本文選題：政策性負(fù)擔(dān)　切入點(diǎn)：民營企業(yè)　出處：《財(cái)經(jīng)研究》2017年05期

【摘要】：文章基于三一重工變更注冊地的事件,以政策性負(fù)擔(dān)為切入點(diǎn),探討了其對民營企業(yè)行為的影響。研究發(fā)現(xiàn),在財(cái)政分權(quán)制度和政治錦標(biāo)賽激勵(lì)下,為了實(shí)現(xiàn)政治目標(biāo),地方政府干預(yù)地方企業(yè)的動(dòng)機(jī)增強(qiáng),會(huì)通過政策性負(fù)擔(dān)干預(yù)當(dāng)?shù)匾?guī)模較大的民營企業(yè)。相對于國有企業(yè),民營企業(yè)對于政策性負(fù)擔(dān)的反應(yīng)受自身發(fā)展規(guī)模影響。當(dāng)發(fā)展規(guī)模達(dá)到一定程度時(shí),民營企業(yè)傾向于主動(dòng)規(guī)避地方政府的干預(yù),尋求公平的市場環(huán)境。已有文獻(xiàn)主要發(fā)現(xiàn)部分民營企業(yè)會(huì)通過主動(dòng)承擔(dān)政策性負(fù)擔(dān)來建立政企聯(lián)系,或者對于政策性負(fù)擔(dān)持被動(dòng)接受的態(tài)度。文章采用案例分析方法,考察了民營企業(yè)對于政策性負(fù)擔(dān)可能存在的另一種反應(yīng),并從政策性負(fù)擔(dān)的角度解釋了民營企業(yè)與地方政府的互動(dòng)關(guān)系。
[Abstract]:Based on the change of registration of Sany heavy Industry, this paper discusses its influence on the behavior of private enterprises from the perspective of policy burden. It is found that, under the incentive of fiscal decentralization system and political championship, in order to achieve political objectives, The motivation of local governments to intervene in local enterprises has increased, and they will intervene in local larger private enterprises through policy burdens. Compared with state-owned enterprises, The response of private enterprises to the policy burden is influenced by their own development scale. When the development scale reaches a certain level, private enterprises tend to avoid the intervention of local government actively. In order to seek a fair market environment, it has been found that some private enterprises will take the initiative to bear the policy burden to establish the relationship between the government and the enterprise, or to accept the policy burden passively. This paper examines another possible reaction of private enterprises to policy burden and explains the interaction between private enterprises and local governments from the perspective of policy burden.
【作者單位】： 西南財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)會(huì)計(jì)學(xué)院;中國科學(xué)院成都山地災(zāi)害與環(huán)境研究所;
【基金】：教育部人文社會(huì)科學(xué)研究項(xiàng)目“官員腐敗、企業(yè)尋租與政府補(bǔ)貼”(16XJA630001) 西南財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)重大基礎(chǔ)理論研究項(xiàng)目“現(xiàn)行產(chǎn)業(yè)政策與產(chǎn)能過剩關(guān)系研究”(JBK161104)
【分類號(hào)】：F276.5
，

本文編號(hào)：1690517