機會網(wǎng)絡中節(jié)點激勵機制研究
發(fā)布時間：2018-09-11 15:05
【摘要】：機會網(wǎng)絡是由無線自組織網(wǎng)絡和延遲容忍網(wǎng)絡演化而來的一種新型網(wǎng)絡,它是一種源節(jié)點與目的節(jié)點可能不存在完整的通信鏈路、利用節(jié)點移動帶來的相遇機會進行數(shù)據(jù)交換的移動自組織網(wǎng)絡。與傳統(tǒng)的無線自組織網(wǎng)絡不同,機會網(wǎng)絡節(jié)點稀疏、分布不均勻,節(jié)點間都是機會性的相遇,所以采用的是“存儲-攜帶-轉發(fā)”的路由機制。這種路由機制完全依賴于中繼節(jié)點的合作,現(xiàn)有的路由轉發(fā)協(xié)議也都是假設節(jié)點會選擇合作即幫助其他節(jié)點轉發(fā)數(shù)據(jù)。然而,組成機會網(wǎng)絡的大部分移動設備是資源有限的,比如電池、內(nèi)存、CPU等資源。如果節(jié)點被理性個體控制的話,它們可能會為了節(jié)省資源而不幫其他節(jié)點轉發(fā)消息,這些節(jié)點被稱為“自私節(jié)點”,目前,大量文獻研究發(fā)現(xiàn)這些自私節(jié)點將嚴重影響整個網(wǎng)絡的性能,并且導致數(shù)據(jù)傳輸率下降。 本文提出的激勵機制就是為了解決自私節(jié)點影響網(wǎng)絡性能的問題,現(xiàn)有的一些激勵機制基本上都是應用在傳統(tǒng)的無線自組織網(wǎng)絡當中,然而由于機會網(wǎng)絡的一些固有特性如網(wǎng)絡間歇性斷開、延遲長等,使得這些激勵機制不太適用于機會網(wǎng)絡。本文在討論現(xiàn)有的激勵機制基礎上,提出了一種基于交換的聲譽激勵機制(ERIS),該機制的主要思想是：相遇的兩個節(jié)點是基于感興趣的消息出發(fā),聲譽高的兩個相遇節(jié)點彼此交換消息,本文認為任何交換的消息都是有價值的,雖然有可能交換到的消息不是自身感興趣的,但是以后可以用它們來交換自身感興趣的消息,這樣的交互使得消息在網(wǎng)絡中能夠順利的傳輸,數(shù)據(jù)傳輸延遲下降。不交換消息(不合作)的節(jié)點不僅可能失去自身感興趣的消息也會導致聲譽下降,聲譽下降到比閾值低時,它將被隔離出網(wǎng)絡,不會再有節(jié)點為它轉發(fā)消息。 本文利用博弈論理論分析ERIS機制,并在ONE模擬器上進行仿真實驗,實驗結果表明該激勵機制可以減少節(jié)點的自私行為,提高數(shù)據(jù)的傳輸率。自私行為在長期看來對節(jié)點自身是不利的,節(jié)點為了獲取自身感興趣的消息和提高自身的聲譽會盡量選擇合作,實驗證明在本文的激勵機制中節(jié)點選擇納什均衡的策略組合時,整個網(wǎng)絡的性能和數(shù)據(jù)傳輸率均得到很大的改善。
[Abstract]:Opportunistic network is a new network evolved from wireless ad hoc network and delay tolerance network. It is a kind of source node and destination node which may not have a complete communication link. A mobile ad hoc network that uses the encounter opportunity brought by node mobility to exchange data. Different from the traditional wireless ad hoc networks, the nodes of the opportunistic networks are sparse, unevenly distributed, and the nodes meet each other opportunistically, so the routing mechanism of "store-carry-forward" is adopted. This routing mechanism depends entirely on the cooperation of relay nodes. Existing routing and forwarding protocols also assume that nodes will choose cooperation to help other nodes forward data. However, most of the mobile devices that make up the opportunity network have limited resources, such as batteries, memory processors, and so on. If nodes were controlled by rational individuals, they might not forward messages for other nodes, known as "selfish nodes," in order to save resources. A large number of literatures have found that these selfish nodes will seriously affect the performance of the entire network and lead to a decrease in the data transmission rate. The incentive mechanism proposed in this paper is to solve the problem that selfish nodes affect the performance of the network. Some existing incentive mechanisms are basically applied in the traditional wireless ad hoc networks. However, due to some inherent characteristics of opportunistic networks, such as intermittent disconnection, long delay and so on, these incentive mechanisms are not suitable for opportunistic networks. In this paper, based on the discussion of the existing incentive mechanism, a reputation incentive mechanism based on exchange (ERIS),) is proposed. The main idea of the mechanism is that the two nodes met are based on the interested message. Two reputable meeting nodes exchange messages with each other. This paper holds that any messages exchanged are valuable. Although the messages that may be exchanged are not of interest to them, they can be used to exchange messages of interest to them in the future. Such interaction enables messages to be transmitted smoothly in the network, and data transmission delays decrease. The node that does not exchange messages (uncooperative) may not only lose the information of its own interest but also lead to the loss of reputation. When the reputation falls below the threshold it will be isolated from the network and no more nodes will forward messages for it. In this paper, the game theory is used to analyze the ERIS mechanism, and the simulation experiments are carried out on the ONE simulator. The experimental results show that the excitation mechanism can reduce the selfish behavior of the nodes and improve the data transmission rate. In the long run, selfishness is unfavorable to the node itself. In order to obtain the information of interest to the node and improve its reputation, the node will choose cooperation as far as possible. The experimental results show that in the incentive mechanism of this paper, the node chooses the Nash equilibrium strategy combination. The performance and data transmission rate of the whole network are greatly improved.
