研究結(jié)果更具有實(shí)用性。
[Abstract]:The construction of electric power engineering project is a system engineering which needs multi-participation and multi-cooperation. Therefore, the cost control of power engineering project also involves many roles. The design stage is the initial stage of the project. Whether the owner can control the cost reasonably and effectively at this stage determines the control direction of the whole project. At the present stage in our country, the design unit optimizes the design scheme and reduces the power of the design estimate obviously, and the owner's management mode of the design contractor needs to be innovated. Therefore, it is urgent to establish an incentive mechanism to optimize the natural game relationship between the owner and the design contractor, to realize the mutual benefit and win-win between the owner and the design contractor, and to effectively control the overall cost of the project construction. In order to solve this problem, based on the extensive search, reading and analysis of the literature at home and abroad, this paper studies the development of incentive theory and the latest research results. It is pointed out that the current incentive theory based on the hypothesis of "rational man" can not effectively solve the problem of incentive in engineering. On the basis of these studies, this paper puts forward to improve the existing incentive mechanism by using the relevant theoretical knowledge of psychology. By introducing the frontier foreground theory of psychology into the incentive research, this paper constructs the incentive model of the design contractor based on the owner's angle, and applies the research results to the contract terms to guide the engineering practice. Based on the research of relevant theories, this paper divides the incentive stage of the design contractor into three stages: bidding stage, design stage and construction stage. Aiming at the design stage, three incentive indexes of design progress, design quality and economy are constructed, and two indexes of design change and design service are constructed in view of the construction stage. This paper transforms the prospect theory of reward and punishment cost of each index into the benefit and loss utility that people feel. Based on the utility and based on the owner's angle, this paper studies how to design the incentive mechanism for the design contractor. The incentive mechanism which accords with the psychological expectation of both parties is constructed. According to the research results, it is verified that the setting of incentive clause can help the owner to select the design contractor in the bidding stage. Based on the model construction, this paper collects the historical data of Beijing 110kV substation project in recent years. By using the method of mathematical statistics, the probability frequency chart and cumulative probability curve of the sample data of economic and reasonable indexes are obtained, and then the general cost of the national network company and the relevant regulations of the current incentive model are used. The basic points of rewards and punishments and the incentive coefficient of the economic reasonable index are obtained, and are refined into the cumulative rate of the design fee. For the design change and design service index, the rewards and punishment basic points of the corresponding incentive parameters are obtained by using the cumulative foreground value and the genetic algorithm toolbox in MATLAB, and the corresponding incentive coefficient and cumulative rate are solved. Finally, the contract terms are designed according to the research results, which makes the results more practical.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：華北電力大學(xué)(北京)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F224.32;F426.61

【參考文獻(xiàn)】

相關(guān)期刊論文 前10條

1 郭濤;;電力工程項目風(fēng)險管理研究[J];科技創(chuàng)新導(dǎo)報;2016年21期

2 周丹丹;李威偉;孫宇清;;博弈論隱私保護(hù)方法研究綜述[J];小型微型計算機(jī)系統(tǒng);2015年12期

3 王曉偉;丁曉京;侯智愚;;工程總承包項目的費(fèi)用控制管理[J];化工管理;2014年10期

4 王榴;陳建明;;基于委托代理模型的建筑工程激勵合同機(jī)制研究[J];工程管理學(xué)報;2014年01期

5 李悅軍;;房地產(chǎn)項目設(shè)計階段存在的問題與管理措施[J];中國高新技術(shù)企業(yè);2013年24期

6 郭延永;劉攀;吳瑤;;基于累計前景理論的城市軌道交通建設(shè)時序[J];交通運(yùn)輸系統(tǒng)工程與信息;2013年04期

7 姚晉川;;“一體五制”夯實(shí)項目精細(xì)管理基礎(chǔ)[J];施工企業(yè)管理;2013年04期

8 閆平;;我國房地產(chǎn)開發(fā)項目設(shè)計階段的管理分析[J];價值工程;2013年01期

9 蔡輝旺;陶莉;;限額設(shè)計下項目成本控制的探討[J];建筑經(jīng)濟(jì);2012年02期

10 唐小弟;魏蓉;;項目業(yè)主的激勵成本與設(shè)計方利益的博弈模型[J];中南林業(yè)科技大學(xué)學(xué)報;2011年06期

相關(guān)博士學(xué)位論文 前3條

1 易濤;基于費(fèi)用控制的業(yè)主對承包商激勵機(jī)制設(shè)計與模型構(gòu)建[D];華北電力大學(xué);2014年

2 韓國波;基于全壽命周期的建筑工程質(zhì)量監(jiān)管模式及方法研究[D];中國礦業(yè)大學(xué)（北京）;2013年

3 官慶;大型公用建筑項目設(shè)計風(fēng)險管理研究[D];西南交通大學(xué);2007年

相關(guān)碩士學(xué)位論文 前6條

1 張玲;斯金納的強(qiáng)化理論在高中歷史教學(xué)中的應(yīng)用探究[D];重慶師范大學(xué);2016年

2 朝樂夢;雙因素理論視角下我國基層政府公務(wù)員激勵機(jī)制的思考[D];陜西師范大學(xué);2015年

3 袁源;基于生命周期理論的大型工程項目監(jiān)理激勵機(jī)制研究[D];西南交通大學(xué);2015年

4 董宇恒;相對價值創(chuàng)造及長短期業(yè)績相結(jié)合的經(jīng)營者激勵模型研究[D];東北大學(xué);2014年

5 王斌;科研激勵的需要維度研究[D];太原科技大學(xué);2010年

6 王蕊;建設(shè)項目利益相關(guān)者協(xié)調(diào)管理研究[D];中南大學(xué);2008年

，

本文編號：1938704