本文選題：供應(yīng)鏈決策 + 裝配產(chǎn)品��； 參考：《鄭州大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：更新產(chǎn)品是基于原產(chǎn)品增加或優(yōu)化了部分功能的產(chǎn)品。更新產(chǎn)品相對原產(chǎn)品融入了更先進的技術(shù),具有更強大的功能,更能獲得消費者的青睞。產(chǎn)品更新?lián)Q代在各行業(yè)中愈演愈烈,以IT行業(yè)最為典型,其多以裝配產(chǎn)品為主,表現(xiàn)為部件更新引起的產(chǎn)品整體更新。如何正確優(yōu)化基于部件更新的組裝產(chǎn)品供應(yīng)鏈中產(chǎn)品動態(tài)定價決策,將極大的影響企業(yè)的生存發(fā)展。針對此問題,本文進行了以下研究:首先,分析了由關(guān)鍵部件更新引起的裝配產(chǎn)品更新,在此基礎(chǔ)上建立了新舊兩代裝配產(chǎn)品共存時的裝配產(chǎn)品更新供應(yīng)鏈模型,該模型由新舊關(guān)鍵部件供應(yīng)商和新舊產(chǎn)品裝配商構(gòu)成。其次,結(jié)合Fisher擴散模型和靜態(tài)差異產(chǎn)品需求模型建立了新舊兩代裝配產(chǎn)品處于同一市場時的動態(tài)需求函數(shù)模型。其中新產(chǎn)品潛在市場需求隨時間變化趨勢符合S型曲線,時間一定時,新舊兩代裝配產(chǎn)品潛在市場份額一定,新舊兩代裝配產(chǎn)品的需求和本身零售價成反比,和競爭裝配產(chǎn)品零售價成正比�；谏鲜龉⿷�(yīng)鏈模型和動態(tài)需求函數(shù)模型,研究了裝配商非合作情形下的決策問題。通過Stackelberg博弈和Nash博弈獲得新舊兩代關(guān)鍵部件供應(yīng)商和新舊兩代產(chǎn)品裝配商各自制定的最優(yōu)動態(tài)定價和各自動態(tài)收益。通過仿真分析獲得:原產(chǎn)品供應(yīng)鏈中供應(yīng)商和裝配商制定的動態(tài)批發(fā)價和零售價曲線均隨更新產(chǎn)品生命周期而遞減;而更新產(chǎn)品供應(yīng)鏈中供應(yīng)商和裝配商制定的動態(tài)批發(fā)價和零售價曲線均隨更新產(chǎn)品生命周期而上升。最后研究了裝配商合作情形下,研究新舊兩代裝配產(chǎn)品最優(yōu)動態(tài)定價,并通過仿真分析得到:關(guān)鍵部件的批發(fā)價上升或下降幅度大于非合作情形,相反裝配產(chǎn)品零售價上升或下降幅度小于非合作情形。裝配商的最優(yōu)收益均大于相應(yīng)的供應(yīng)商收益。合作情形供應(yīng)商的收益均低于非合作情形,而裝配商的收益均大于非合作時。市場價格敏感度和功能替代參數(shù)越相近,相應(yīng)的產(chǎn)品需求、批發(fā)價、零售價、供應(yīng)商和裝配商的收益越高。
[Abstract]:Update product is based on the original product added or optimized part of the function of the product. Compared with the original products, the newer products have more advanced technology, more powerful functions and more popular with consumers. Product upgrading is becoming more and more intense in various industries, IT industry is the most typical, most of which is assembly products, which is the whole product update caused by component update. How to correctly optimize the dynamic pricing decision in the assembly product supply chain based on component renewal will greatly affect the survival and development of enterprises. In order to solve this problem, the following researches are carried out: firstly, the assembly product update caused by the key component update is analyzed, and then the supply chain model of assembly product renewal is established when the new and the old assembly products coexist. The model consists of suppliers of new and old key components and assemblers of new and old products. Secondly, combined with Fisher diffusion model and static differential product demand model, the dynamic demand function model of the old and new generation assembly products is established when they are in the same market. The trend of the potential market demand of the new product accords with the S curve with time. When the time is fixed, the potential market share of the new and the old generation assembly products is constant, and the demand of the new and the old generation assembly products is inversely proportional to the retail price of the new and old generation assembly products. It is directly proportional to the retail price of competing assembly products. Based on the above supply chain model and the dynamic demand function model, the decision problem of the assembler in the case of non-cooperation is studied. Through Stackelberg game and Nash game, the optimal dynamic pricing and dynamic income of each generation of key component suppliers and assemblers of new and old generations are obtained. The simulation results show that the dynamic wholesale price and retail price curve set by suppliers and assemblers in the original product supply chain decrease with the renewal of product life cycle. The dynamic wholesale price and retail price curve set by suppliers and assemblers in the updated product supply chain increase with the renewal product life cycle. Finally, the optimal dynamic pricing of new and old generation assembly products is studied in the case of assembler cooperation. Through simulation analysis, it is concluded that the wholesale price of key components is higher or lower than that of non-cooperation. On the contrary, the retail price of assembly products increased or decreased less than that of non-cooperative products. The optimal profit of the assembler is higher than that of the corresponding supplier. The profit of supplier is lower than that of non-cooperation, and the profit of assembler is higher than that of non-cooperation. The more similar the market price sensitivity and the function substitution parameter, the higher the corresponding product demand, wholesale price, retail price, supplier and assembler's income.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：鄭州大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F274

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