本文選題：中小企業(yè)　切入點(diǎn)：融資聯(lián)保貸款市場(chǎng)結(jié)構(gòu)一般均衡　出處：《復(fù)旦大學(xué)》2013年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：中小企業(yè)在國(guó)民經(jīng)濟(jì)中的作用無須贅述,然而受制于銀企信息非對(duì)稱、企業(yè)規(guī)模較小、財(cái)務(wù)制度不健全和經(jīng)營(yíng)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)較大等因素,其融資問題長(zhǎng)期以來是一個(gè)世界難題。對(duì)此,學(xué)術(shù)界提出了大力發(fā)展中小金融機(jī)構(gòu)、拓展關(guān)系型信貸、推動(dòng)直接融資等諸多舉措；中小企業(yè)融資境況稍有改觀,但仍難以令人滿意。團(tuán)體貸款自20世紀(jì)70年代由Yunus教授創(chuàng)立以來,因其驕人的還款率和扶貧表現(xiàn)受到世界矚目。在我國(guó),團(tuán)體貸款首先以農(nóng)戶聯(lián)保的形式引入到農(nóng)村市場(chǎng),隨后中小企業(yè)聯(lián)保貸款和網(wǎng)絡(luò)聯(lián)保貸款等紛紛出現(xiàn)。然而這些團(tuán)體貸款的變種雖有所成果,卻仍遠(yuǎn)未達(dá)到當(dāng)初預(yù)期的效果。 中小企業(yè)融資難可以簡(jiǎn)要抽象為由信息非對(duì)稱及金融抑制導(dǎo)致的雙重信貸配給問題。本文首先從經(jīng)典的S-W信貸配給模型出發(fā),結(jié)合我國(guó)當(dāng)前的金融體系,探討中小企業(yè)融資難的成因及學(xué)術(shù)界給出的一些解決方案。接下來介紹團(tuán)體貸款相對(duì)于傳統(tǒng)抵押貸款的優(yōu)勢(shì),即由于其自身的連帶責(zé)任、自我選擇和橫向監(jiān)督等諸多機(jī)制,有助于緩解傳統(tǒng)信貸中的逆向選擇與道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn),降低銀行審查與執(zhí)行成本,同時(shí)以社會(huì)資本代替了傳統(tǒng)抵押物。并通過信息優(yōu)勢(shì)誘導(dǎo)正向分類配對(duì)以及連帶責(zé)任的擔(dān)保效果顯示團(tuán)體貸款對(duì)信貸市場(chǎng)效率的提升。 長(zhǎng)期以來,對(duì)團(tuán)體貸款的研究集中在具體貸款機(jī)制及還款激勵(lì)等方面,而疏于從貸款者角度出發(fā)。但與通常所假定的貸款者非盈利不同,企業(yè)聯(lián)保貸款脫離了原本的扶貧范疇而具有逐利性,市場(chǎng)結(jié)構(gòu)的變化也將極大影響貸款者行為模式與信貸市場(chǎng)上的一般均衡。本文從de Quidt的一般均衡模型出發(fā),加入信貸市場(chǎng)完全程度這一因素,對(duì)不同市場(chǎng)結(jié)構(gòu)下的信貸市場(chǎng)一般均衡進(jìn)行了探討,并顯示壟斷勢(shì)力的存在將縮小貸款者提供團(tuán)體貸款的可能性空間,同時(shí)產(chǎn)出分布的限制可能使得壟斷貸款者只愿意提供個(gè)人貸款。 2012年,浙江等地出現(xiàn)了嚴(yán)重的聯(lián)保互保危機(jī),一時(shí)市場(chǎng)上談保色變,聯(lián)保貸款模式飽受質(zhì)疑。本文通過分析認(rèn)為團(tuán)體貸款模式被運(yùn)用到中小企業(yè)信貸市場(chǎng)之后發(fā)生了嚴(yán)重的異質(zhì)化,而正是這種異質(zhì)化與企業(yè)和銀行風(fēng)險(xiǎn)意識(shí)淡薄等因素導(dǎo)致了此次危機(jī)如此肆虐；并對(duì)企業(yè)聯(lián)保貸款的健康運(yùn)作給出了建議。 最后對(duì)全文進(jìn)行了總結(jié),指出了本文的創(chuàng)新之處,并對(duì)本領(lǐng)域進(jìn)一步研究的方向進(jìn)行了展望。
[Abstract]:The role of small and medium-sized enterprises in the national economy does not need to be restated. However, due to the asymmetric information of banks and enterprises, the small scale of enterprises, the unsound financial system and the high risk of operation, the financing problem of SMEs has been a world problem for a long time. Academic circles have put forward many measures such as vigorously developing small and medium-sized financial institutions, expanding relational credit, promoting direct financing, etc. The financing situation of small and medium-sized enterprises has slightly improved. But it is still not satisfactory. Since its establishment by Professor Yunus in 1970s, group loans have attracted worldwide attention for their outstanding repayment rate and poverty alleviation performance. In China, group loans were first introduced into the rural market in the form of rural household protection. However, the variations of these group loans, though fruitful, are still far from the expected results. The problem of double credit rationing caused by asymmetric information and financial suppression can be briefly abstracted from the financing difficulties of small and medium-sized enterprises. This paper starts from the classical S-W credit rationing model and combines the current financial system of our country. This paper discusses the causes of the financing difficulties of small and medium-sized enterprises and some solutions given by the academic circles. Next, it introduces the advantages of group loans over traditional mortgage loans, that is, because of their joint and several liability, self-selection and horizontal supervision, and so on. It helps to mitigate adverse selection and moral hazard in traditional credit and reduce the cost of bank review and execution. At the same time, social capital is used to replace the traditional collateral, and the information advantage induces the positive classification matching and the collateral effect of joint and several liability to show the improvement of the efficiency of group loan to the credit market. For a long time, the research on group loans has focused on specific loan mechanisms and repayment incentives, but not from the perspective of lenders. The change of market structure will greatly influence the behavior pattern of lender and the general equilibrium of credit market. This paper starts from de Quidt's general equilibrium model. This paper discusses the general equilibrium of credit market under different market structure by adding the complete degree of credit market, and shows that the existence of monopoly power will narrow the possibility for lenders to provide group loans. At the same time, restrictions on the distribution of output may make monopoly lenders only willing to make personal loans. In 2012, Zhejiang and other places had a serious crisis of mutual protection. The model of UNPROFOR loan has been questioned. Through the analysis, the author thinks that the model of group loan has been used in the credit market of small and medium-sized enterprises, and there has been serious heterogeneity. It is this heterogeneity and the weak risk consciousness of enterprises and banks that lead to the crisis so rampant, and give some suggestions on the healthy operation of the enterprise's UNPROFOR loan. Finally, the paper summarizes the full text, points out the innovation of this paper, and looks forward to the direction of further research in this field.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：復(fù)旦大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類號(hào)】：F276.3;F832.4

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