【摘要】：高管薪酬管制是伴隨我國(guó)國(guó)企改革進(jìn)程產(chǎn)生的制度設(shè)計(jì),激勵(lì)理論引入公平偏好理論又為薪酬管制提供了進(jìn)一步的學(xué)理支撐�；诠狡玫恼匠旯苤圃谖覈�(guó)國(guó)企高管薪酬確定過(guò)程中實(shí)際存在,這有利于政府部門(mén)提升社會(huì)公眾公平認(rèn)知、降低自身代理成本。與此同時(shí),外生的薪酬管制又在一定程度上影響了國(guó)企業(yè)績(jī)型報(bào)酬方案的實(shí)施空間和激勵(lì)效率,可能導(dǎo)致更多在職消費(fèi),增加企業(yè)代理成本。國(guó)企高管薪酬管制可作為提升政府部門(mén)公平感知的一項(xiàng)措施,但歸根結(jié)底,深化國(guó)企改革,加強(qiáng)國(guó)企監(jiān)管,從制度層面上為合理的國(guó)企高管薪酬提供保障才是根本之舉、治本之策。
[Abstract]:Executive compensation regulation is a system design that comes into being along with the reform process of state-owned enterprises in our country. The introduction of fair preference theory in incentive theory provides further theoretical support for compensation regulation. Government compensation regulation based on fair preference actually exists in the process of determining executive compensation of state-owned enterprises in China, which is beneficial to the government to enhance the public's understanding of fairness and reduce its agency cost. At the same time, the exogenous salary control affects the implementation space and incentive efficiency of the performance compensation scheme of state-owned enterprises to a certain extent, which may lead to more in-service consumption and increase the agency cost of enterprises. The regulation of executive compensation in state-owned enterprises can be taken as a measure to enhance the sense of fairness in government departments, but in the final analysis, it is essential to deepen the reform of state-owned enterprises, strengthen the supervision of state-owned enterprises, and provide a guarantee for the reasonable executive compensation of state-owned enterprises from the system level. A cure to the root of the disease.
【作者單位】： 四川大學(xué)商學(xué)院;鄭州航空工業(yè)管理學(xué)院會(huì)計(jì)學(xué)院;
【基金】：國(guó)家社會(huì)科學(xué)基金一般項(xiàng)目“上市公司員工收入與資本回報(bào)財(cái)務(wù)公平測(cè)度研究”(13BJY015)階段性成果
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：F272.92;F276.1

【參考文獻(xiàn)】

相關(guān)期刊論文 前2條

1 盧銳;;管理層權(quán)力、薪酬差距與績(jī)效[J];南方經(jīng)濟(jì);2007年07期

2 陳p，

本文編號(hào)：2387933