本文選題：制度環(huán)境 + 股權(quán)激勵契約結(jié)構(gòu)　； 參考：《中國礦業(yè)大學》2013年博士論文

【摘要】：股權(quán)激勵一直被視為解決“斯密難題”的較佳方案。然而，中國上市公司的股權(quán)激勵自從推行伊始就是怪相頻出，過低的行權(quán)價格、寬松的行權(quán)條件、較短的激勵期限等，已儼然變形為福利性制度安排。論文突破了以往單從外生視角直接考察高管持股與公司業(yè)績關(guān)系的局限，針對我國上市公司普遍存在的政府干預、內(nèi)部人控制及其導致的管理層權(quán)力問題突出的現(xiàn)實背景下，提出從契約結(jié)構(gòu)的內(nèi)生視角考察制度環(huán)境、股權(quán)激勵契約結(jié)構(gòu)及效應三者之間的關(guān)系。 論文首先從委托代理理論、契約理論及兩權(quán)聯(lián)盟理論系統(tǒng)提煉出股權(quán)激勵的理論基礎，其次對國內(nèi)外文獻進行了系統(tǒng)梳理。在此基礎上，論文從規(guī)范和實證兩個角度，以股權(quán)分置改革后我國證券市場2006-2011年公告股權(quán)激勵計劃的上市公司為樣本，構(gòu)建數(shù)學模型，利用多元線性回歸、因子分析、配對樣本T檢驗、中介變量檢驗等方法檢驗了制度環(huán)境、股權(quán)激勵契約結(jié)構(gòu)及效應三者之間的關(guān)系。在指標設計中，論文從政府與市場的關(guān)系、地區(qū)市場化水平、企業(yè)最終控制人類別三個變量衡量政府干預程度；從大股東持股和Z指數(shù)衡量股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)；從兩職設置情況、董事會規(guī)模、管理層持股、董事會持股四個變量衡量管理層權(quán)力大��；從激勵水平、模式、期限及行權(quán)價格四個要素衡量股權(quán)激勵契約結(jié)構(gòu)；從公司業(yè)績和盈余管理兩個層面測度股權(quán)激勵效應。研究發(fā)現(xiàn)： （1）制度環(huán)境影響股權(quán)激勵契約結(jié)構(gòu)。①政府干預降低了股權(quán)激勵水平；②管理層權(quán)力越大，選擇的行權(quán)價格越低；③大股東持股比例越高，股權(quán)激勵水平越低，選擇的行權(quán)價格越高； （2）股權(quán)激勵契約結(jié)構(gòu)影響激勵效應。①管理層股權(quán)激勵水平越高、貨幣激勵越高、激勵期限越短，公司業(yè)績越好，最佳的激勵有效期為3-4年，股權(quán)激勵短期化行為嚴重；采用股票期權(quán)模式的公司業(yè)績更好；②管理層獲得的股票數(shù)量越多，貨幣薪酬越高，激勵期限越長，盈余管理行為越嚴重。 （3）制度環(huán)境、股權(quán)激勵契約結(jié)構(gòu)及效應三者之間存在相關(guān)關(guān)系。①股權(quán)激勵水平在政府干預和公司業(yè)績間起中介傳導作用。與非國有控股公司相比，政府干預不僅降低了國有控股上市公司的股權(quán)激勵水平，還降低了公司業(yè)績；②不同所有制下上市公司管理層進行機會主義行為的時間和方式不同。非國有控股公司管理層在初始設計股權(quán)激勵契約時權(quán)力較大，往往通過自身的權(quán)力影響薪酬委員會在合適的時間獲得較低的行權(quán)價格。而政府干預抑制了國有控股公司管理層在初始制定薪酬契約時的影響力，很難獲得較低的行權(quán)價格，，為了達到行權(quán)條件，管理層往往在股權(quán)激勵的實施過程中進行盈余管理；③大股東的存在在一定程度上抑制了管理層機會主義行為。 論文從制度環(huán)境的角度為上市公司有效實施股權(quán)激勵提供了經(jīng)驗證據(jù)，豐富了股權(quán)激勵契約結(jié)構(gòu)及效應的相關(guān)文獻。研究表明，股權(quán)激勵的實施提升了公司業(yè)績，但同時也導致管理層的短期化行為和機會主義行為�？傮w來說，中國尚不具備大規(guī)模推行股權(quán)激勵的充分條件，只宜適度試點，目前的核心工作仍是繼續(xù)加大完善公司治理機制和制度法規(guī)的建設力度。
[Abstract]:Equity incentive has always been regarded as a better solution to the "Smith Problem". However, the stock incentive of Chinese listed companies has been frequent since the beginning of the implementation, the low price of the right, the loose right conditions, the short incentive period, etc., have been transformed into a welfare system. This paper examines the limitations of the relationship between executive stock ownership and corporate performance. In the light of the prevailing background of government intervention, insider control and the management power caused by the listed companies in China, the institutional environment is investigated from the Endogenous Perspective of the contract structure and the relationship between the three parties.
This paper first abstracts the theoretical basis of equity incentive from the principal-agent theory, contract theory and the two right alliance theory system. Secondly, the paper systematically combs the domestic and foreign documents. On this basis, the paper from the two angles of standard and empirical analysis, the public equity incentive plan of China's stock market after 2006-2011 years' equity division reform is listed public. As a sample, we construct a mathematical model, and use the multiple linear regression, factor analysis, paired sample T test and intermediate variable test to test the relationship between the institutional environment, the structure of the equity incentive contract and the effect of the three. In the index design, the thesis is based on the