本文選題：內(nèi)部控制 + 權(quán)力差距��； 參考：《南京大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：安然、世通等一系列公司財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)表舞弊事件發(fā)生后,人們意識(shí)到健全有效的內(nèi)部控制對(duì)預(yù)防此類事件的發(fā)生具有重要作用,企業(yè)內(nèi)部控制建設(shè)得到了政府監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)、企業(yè)界和會(huì)計(jì)職業(yè)界的空前重視。管理層在企業(yè)內(nèi)部控制建設(shè)過程中扮演"中心角色",對(duì)內(nèi)部控制的建立、執(zhí)行、監(jiān)督均有著重要影響。已有文獻(xiàn)表明管理層權(quán)力、高管過度自信與內(nèi)部控制質(zhì)量之間存在關(guān)聯(lián),本文立足于董事長(zhǎng)與總經(jīng)理的微觀層面,結(jié)合委托代理理論、管理層權(quán)力理論、管理層過度自信理論,分析兩者權(quán)力差距、高管過度自信對(duì)內(nèi)部控制的作用機(jī)理,并進(jìn)一步探究存在高管自信時(shí),權(quán)力差距對(duì)內(nèi)部控制的影響是否會(huì)發(fā)生變化,本文以2009-2015年A股上市公司為研究樣本進(jìn)行實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)。研究結(jié)果表明:(1)權(quán)力差距與內(nèi)部控制顯著正相關(guān)。具體來說,權(quán)力差距帶來的好處不管是國(guó)企還是非國(guó)企均存在,從權(quán)力差距測(cè)量的幾個(gè)方面來看,任期、創(chuàng)始人權(quán)力、政治背景所帶來的權(quán)力差距具有顯著作用。(2)高管過度自信對(duì)內(nèi)部控制質(zhì)量具有顯著負(fù)向影響。(3)高管過度自信會(huì)削弱權(quán)力差距對(duì)內(nèi)部控制的積極作用。本文研究結(jié)果為上市公司如何通過權(quán)力配置提升內(nèi)部控制提供了經(jīng)驗(yàn)參考。董事長(zhǎng)與總經(jīng)理作為上市公司的核心權(quán)力結(jié)構(gòu),兩者的權(quán)力差距有助于解決兩者的代理問題,促進(jìn)內(nèi)部控制執(zhí)行效率以及更好的發(fā)揮董事長(zhǎng)的監(jiān)督職責(zé)。所以企業(yè)在內(nèi)部控制建設(shè)過程中應(yīng)當(dāng)合理配置董事長(zhǎng)和總經(jīng)理的權(quán)力。
[Abstract]:After a series of financial statement fraud incidents, such as Enron and WorldCom, people realized that sound and effective internal control plays an important role in preventing such incidents. The unprecedented attention of the business community and the accounting profession. Management plays a central role in the construction of internal control, which has an important impact on the establishment, implementation and supervision of internal control. There is a relationship between management power, executive overconfidence and internal control quality. This paper is based on the micro level of chairman and general manager, combined with principal-agent theory, management power theory, management overconfidence theory. Analyze the power gap, the mechanism of executive overconfidence to internal control, and further explore whether the influence of power gap on internal control will change when there is executive confidence. In this paper, A-share listed companies from 2009-2015 as a sample for empirical testing. The results show that: (1) there is a significant positive correlation between power gap and internal control. Specifically, the benefits of the power gap exist in both state-owned and non-state-owned enterprises. From several aspects of the measurement of the power gap, the term of office, the power of the founder, The power gap brought by the political background has a significant effect. (2) the executive overconfidence has a significant negative impact on the internal control quality. (3) the executive overconfidence will weaken the positive effect of the power gap on the internal control. The results of this study provide an empirical reference for listed companies how to promote internal control through power allocation. As the core power structure of the listed company, the power gap between the chairman and the general manager is helpful to solve the agency problem, to promote the efficiency of internal control and to give full play to the supervisory responsibility of the chairman. Therefore, enterprises should reasonably allocate the power of chairman and general manager in the process of internal control construction.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：南京大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：F275;F272.91
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本文編號(hào)：2055702