本文選題：政治關聯(lián) + 過度投資水平�。� 參考：《西北大學》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：在轉型經濟的制度背景下,政治關聯(lián)作為非制度因素的一種補充機制,是影響企業(yè)過度投資的重要因素。在我國,政府對社會稀缺資源的干預能力很強,顯著影響企業(yè)經營活動。與國有企業(yè)不同,民營企業(yè)的發(fā)展受眾多因素限制,迫切需要與政府保持密切聯(lián)系以改善外部資源環(huán)境。本文選取2013-2015年滬、深A股的民營上市公司為初始樣本,從政治關聯(lián)存在性、政治關聯(lián)程度及強度和政治關聯(lián)類型三個層次構建政治關聯(lián)體系,分析我國民營上市公司政治關聯(lián)與過度投資之間的相關性,得到以下結論:(1)政治關聯(lián)的確會引發(fā)我國民營企業(yè)過度投資,促使其過度投資水平更高;(2)進一步地,政治關聯(lián)程度顯著促進民營企業(yè)過度投資問題更加嚴重,民營企業(yè)過度投資水平會隨著政治關聯(lián)程度的提高而上升;(3)政治關聯(lián)強度并不會加重民營企業(yè)過度投資,二者呈不顯著的正相關關系,即民營企業(yè)過度投資水平不會隨著政治關聯(lián)強度的增強而升高;(4)對政治關聯(lián)類型作進一步區(qū)分后的結果表明,獨立董事型政治關聯(lián)并沒有發(fā)揮治理效應,反而促進民營企業(yè)過度投資,但這種效果并不顯著。即獨立董事型政治關聯(lián)并不會抑制民營企業(yè)過度投資;(5)其他高管型政治關聯(lián)會加重民營企業(yè)過度投資,二者呈現(xiàn)顯著的正相關關系。即民營企業(yè)過度投資問題會隨著其他高管政治關聯(lián)的建立而更加嚴重。
[Abstract]:Under the institutional background of the transition economy, political association, as a supplementary mechanism of non-institutional factors, is an important factor affecting the overinvestment of enterprises.In China, the government's ability to intervene in social scarce resources is very strong, significantly affecting business activities.Different from the state-owned enterprises, the development of private enterprises is restricted by many factors, so it is urgent to maintain close contact with the government to improve the external resource environment.This paper selects the private listed companies of Shanghai and Shenzhen A shares from 2013-2015 as the initial sample to construct the political association system from three levels: the existence of political association, the degree and intensity of political association and the type of political association.By analyzing the correlation between political association and overinvestment of private listed companies in China, the following conclusions are drawn: 1) political association will indeed lead to excessive investment of private enterprises in China, and promote the level of over-investment in private enterprises to a higher level.The degree of political connection significantly promotes the problem of excessive investment of private enterprises, and the level of excessive investment of private enterprises will rise with the increase of the degree of political connection) the intensity of political connection will not aggravate the excessive investment of private enterprises.There is no significant positive correlation between the two, that is, the level of excessive investment in private enterprises will not increase with the increase of the intensity of political association.The political relation of independent director does not exert the governance effect, on the contrary, it promotes the private enterprise to invest excessively, but this kind of effect is not remarkable.That is, independent director-type political association does not restrain private enterprise overinvestment. Other top-level political association will aggravate private enterprise overinvestment, and there is a significant positive correlation between them.That is, the problem of excessive investment in private enterprises will become more serious with the establishment of political connections among other senior executives.
【學位授予單位】：西北大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F276.5;D0;F275

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