relationship between the government and the market, the level of Regional Marketization, and the final control of the human three. The degree of government intervention is measured by a variable; the stock ownership structure is measured from the large stockholders and Z index; from the two position setting, the size of the board of directors, the managerial ownership, and the four variables of the board of directors measure the power size of the management level; the structure of equity incentive contract is measured from the four elements of the incentive level, model, term and the price of the power; from the company industry Two levels of performance and earnings management measure equity incentive effect.
(1) the institutional environment affects the structure of equity incentive contract. (1) the government intervention reduces the level of equity incentive; the greater the power of the management, the lower the choice of the right price; the higher the proportion of the large shareholders, the lower the equity incentive level, the higher the choice of the right price.
(2) the equity incentive contract structure affects the incentive effect. (1) the higher the management level, the higher the level of equity incentive, the higher the monetary incentive, the shorter the duration of the incentive, the better the performance of the company, the best incentive validity period of 3-4 years, the serious short-term behavior of the equity incentive, the better performance of the public stock options with the stock option model, and the more stocks obtained by the management level, The higher the monetary pay and the longer the incentive period, the more serious the earnings management behavior.
(3) there is a correlation between the institutional environment, the structure of the equity incentive contract and the effect of the three. (1) the level of equity incentive plays an intermediary role between government intervention and the performance of the company. The time and way of the opportunistic behavior of the management of the listed companies under the system are different. The management of non state holding companies has great power in the initial design of the equity incentive contract, and often affects the salary Committee through its own power to get the lower price of the executive power at the appropriate time. In order to achieve the right conditions, management often conducts earnings management during the implementation of equity incentive, and the existence of large shareholders inhibits the opportunism of management to a certain extent.
From the perspective of institutional environment, this paper provides empirical evidence for the effective implementation of equity incentive for listed companies, enriches the related literature of the structure and effect of equity incentive contract. The research shows that the implementation of equity incentive has promoted the company performance, but also leads to the short-term management and opportunism behavior. With the sufficient conditions for carrying out the equity incentive on a large scale, it is only suitable for a moderate pilot, and the current core work remains to continue to strengthen the construction of the corporate governance mechanism and the system and regulations.

【學位授予單位】：中國礦業(yè)大學
【學位級別】：博士
【學位授予年份】：2013
【分類號】：F272.92;F275;F832.51

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