基于信息不對(duì)稱的中建銀行深圳市分行信貸風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管理對(duì)策研究
[Abstract]:Commercial banks are the most important part of our financial system. The capital safety of commercial banks is related to the people's livelihood of the society, especially the quality of credit assets, and is related to the health, stability and order of the overall economic operation of the country. How to prevent and control the credit risk of commercial banks and improve their ability of credit risk management under the complicated and changeable economic situation at home and abroad, In front of commercial banks is a very practical issue is also urgent to solve the problem. Judging from the bad credit cases of banks, the formation of credit risks is artificially or unintentionally resulting in asymmetric information between banks and enterprises, which affects the banks' correct judgment on the operation, profitability, legal compliance and other situations of the enterprises. Therefore, the formation of credit risk, and the causes of information asymmetry mainly have two aspects: leakage and loss of information transmission within banks, resulting in the result of information asymmetry: the borrower has the choice to transmit information to the bank. Subjective filtering of negative information. Therefore, the key to reduce the credit risk is to reduce the leakage in the internal information transmission of the bank and to reduce the information asymmetry between the bank and the borrower. This paper mainly combines the author's practical experience in many posts such as bank credit initiation, examination and approval, post-loan management, bad collection and so on, starting with the introduction of the types of bank credit risk and the identification of credit risk. This paper analyzes the present situation of credit supply and credit risk prevention and control system of China Construction Bank Shenzhen Branch, and analyzes the existing credit risk prevention and control system, which reveals the information asymmetry in the credit granting of the bank. Through the investigation and argumentation of actual cases, this paper thinks about how to avoid the blind spot of information in the current bank's credit examination and approval and post-loan management, and puts forward innovatively the problem of information asymmetry in the face of the bank's credit risk. Starting with the core competitiveness, business situation, financial situation and so on, we should refine the content of information collection, emphasize the relationship between each other, strive to obtain relatively complete information to counter the adverse effects of information asymmetry, and put forward the idea of product innovation. System innovation, model innovation, and so on, applying new financial products such as syndicated loans, adopting the system of stationed account manager, setting up a system of prevention and control, and so on, to eliminate the problem of information asymmetry. To strengthen the transformation and application of research results. Hope to help banks strengthen the risk management ability of credit, promote the security, stability and harmonious development of bank credit.
【學(xué)位授予單位】:天津大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】:碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】:2013
【分類號(hào)】:F832.4
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