運(yùn)用博弈論建模高鐵和航空競爭的研究
發(fā)布時(shí)間:2023-02-07 13:35
高速鐵路(HSR)系統(tǒng)已被全球證明是一種高效的運(yùn)輸方式。預(yù)計(jì)將填補(bǔ)更快的城際乘客流動的需求缺口,并迎合不斷增加的客流量。高鐵的引入改變了客運(yùn)行業(yè)的動態(tài)。因此,了解引進(jìn)高鐵后市場的反響是非常重要的。高鐵的快速發(fā)展對航空服務(wù)產(chǎn)生了很大的沖擊,新高鐵線路的開通,造成了許多國家航空公司市場份額的巨大損失和航空公司業(yè)務(wù)的減少。因此,航空公司和高鐵在客源的競爭上十分激烈,尤其是在歐洲和亞洲國家。這種競爭通常集中于服務(wù)質(zhì)量,開行頻次以及城市中心間能否很好的接駁。與航空公司相比,高鐵是一種更安全、更舒適的交通方式,這種優(yōu)勢促使了客流在航空和鐵路運(yùn)輸方式之間的轉(zhuǎn)移或重新分配。很少有研究人員嘗試研究揭示調(diào)查高速鐵路和航空運(yùn)輸之間競爭關(guān)系的數(shù)學(xué)模型。大多數(shù)都側(cè)重于研究一種運(yùn)輸方式(尤其是航空運(yùn)輸)的再分配和收入損失模型的影響。這種信息差促使了本研究的開展,本研究旨在研究利用博弈論來模擬高鐵與航空運(yùn)輸之間的競爭。本文以市場進(jìn)入博弈模型為基礎(chǔ),以均衡票價(jià)和服務(wù)頻率為重點(diǎn),探究中距離高速鐵路和航空運(yùn)輸之間的競爭,并以北京到上海1300公里的中距離客運(yùn)為例,對其進(jìn)行了研究。航空運(yùn)輸是運(yùn)輸市場的在位者,而高鐵則是試圖...
【文章頁數(shù)】:64 頁
【學(xué)位級別】:碩士
【文章目錄】:
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
CHINESE ABSTRACT
ABSTRACT
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
1.1 MOTIVATION
1.1.1 High-speed rail (HSR)
1.1.2 Rapid Development of HSR in China
1.1.3 Fierce competition between Air transport and HSR
1.1.4 Key findings
1.2 SIGNIFICANCE
1.3 PROBLEM STATEMENT
1.4 JUSTIFICATION
1.5 OBJECTIVE
1.6 SCOPE
1.7 Outline of thesis
1.8 Methodology
1.9 Expected outcome
CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 MARKET ENTRY GAME
2.2 GAME STRATEGY
2.3 PASSENGER DEMAND
2.4 MARKET SHARE SPLIT
2.4.1 Mode switch
2.4.2 Passenger supply
2.4.3 Cost functions
2.5 PAYOFF FUNCTION
2.5.1 Sunk costs and subsidies
2.6 CONVERGENCE
2.7 COMPETITION IN A MARKET ENTRY GAME
2.8 COMPETITION AND COOPERATION IN A MARKET ENTRY GAME
2.9 WELFARE
2.10 CONCLUSION
CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY
3.1 PROBLEM STATEMENT
3.2 GAME MODEL
3.2.1 Objective function
3.2.2 Market entry game process
3.2.3 Passenger's travel preference questionnaire
3.2.4 Mode share(Market Share Split)
3.2.5 Model and constraint for the AIR transport
3.2.6 Model and constraint for the HSR transport
3.3 Conclusion
CHAPTER 4: CASE STUDY
4.1 CASE BACKGROUND
4.2 CASE STUDY TO FIND EQUILIBRIUM BETWEEN TRAVEL MODES
4.3 RESULTS COMPARISON BETWEEN ACCOMMODATION AND DETERRENCE STRATEGIES
4.4 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION
5.1 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
5.2 RECOMMENDATIONS:
References
APPENDIX
Dataset for the Master’s Thesis
本文編號:3736922
【文章頁數(shù)】:64 頁
【學(xué)位級別】:碩士
【文章目錄】:
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
CHINESE ABSTRACT
ABSTRACT
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
1.1 MOTIVATION
1.1.1 High-speed rail (HSR)
1.1.2 Rapid Development of HSR in China
1.1.3 Fierce competition between Air transport and HSR
1.1.4 Key findings
1.2 SIGNIFICANCE
1.3 PROBLEM STATEMENT
1.4 JUSTIFICATION
1.5 OBJECTIVE
1.6 SCOPE
1.7 Outline of thesis
1.8 Methodology
1.9 Expected outcome
CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 MARKET ENTRY GAME
2.2 GAME STRATEGY
2.3 PASSENGER DEMAND
2.4 MARKET SHARE SPLIT
2.4.1 Mode switch
2.4.2 Passenger supply
2.4.3 Cost functions
2.5 PAYOFF FUNCTION
2.5.1 Sunk costs and subsidies
2.6 CONVERGENCE
2.7 COMPETITION IN A MARKET ENTRY GAME
2.8 COMPETITION AND COOPERATION IN A MARKET ENTRY GAME
2.9 WELFARE
2.10 CONCLUSION
CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY
3.1 PROBLEM STATEMENT
3.2 GAME MODEL
3.2.1 Objective function
3.2.2 Market entry game process
3.2.3 Passenger's travel preference questionnaire
3.2.4 Mode share(Market Share Split)
3.2.5 Model and constraint for the AIR transport
3.2.6 Model and constraint for the HSR transport
3.3 Conclusion
CHAPTER 4: CASE STUDY
4.1 CASE BACKGROUND
4.2 CASE STUDY TO FIND EQUILIBRIUM BETWEEN TRAVEL MODES
4.3 RESULTS COMPARISON BETWEEN ACCOMMODATION AND DETERRENCE STRATEGIES
4.4 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION
5.1 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
5.2 RECOMMENDATIONS:
References
APPENDIX
Dataset for the Master’s Thesis
本文編號:3736922
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