【學位授予單位】：大連理工大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：TN92
本文編號：2237041
[Abstract]:Opportunistic network is a new network evolved from wireless ad hoc network and delay tolerance network. It is a kind of source node and destination node which may not have a complete communication link. A mobile ad hoc network that uses the encounter opportunity brought by node mobility to exchange data. Different from the traditional wireless ad hoc networks, the nodes of the opportunistic networks are sparse, unevenly distributed, and the nodes meet each other opportunistically, so the routing mechanism of "store-carry-forward" is adopted. This routing mechanism depends entirely on the cooperation of relay nodes. Existing routing and forwarding protocols also assume that nodes will choose cooperation to help other nodes forward data. However, most of the mobile devices that make up the opportunity network have limited resources, such as batteries, memory processors, and so on. If nodes were controlled by rational individuals, they might not forward messages for other nodes, known as "selfish nodes," in order to save resources. A large number of literatures have found that these selfish nodes will seriously affect the performance of the entire network and lead to a decrease in the data transmission rate. The incentive mechanism proposed in this paper is to solve the problem that selfish nodes affect the performance of the network. Some existing incentive mechanisms are basically applied in the traditional wireless ad hoc networks. However, due to some inherent characteristics of opportunistic networks, such as intermittent disconnection, long delay and so on, these incentive mechanisms are not suitable for opportunistic networks. In this paper, based on the discussion of the existing incentive mechanism, a reputation incentive mechanism based on exchange (ERIS),) is proposed. The main idea of the mechanism is that the two nodes met are based on the interested message. Two reputable meeting nodes exchange messages with each other. This paper holds that any messages exchanged are valuable. Although the messages that may be exchanged are not of interest to them, they can be used to exchange messages of interest to them in the future. Such interaction enables messages to be transmitted smoothly in the network, and data transmission delays decrease. The node that does not exchange messages (uncooperative) may not only lose the information of its own interest but also lead to the loss of reputation. When the reputation falls below the threshold it will be isolated from the network and no more nodes will forward messages for it. In this paper, the game theory is used to analyze the ERIS mechanism, and the simulation experiments are carried out on the ONE simulator. The experimental results show that the excitation mechanism can reduce the selfish behavior of the nodes and improve the data transmission rate. In the long run, selfishness is unfavorable to the node itself. In order to obtain the information of interest to the node and improve its reputation, the node will choose cooperation as far as possible. The experimental results show that in the incentive mechanism of this paper, the node chooses the Nash equilibrium strategy combination. The performance and data transmission rate of the whole network are greatly improved.
【學位授予單位】：大連理工大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：TN92
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