本文選題：政府補(bǔ)助 + 市場反應(yīng)��； 參考：《西南大學(xué)》2013年碩士論文

【摘要】：政企關(guān)系一直是學(xué)術(shù)界研究的重點(diǎn)問題。我國當(dāng)前仍處于由計(jì)劃經(jīng)濟(jì)體制向市場經(jīng)濟(jì)體制轉(zhuǎn)軌的過程中,證券市場作為國民經(jīng)濟(jì)的晴雨表更是將這背后的政企關(guān)系表露無遺。一方面,眾多由國有公司改制而來的上市公司與政府的利益關(guān)系深度交織,地方政府出于增加社會(huì)就業(yè)、對(duì)地方企業(yè)承擔(dān)的政策性負(fù)擔(dān)進(jìn)行補(bǔ)償、滿足資本市場的各種硬性指標(biāo)要求等各種目的參與到上市公司的盈余管理中去,給予了這些公司大量的政府補(bǔ)助。另一方面,出于宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)調(diào)控、中觀產(chǎn)業(yè)扶持和微觀技術(shù)創(chuàng)新的目的,各級(jí)政府給予了眾多上市公司專項(xiàng)財(cái)政補(bǔ)貼,用以引導(dǎo)企業(yè)投資方向,培植企業(yè)核心競爭力,實(shí)現(xiàn)政府調(diào)整國民經(jīng)濟(jì)產(chǎn)業(yè)結(jié)構(gòu)的目的。政府補(bǔ)助切實(shí)改善了上市公司的財(cái)務(wù)狀況,提高了上市公司的經(jīng)營業(yè)績,扮靚了報(bào)告期內(nèi)的會(huì)計(jì)盈余,而專項(xiàng)補(bǔ)助更可在長期改善企業(yè)的營運(yùn)水平和盈利能力。當(dāng)這些公司發(fā)布政府補(bǔ)助公告后,其背后所具有的信息含量能夠改善投資者對(duì)于公司未來的經(jīng)營預(yù)期,從而導(dǎo)致股票市場的價(jià)格變動(dòng),產(chǎn)生一定的超額收益,也即引起股票市場的市場反應(yīng)。 本文即以政府補(bǔ)助公告的市場反應(yīng)作為研究內(nèi)容,首先采用事件研究法對(duì)政府補(bǔ)助公告的市場反應(yīng)存在與否進(jìn)行了檢驗(yàn)與分析,接著基于已證實(shí)存在的市場累計(jì)平均超額收益,采用多元回歸分析的方法對(duì)影響政府補(bǔ)助市場反應(yīng)的因素進(jìn)行了實(shí)證研究,并依照得出的顯著影響因素對(duì)總體研究樣本進(jìn)行分類后的對(duì)比研究,得到主要結(jié)論如下： (1)上市公司政府補(bǔ)助公告的披露確實(shí)具有一定的信息含量,能夠引起公告前和公告目的顯著正向市場反應(yīng),而在公告后超額收益趨于消散。這一現(xiàn)象的存在,亦在側(cè)面說明我國A股市場仍為一個(gè)弱式有效市場。 (2)進(jìn)一步的多元回歸分析和分組對(duì)比研究表明：①政府補(bǔ)助公告的市場反應(yīng)存在規(guī)模效應(yīng)現(xiàn)象,即小規(guī)模的公司能夠獲得更高的累計(jì)平均超額收益。②當(dāng)政府補(bǔ)助金額占當(dāng)期利潤的比例較高時(shí),投資者的滯后反應(yīng)導(dǎo)致累計(jì)平均超額收益一路走高,體現(xiàn)了投資者不理性的一面。③投資者更為看好將政府補(bǔ)助金額計(jì)入遞延收益這一會(huì)計(jì)確認(rèn)結(jié)果,由此錄得較高的累計(jì)平均超額收益。④公司的最終控制權(quán)是國有部門還是私營部門這一區(qū)別并不能對(duì)政府補(bǔ)助公告的市場反應(yīng)產(chǎn)生顯著影響。 (3)對(duì)總體樣本和各組分類樣本的研究表明,內(nèi)幕交易這一證券市場的幽靈在上市公司政府補(bǔ)助公告事件中普遍存在,這樣的行為扭曲了證券市場運(yùn)行效率,侵害了非知情交易者的利益,有必要對(duì)其加以監(jiān)督和懲罰。 最后基于以上研究,本文于完善政府補(bǔ)助公告事件的披露質(zhì)量、加強(qiáng)內(nèi)幕交易的監(jiān)管和懲治、改善投資者結(jié)構(gòu)、加強(qiáng)投資者教育等方面提出了相關(guān)政策建議。
[Abstract]:The relationship between government and enterprise has been the focus of academic research. At present, our country is still in the process of transition from planned economy system to market economy system, and the securities market, as a barometer of national economy, reveals the relationship between government and enterprise. On the one hand, the interests of many listed companies that have been restructured from state-owned companies are deeply intertwined with the government. In order to increase social employment, local governments compensate for the policy burden borne by local enterprises. In order to meet the requirements of the capital market, we participate in the earnings management of listed companies and give them a lot of government subsidies. On the other hand, for the purposes of macroeconomic control, meso-industrial support and micro-technological innovation, governments at all levels have given special financial subsidies to many listed companies to guide enterprises in their investment direction and cultivate their core competitiveness. Realize the goal that the government adjusts the industrial structure of national economy. The government subsidy has improved the financial situation of the listed company, improved the operating performance of the listed company, and enhanced the accounting surplus in the reporting period, while the special subsidy can improve the operating level and profitability of the enterprise in the long run. When these companies issue government subsidy announcements, the information content behind them can improve investors' expectations for the future operation of the company, resulting in price changes in the stock market and certain excess returns. That is, the stock market reaction. In this paper, the market reaction of government subsidy announcement is taken as the research content. Firstly, the existence or not of the market reaction of government subsidy announcement is tested and analyzed by the event research method, and then based on the accumulated average excess return of the market that has been proved to exist. Using the method of multiple regression analysis, this paper makes an empirical study on the factors that affect the market response of government subsidies, and makes a comparative study of the overall study samples according to the significant influencing factors obtained. The main conclusions are as follows: 1) the disclosure of government subsidy announcements of listed companies does have a certain amount of information, which can cause a significant positive reaction to the market before and after the announcement, and the excess returns tend to dissipate after the announcement. The existence of this phenomenon also shows that China's A-share market is still a weak efficient market. (2) further multivariate regression analysis and comparative study of groups show that the market response of the government subsidy announcement at 1: 1 has a phenomenon of scale effect. That is, small companies can obtain higher cumulative average excess returns. 2. When government subsidies account for a higher proportion of current profits, investors' lagging reactions lead to higher cumulative average excess returns. This reflects the irrationality of investors. 3 investors are more optimistic about the accounting recognition result of recording the amount of government subsidies into deferred earnings. The difference between the final control of the company and the private sector, as a result, recorded a higher cumulative average of excess returns, does not have a significant impact on the market response to government subsidy announcements. 3) A study of the total sample and the group of classified samples shows that the specter of insider trading, the specter of the securities market, is prevalent in the public subsidy announcement of listed companies, and this behavior distorts the efficiency of the securities market. It infringes the interests of uninformed traders, and it is necessary to supervise and punish them. Finally, based on the above research, this paper puts forward some policy suggestions on perfecting the disclosure quality of government subsidy announcement, strengthening the supervision and punishment of insider trading, improving investor structure and strengthening investor education.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：西南大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類號(hào)】：F812.45;F832.5

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