【摘要】：當(dāng)經(jīng)濟(jì)中的參與者之間存在信息不對(duì)稱的問題時(shí),信息的有效傳遞就會(huì)成為一個(gè)重要的問題。經(jīng)典的合約理論框架下,委托人可以對(duì)代理人進(jìn)行轉(zhuǎn)移支付,這樣,基于不同信息的獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)和懲罰使得信息能夠完全傳遞。如果不能夠使用轉(zhuǎn)移支付,要想獲得有效的信息傳遞,委托人傾向于使用授權(quán):將決策的權(quán)力交給委托人,同時(shí)限制委托人的選擇范圍。本文對(duì)最優(yōu)授權(quán)的理論進(jìn)行概括和評(píng)述,并提出未來可能的研究方向。
[Abstract]:When there is asymmetric information among the participants in the economy, the effective transmission of information becomes an important problem. Under the framework of the classical contract theory, the principal can transfer payment to the agent, so the reward and punishment based on different information can make the information completely transmitted. If the transfer payment cannot be used, in order to obtain the effective transmission of information, the principal tends to use authorization: to give the power of decision to the client, and to limit the scope of the client's choice at the same time. In this paper, the theory of optimal delegation is summarized and reviewed, and the possible research directions in the future are proposed.
【作者單位】： 合肥師范學(xué)院經(jīng)濟(jì)與管理學(xué)院;復(fù)旦大學(xué)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)院;
【基金】：安徽省教育廳人文社科研究重大項(xiàng)目(SK2016SD49)階段性研究成果
【分類號(hào)】：C934;F272
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本文編號(hào)：2299364