本文選題：獨(dú)立董事 + 連任�。� 參考：《金融研究》2016年12期

【摘要】：在公司治理實(shí)踐中,對(duì)董事會(huì)議案出具否定性意見(jiàn)是獨(dú)立董事履行監(jiān)督職能最具代表性的行為,而換屆未連任是我國(guó)制度背景和文化特質(zhì)下更為真實(shí)的獨(dú)董離職方式。利用我國(guó)上市公司獨(dú)立董事對(duì)議案發(fā)表意見(jiàn)的獨(dú)特?cái)?shù)據(jù),本文從否定意見(jiàn)的具體類(lèi)型、董事會(huì)議案事項(xiàng)、是否集體行動(dòng)等三個(gè)方面實(shí)證考察了對(duì)董事會(huì)議案說(shuō)"不"與獨(dú)董未來(lái)是否在第一任期結(jié)束后實(shí)現(xiàn)連任之間的關(guān)系。研究發(fā)現(xiàn),在我國(guó)公司治理實(shí)踐中,出具否定意見(jiàn)的方式(委婉或直接、集體或單獨(dú))有時(shí)比否定意見(jiàn)本身更加重要;即使同樣是否定性意見(jiàn),但如果針對(duì)的董事會(huì)議案事項(xiàng)不同,獨(dú)董未來(lái)連任的可能性也不同。一般而言,明確出具反對(duì)意見(jiàn)的,針對(duì)內(nèi)部人的反對(duì)事項(xiàng)以及集體說(shuō)不的獨(dú)董未來(lái)連任的可能性更低,因而獨(dú)董所預(yù)期的公司治理角色由于上述"逆淘汰"機(jī)制和"任人唯親"的董事會(huì)文化的存在而大打折扣。本文的研究提示,應(yīng)該為獨(dú)董出具否定性意見(jiàn)的相關(guān)法律風(fēng)險(xiǎn)提供更加明確的指引,避免政策模糊地帶,將有利于獨(dú)董更好地履行監(jiān)督職能。
[Abstract]:In the practice of corporate governance, it is the most representative behavior for independent directors to issue negative opinions to the board of directors to perform their supervisory functions, while the non-reelection is a more real way for independent directors to leave their posts under the background of the system and the cultural characteristics of our country.Based on the unique data of independent directors' opinions on the motion of listed companies in China, this paper discusses the specific types of negative opinions, the issues of board motions,The relationship between saying "no" to the board motion and whether Dong Dong will be re-elected after the end of the first term is examined empirically in three aspects, whether collective action or not.The study found that in the practice of corporate governance in China, the way of issuing negative opinions (euphemism or direct, collective or individual) is sometimes more important than negative opinions themselves;But if the board of directors bill is different, sole Dong in the future re-election possibility is also different.In general, those who explicitly issue objections are less likely to be re-elected in the future against the objections of insiders and the collective saying that Dong is the only one who will be re-elected in the future.As a result, the role of corporate governance expected by Dou Dong is greatly reduced by the existence of the "anti-elimination" mechanism and the "cronyism" of the board culture.The research in this paper suggests that we should provide more clear guidance for Dou Dong to issue negative opinions on the relevant legal risks and avoid the ambiguity of policies which will help him to perform his supervisory function better.
【作者單位】： 中國(guó)人民大學(xué)財(cái)政金融學(xué)院/中國(guó)財(cái)政金融政策研究中心;河北金融學(xué)院;
【基金】：國(guó)家自然基金面上項(xiàng)目“獨(dú)立董事激勵(lì)機(jī)制的影響因素和激勵(lì)效果-來(lái)自我國(guó)上市公司的證據(jù)”(項(xiàng)目批準(zhǔn)號(hào):71272159)和面上項(xiàng)目“任人唯親的董事會(huì)文化與獨(dú)立董事更迭的‘逆淘汰’”(項(xiàng)目批準(zhǔn)號(hào):71472177) 教育部“新世紀(jì)優(yōu)秀人才支持計(jì)劃”對(duì)本項(xiàng)研究的資助
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：F271

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