基于利益博弈視角下的農(nóng)村土地流轉(zhuǎn)問題研究
發(fā)布時(shí)間：2019-05-10 12:13
【摘要】：改革開放三十多年以來,農(nóng)村家庭聯(lián)產(chǎn)承包責(zé)任制對推動(dòng)農(nóng)村經(jīng)濟(jì)社會(huì)發(fā)展,提高農(nóng)業(yè)現(xiàn)代化水平,鞏固農(nóng)業(yè)基礎(chǔ)性地位,提高農(nóng)民生活水平等方面發(fā)揮了巨大作用。隨著生產(chǎn)力的發(fā)展和時(shí)代進(jìn)步,傳統(tǒng)家庭聯(lián)產(chǎn)承包責(zé)任制的小農(nóng)經(jīng)營模式越來越不適應(yīng)現(xiàn)代工業(yè)化和城鎮(zhèn)化的發(fā)展需要。出于對農(nóng)民生活水平的進(jìn)一步提高,農(nóng)業(yè)發(fā)展的進(jìn)一步現(xiàn)代化,農(nóng)村經(jīng)濟(jì)社會(huì)進(jìn)一步發(fā)展的考慮,必須制定優(yōu)化農(nóng)村土地資源配置的相關(guān)土地制度和土地政策,如何制定和完善農(nóng)村土地流轉(zhuǎn)制度成為當(dāng)務(wù)之急。 任何一種制度安排都是現(xiàn)有條件下中央與地方及各利益相關(guān)方進(jìn)行博弈的結(jié)果。在國家法律和地方規(guī)范不同的規(guī)則體系下,會(huì)形成不同的利益博弈格局。農(nóng)村土地流轉(zhuǎn)背后存在的利益差異,使得中央和地方通常會(huì)站在不同的社會(huì)政治、經(jīng)濟(jì)的考量下會(huì)做出不同的利益選擇。作為農(nóng)村土地流轉(zhuǎn)的直接參與者,基層政府、土地流入方、土地流出方對農(nóng)村土地使用權(quán)的流轉(zhuǎn)基于利益訴求采取何種立場、各自會(huì)選擇怎樣的策略來推動(dòng)或限制土地流轉(zhuǎn)、在土地流轉(zhuǎn)過程中究竟問題的癥結(jié)何在、各利益相關(guān)方最終的博弈會(huì)導(dǎo)致何種結(jié)果,是當(dāng)前農(nóng)村土地流轉(zhuǎn)問題研究中需要關(guān)注的問題。其中,完善農(nóng)村土地流轉(zhuǎn)制度的關(guān)鍵在于如何進(jìn)行利益與價(jià)值權(quán)衡,從而使參與博弈的各主體利益最大化,即達(dá)到博弈的納什均衡�；诖�,本研究通過對農(nóng)村土地流轉(zhuǎn)各參與主體的收益、博弈的成因、博弈的結(jié)果分析,力圖從中發(fā)現(xiàn)土地流轉(zhuǎn)政策博弈過程中存在的問題,并提出完善土地流轉(zhuǎn)制度、機(jī)制的政策建議。 本文主要由7章組成。 第一章：緒論。主要介紹論文的選題背景及研究的意義,分析了國內(nèi)外對于土地流轉(zhuǎn)問題的研究現(xiàn)狀,概述了本論文的研究方法。 第二章：研究土地流轉(zhuǎn)主體利益博弈的理論基礎(chǔ)。理論是研究的指南。本章主要介紹本論文在撰寫過程中涉及到的理論依據(jù),主要包括博弈論、社會(huì)資本理論、土地政策理論和制度變遷理論等。 第三章：中央政府與地方政府的利益博弈分析。本章主要從宏觀層面闡述了利益博弈的兩大主體,中央政府與地方政府在利益博弈中的策略選擇,以及博弈的最終結(jié)果。 第四章：農(nóng)村土地流轉(zhuǎn)各參與主體間的博弈分析。本章主要從微觀的視角去剖析農(nóng)村土地流轉(zhuǎn)利益主體之間的博弈,介紹了博弈的三大主體：基層政府、土地流入方、土地流出方,并明確了各主體的收益,通過建立博弈模型,推演出相關(guān)結(jié)論。 第五章：土地流轉(zhuǎn)過程中存在的問題。本章主要從中央政府、地方政府和土地流出方三方各自分析了土地流轉(zhuǎn)過程中存在的問題。 第六章：解決土地流轉(zhuǎn)問題的對策。本章主要針對第五章的問題逐一進(jìn)行了分析,提出了解決方案。 第七章：總結(jié)部分。主要對全文的邏輯框架進(jìn)行了一個(gè)小結(jié),同時(shí)展望了未來還有待進(jìn)一步研究和拓展的問題。
[Abstract]:Since the reform and opening-up for more than 30 years, the responsibility system for rural families has played an important role in promoting the economic and social development of the rural areas, improving the level of agricultural modernization, strengthening the basic status of agriculture and improving the living standards of the peasants. With the development of the productive forces and the progress of the times, the small-scale peasant operation model of the traditional household contract responsibility system is becoming more and more unsuitable for the development of the modern industrialization and the urbanization. In the light of the further improvement of the living standard of the peasants, the further modernization of the agricultural development and the further development of the rural economy and society, the relevant land system and land policy for optimizing the allocation of rural land must be formulated, It is urgent to develop and improve the rural land circulation system. Any one of the institutional arrangements is the knot of the game between the central and local and the stakeholders under the existing conditions Fruit. Under the different rules and regulations of national laws and local codes, different interests games can be formed. The interest difference behind the rural land circulation is that the center and the place usually stand in different social and political and economic considerations to make different interests. Alternative. As the direct participant of the rural land circulation, the grass-roots government, the land inflow party and the land outflow party take the position on the transfer of the rural land use right based on the interest demand, and the respective strategies will be chosen to push or restrict the land flow In the process of land circulation, what is the crux of the problem, what is the result of the final game of the stakeholders is the question that needs to be paid attention to in the current research of the rural land circulation The key to the improvement of the rural land circulation system is how to balance the interests and the value, so as to maximize the interests of the main subjects involved in the game, that is, the Nash of the game On the basis of this, this study tries to find out the problems existing in the process of land circulation policy game by analyzing the income, the cause of the game and the result of the game, and put forward the policy construction to improve the land circulation system and mechanism. The present paper is mainly composed of 7 chapter This paper mainly introduces the background and significance of the thesis, and analyses the present situation of the research on the land circulation problem both at home and abroad. The second chapter: to study the interests of the main body of the land flow The theoretical basis of game theory. This chapter mainly introduces the theoretical basis of the paper in the writing process, mainly including the game theory, the social capital theory, the land policy theory and the theory of land policy. The theory of institutional change, etc. Chapter 3: the central government and the local This chapter mainly expounds the two main subjects of the interest game from the macro level, and the strategic choice of the central government and the local government in the interest game. And the final result of the game. This chapter mainly analyzes the game between the main body of the rural land circulation from the micro view point of view, and introduces the three main subjects of the game: the grass-roots government, the land inflow party, the land outflow party, and the income of the main body, and through the establishment of the game The relevant conclusions are derived from the model and the relevant conclusions are derived. : The problems existing in the process of land circulation. This chapter is mainly analyzed from the three sides of the central government, the local government and the land outflow party. There are some problems in the process of land circulation. Chapter 6: Measures to solve the problem of land circulation. This chapter is mainly on the question of the fifth chapter. The analysis is carried out on a case-by-case basis. Chapter 7: A summary of the logical framework of the full text.