本文選題：服務(wù)質(zhì)量 + 博弈分析��； 參考：《北京交通大學(xué)》2017年博士論文

【摘要】：在排隊(duì)系統(tǒng)中,服務(wù)質(zhì)量是反映顧客滿意度的重要指標(biāo).服務(wù)臺(tái)的故障及休假均能影響服務(wù)質(zhì)量.基于服務(wù)質(zhì)量,本文從經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)角度考慮了可修排隊(duì)、休假排隊(duì)及醫(yī)療服務(wù)系統(tǒng)等若干排隊(duì)系統(tǒng)的博弈問(wèn)題.首先,本文將可修排隊(duì)系統(tǒng)與重試排隊(duì)系統(tǒng)相結(jié)合,分析了同質(zhì)顧客與異質(zhì)顧客的策略行為.其次,在不同信息水平下,研究了帶有工作休假的離散排隊(duì)系統(tǒng)和帶門(mén)策略的雙向排隊(duì)系統(tǒng)中顧客的策略行為.最后,本文研究了醫(yī)療服務(wù)系統(tǒng)中的博弈分析及最優(yōu)預(yù)算分配策略.本文共分為五章.第一章簡(jiǎn)述了排隊(duì)博弈分析的研究背景及現(xiàn)狀,并給出了本文所需的基本概念及理論知識(shí).第二章分析了可修重試排隊(duì)系統(tǒng)中的博弈問(wèn)題.2.1節(jié)討論了帶單刪除機(jī)制的常數(shù)重試排隊(duì)系統(tǒng)中顧客的策略行為,得到了可見(jiàn)與不可見(jiàn)情形下顧客的均衡策略及社會(huì)最優(yōu)策略.直觀地認(rèn)為,服務(wù)臺(tái)故障會(huì)降低顧客的服務(wù)質(zhì)量,導(dǎo)致進(jìn)入系統(tǒng)的顧客數(shù)減少.然而,數(shù)值實(shí)例顯示,不同信息水平下顧客對(duì)單位時(shí)間內(nèi)發(fā)生故障次數(shù)的偏好不一樣.2.2節(jié)用可修重試排隊(duì)系統(tǒng)刻畫(huà)了感知錯(cuò)誤下的認(rèn)知用戶在頻譜共享中的策略行為,服務(wù)臺(tái)故障看作是授權(quán)用戶的到達(dá).其中,認(rèn)知用戶發(fā)生感知錯(cuò)誤會(huì)降低系統(tǒng)的服務(wù)質(zhì)量.本節(jié)重點(diǎn)分析了感知錯(cuò)誤對(duì)認(rèn)知用戶策略行為的影響,通過(guò)征收入場(chǎng)費(fèi)的方式使得認(rèn)知用戶按照社會(huì)最優(yōu)策略采取行動(dòng),從而充分利用有限的認(rèn)知無(wú)線電資源.2.3節(jié)給出了可修的經(jīng)典重試排隊(duì)系統(tǒng)中異質(zhì)顧客的博弈分析,數(shù)值實(shí)例表明,單位時(shí)間內(nèi)顧客的等待花費(fèi)不同時(shí),服務(wù)商最大利潤(rùn)與社會(huì)收益最大值不再相等,顧客的異質(zhì)性增加了顧客間的負(fù)外部經(jīng)濟(jì)效應(yīng).第三章研究了離散時(shí)間與連續(xù)時(shí)間休假排隊(duì)系統(tǒng)中的博弈問(wèn)題.3.1節(jié)得到了單重工作休假策略下離散排隊(duì)系統(tǒng)中的顧客均衡策略,分析了不同信息水平對(duì)顧客策略的影響.另外通過(guò)數(shù)值實(shí)例分析了休假時(shí)間對(duì)顧客均衡行為的影響.3.2節(jié)利用門(mén)策略控制下的雙向排隊(duì)系統(tǒng)討論了'乘客-出租車(chē)'中的博弈問(wèn)題,該門(mén)策略表明當(dāng)出租車(chē)的數(shù)量達(dá)到最大閾值時(shí)停止進(jìn)入系統(tǒng),低于一定閾值時(shí)重新開(kāi)始進(jìn)入系統(tǒng).在此門(mén)策略下,得到了三種不同信息水平(完全不可見(jiàn)、幾乎不可見(jiàn)和完全可見(jiàn)情形)下到達(dá)乘客的均衡進(jìn)隊(duì)策略與社會(huì)最優(yōu)進(jìn)隊(duì)策略.數(shù)值實(shí)例表明,在完全可見(jiàn)情形下,顧客的均衡閾值策略不僅依賴于門(mén)策略,也依賴于乘客與出租車(chē)到達(dá)率的大小關(guān)系.當(dāng)出租車(chē)的停車(chē)數(shù)量比較多時(shí),帶有門(mén)策略的雙向排隊(duì)系統(tǒng)能夠在一定條件下提高系統(tǒng)的社會(huì)收益.第四章基于博弈理論,通過(guò)權(quán)衡系統(tǒng)的服務(wù)速率與服務(wù)質(zhì)量研究了醫(yī)療服務(wù)系統(tǒng)中的預(yù)算分配策略,分別得到了兩層和三層醫(yī)療服務(wù)系統(tǒng)中病人的均衡策略及唯一最優(yōu)分配策略.而且對(duì)于旨在通過(guò)預(yù)算分配策略提高服務(wù)速率與服務(wù)質(zhì)量的不同層次的醫(yī)療服務(wù)系統(tǒng),上述結(jié)果具有魯棒性.從社會(huì)管理者(政府)角度出發(fā),其分析結(jié)果為公共醫(yī)療服務(wù)系統(tǒng)中預(yù)算分配問(wèn)題提供了合理的建議.第五章總結(jié)了本論文的成果與創(chuàng)新點(diǎn),并給出了未來(lái)的研究方向.