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：東北財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F321.1
本文編號：2473637
[Abstract]:Since the reform and opening-up for more than 30 years, the responsibility system for rural families has played an important role in promoting the economic and social development of the rural areas, improving the level of agricultural modernization, strengthening the basic status of agriculture and improving the living standards of the peasants. With the development of the productive forces and the progress of the times, the small-scale peasant operation model of the traditional household contract responsibility system is becoming more and more unsuitable for the development of the modern industrialization and the urbanization. In the light of the further improvement of the living standard of the peasants, the further modernization of the agricultural development and the further development of the rural economy and society, the relevant land system and land policy for optimizing the allocation of rural land must be formulated, It is urgent to develop and improve the rural land circulation system. Any one of the institutional arrangements is the knot of the game between the central and local and the stakeholders under the existing conditions Fruit. Under the different rules and regulations of national laws and local codes, different interests games can be formed. The interest difference behind the rural land circulation is that the center and the place usually stand in different social and political and economic considerations to make different interests. Alternative. As the direct participant of the rural land circulation, the grass-roots government, the land inflow party and the land outflow party take the position on the transfer of the rural land use right based on the interest demand, and the respective strategies will be chosen to push or restrict the land flow In the process of land circulation, what is the crux of the problem, what is the result of the final game of the stakeholders is the question that needs to be paid attention to in the current research of the rural land circulation The key to the improvement of the rural land circulation system is how to balance the interests and the value, so as to maximize the interests of the main subjects involved in the game, that is, the Nash of the game On the basis of this, this study tries to find out the problems existing in the process of land circulation policy game by analyzing the income, the cause of the game and the result of the game, and put forward the policy construction to improve the land circulation system and mechanism. The present paper is mainly composed of 7 chapter This paper mainly introduces the background and significance of the thesis, and analyses the present situation of the research on the land circulation problem both at home and abroad. The second chapter: to study the interests of the main body of the land flow The theoretical basis of game theory. This chapter mainly introduces the theoretical basis of the paper in the writing process, mainly including the game theory, the social capital theory, the land policy theory and the theory of land policy. The theory of institutional change, etc. Chapter 3: the central government and the local This chapter mainly expounds the two main subjects of the interest game from the macro level, and the strategic choice of the central government and the local government in the interest game. And the final result of the game. This chapter mainly analyzes the game between the main body of the rural land circulation from the micro view point of view, and introduces the three main subjects of the game: the grass-roots government, the land inflow party, the land outflow party, and the income of the main body, and through the establishment of the game The relevant conclusions are derived from the model and the relevant conclusions are derived. : The problems existing in the process of land circulation. This chapter is mainly analyzed from the three sides of the central government, the local government and the land outflow party. There are some problems in the process of land circulation. Chapter 6: Measures to solve the problem of land circulation. This chapter is mainly on the question of the fifth chapter. The analysis is carried out on a case-by-case basis. Chapter 7: A summary of the logical framework of the full text.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：東北財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F321.1
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