[Abstract]:In the queuing system, the quality of service is an important indicator of customer satisfaction. The failure and vacation of the service table can affect the quality of service. Based on the quality of service, this paper considers the game problems of a number of queuing systems, such as repairable queues, vacation queues and medical service systems from the economic point of view. The trial queuing system is combined to analyze the strategic behavior of homogeneity customers and heterogeneous customers. Secondly, under different information levels, this paper studies the customer strategy behavior in the discrete queuing system with work vacation and the two-way queuing system with gate strategy. Finally, this paper studies the game analysis and optimal budget allocation in the medical service system. This paper is divided into five chapters. In the first chapter, the research background and current situation of queuing game analysis are briefly described, and the basic concepts and theoretical knowledge are given in this paper. The second chapter analyzes the game problem.2.1 in retrial retrial queuing system, and discusses the customer strategy behavior in a constant retrial queuing system with single deletion mechanism. The customer equilibrium strategy and social optimal strategy under visible and invisible conditions are considered. It is intuitively believed that the service table failure can reduce the customer's service quality and lead to the reduction of the number of customers entering the system. However, the numerical example shows that the preference of the customer to the number of failures per unit time under different information levels is not the same as.2.2 repairable. The trial queuing system depicts the strategy behavior of the cognitive users in the spectrum sharing under the perceived error. The service desk failure is regarded as the arrival of the authorized users. In this section, the cognitive users' perception errors will reduce the system's service quality. This section focuses on the analysis of the effect of perception errors on the cognitive user strategy behavior and through the acquisition of admission fees. In order to make the cognitive users act according to the social optimal strategy, the game analysis of the heterogeneous customers in the repairable classic retrial queuing system is given full use of the limited cognitive radio resource.2.3 section. The numerical example shows that the maximum profit and the maximum social income value of the service provider are different when the customer's waiting cost is different within the unit time. The customer heterogeneity increases the negative external economic effect between customers. In the third chapter, the game problem.3.1 in the discrete time and continuous time vacation queuing system is studied. The customer equilibrium strategy in the discrete queuing system under the single work vacation strategy is obtained, and the influence of the different information level on the customer strategy is analyzed. A numerical example is given to analyze the effect of vacation time on customer equilibrium behavior..3.2 section uses a two-way queuing system controlled by gate strategy to discuss the game problem in the "passenger taxi". The strategy shows that when the number of taxis reaches the maximum threshold, it stops entering the system and begins to enter the system when the threshold is below a certain threshold. Under the strategy, three different information levels (completely invisible, almost invisible and fully visible) are obtained to reach the balanced queue strategy and the social optimal team strategy. The numerical example shows that the customer's equilibrium threshold strategy depends not only on the gate strategy but also on the passenger and taxi arrival rates in the completely visible case. When the number of taxi parking is much more, the two-way queuing system with gate strategy can improve the social income of the system under certain conditions. The fourth chapter studies the budget allocation strategy in the medical service system by weighing the service rate and quality of service based on game theory, and obtains two and three layers respectively. The balance strategy and the only optimal allocation strategy in the medical service system. And the results are robust to the different levels of medical service system aimed at improving service rate and quality of service through the budget allocation strategy. From the perspective of the social Manager (government), the results of the analysis are in the public health service system. The fifth chapter summarizes the achievements and innovations of this paper, and gives directions for future research.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：北京交通大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：F224.32

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