本文關(guān)鍵詞： 國有控股上市公司 股權(quán)激勵 員工持股計劃 股票期權(quán)　出處：《北京交通大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：股權(quán)激勵起源于美國,隨著全球金融市場發(fā)展,股權(quán)激勵在世界眾多企業(yè)被廣泛實施,成為現(xiàn)在的全球化的激勵機制。改革開放后,我國企業(yè)開始逐步借鑒學(xué)習(xí)西方公司股權(quán)激勵的管理辦法。隨后,中國國有企業(yè)也在經(jīng)營中不斷適應(yīng)市場變化,完成兩權(quán)分離,深化股份制企業(yè)改革,在這一系列的變化中,國有企業(yè)也逐漸意識到對高管及核心人員實施股權(quán)激勵的意義。目前,雖然有些國有企業(yè)高管的職位還保持行政職級方面的劃分,但他們的行政身份是在漸漸被模糊化的,關(guān)注的焦點轉(zhuǎn)而圍繞在他們“經(jīng)理人”的身份和針對與股東委托代理關(guān)系之間如何更有效的激勵、更有意義的考核等方面。自2005年起,相關(guān)監(jiān)管部門,如證監(jiān)會、國資委、財政部等出臺了一系列相關(guān)的意見、工作指引及試行辦法等法律法規(guī),為股權(quán)激勵在上市公司乃至國有控股上市公司的實施做出了制度和體制方便的保障,使股權(quán)激勵機制得到逐步完善。然而,對于后者來說,由于其特殊的企業(yè)性質(zhì),在股權(quán)激勵方案的制定和審批都會來自證監(jiān)會和國資委的兩個方面的審核和監(jiān)管,相當(dāng)于在符合國企約束條件的前提下利用市場化的方法來對國有控股上市公司進行股權(quán)激勵。自2006年以來,國有控股公司正式實施股權(quán)激勵的案例相比民營公司及普通上市公司,無論從實施的量來看,還是從發(fā)展速度來說都相差甚遠,股權(quán)激勵制度的建設(shè)還需要繼續(xù)完善。本篇論文以討論國有控股上市公司實施股權(quán)激勵為出發(fā)點,通過闡述股權(quán)激勵的相關(guān)概念及理論,對股票期權(quán),虛擬股票,股票增值權(quán),業(yè)績股票,限制性股票,員工持股計劃等幾種激勵中,選取常用的方式進行說明。還會針對我國的現(xiàn)有特殊國情,對我國國有控股上市公司的特征、開展股權(quán)激勵的意義及股權(quán)激勵實施現(xiàn)狀進行分析。國有控股上市公司主要具備以下幾點特征:(1)國有控股公司在股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)中國有大股東占有相當(dāng)比重,因此股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)相對集中(2)不僅要確保國有資產(chǎn)有保值增值,還要起到在國家宏觀經(jīng)濟調(diào)控中的調(diào)節(jié)作用(3)在某些方面尚帶有原國有企業(yè)特征,公司治理方面行政色彩較濃(4)激勵及約束機制陳舊,不健全。而對于國有控股上市公司的股權(quán)激勵的實施現(xiàn)狀來說,主要有前提條件之嚴格、操作限制之繁多等特點。當(dāng)然,對國有資產(chǎn)管理的謹慎思維是可以理解的,這樣是為了避免出現(xiàn)國有資產(chǎn)流失和管理失控等問題。但是在嚴苛的管理辦法下,就無法激起國有企業(yè)股權(quán)激勵的實施積極性以及創(chuàng)新熱情,在A股公告股權(quán)激勵計劃的上市公司中,僅有約15%的實施量是國有控股上市公司所開展的,這相較于其在A股上市公司所占的比例很不相稱。本文以A公司為例,以實際案例為研究對象,對A公司實施的股權(quán)激勵方案設(shè)計進行闡述,并對最后的實施效果進行分析。論述了國有控股上市公司實施股權(quán)激勵的障礙,譬如股票市場不成熟,缺乏合理的行權(quán)條件設(shè)計以及科學(xué)的業(yè)績評價體系等,找出存在的種種問題并分析原因。最后,文中結(jié)合A公司發(fā)展的現(xiàn)狀和所有制的特殊性,為其在未來若實施股權(quán)激勵計劃提出切實有效的建議對策,為類似實施股權(quán)激勵的企業(yè)提供參考,完善股權(quán)激勵的設(shè)計思路。
[Abstract]:Equity incentive originated in the United States, with the global financial market development, equity incentive has been widely implemented in many enterprises, now the global incentive mechanism. After the reform and opening up, China's enterprises gradually began to learn western equity incentive management approach. Then, China state-owned enterprises in the business to adapt the change of the market, complete the separation of two rights, deepen the shareholding system reform of enterprises, in this series of changes, the state-owned enterprises have gradually realized the implementation of equity incentive for executives and key personnel significance. At present, although some state-owned enterprise executives positions also maintain division of administrative rank, but their administrative identity is blurred gradually the focus of attention, turn around in their "manager" and the shareholders' identity and on how to effectively stimulate the agent relationship, more meaningful evaluation etc. . since 2005, the relevant regulatory authorities, such as the Commission, the SASAC, the Ministry of Finance issued a series of related ideas, work guidelines and measures and other laws and regulations, and the state-owned listed companies in the implementation of the listed company has made system and security system convenient for equity incentive, to gradually improve the equity incentive mechanism. However, for the latter, due to the special nature of the enterprise, incentive scheme formulation and approval in the equity are two aspects of the audit and supervision from CSRC and SASAC, the equivalent method in accordance with the constraints of the state-owned enterprises under the market of state-owned listed companies equity incentive. Since 2006, the state-owned holding company officially implemented equity incentive cases compared to private companies and listed companies, both from the implementation point of view, or from the development speed Far, the construction of equity incentive system need to be improved. This paper is to discuss the state-owned holding listed company equity incentive as a starting point, through elaborating the related concepts and theories of equity incentive, stock option, virtual stock, stock appreciation rights, the performance of the stock, restricted stock, several employee stock ownership plans incentive, select the commonly used way is explained. Also available according to the specific condition of China, the characteristics of China's state-owned listed companies, to carry out the significance of implementing equity incentive and equity incentive. To analyze the current situation of state-owned holding listed companies mainly have the following characteristics: (1) the state-owned holding company occupies a large shareholders the proportion of equity structure in China, so relatively concentrated ownership structure (2) not only to ensure that the state-owned assets value, but also play a regulatory role in the national macroeconomic regulation and control in (3) In some respects, still with the former state-owned enterprises, corporate governance administrative color is strong (4) incentive and constraint mechanism is not perfect. And the old, the status of implementation for the state-owned listed companies equity incentive, the main premise of strict restrictions, operating various etc.. Of course, careful thinking of the state-owned asset management is understandable, it is in order to avoid the loss of state-owned assets and the management problem. But in the strict management measures, cannot arouse state-owned enterprises implementing equity incentive motivation and enthusiasm for innovation, A shares in equity incentive plan announcement of listed companies, the implementation of the amount is only about 15% the state-owned listed company carried out, which is not commensurate with the proportion of the total compared to A shares in listed companies. This paper takes A company as an example, the actual case as the research object, the implementation of A company shares The right incentive scheme design is expounded, and the implementation of the results of the analysis are discussed. Finally, the state-owned holding listed company equity incentive obstacles, such as the stock market is not mature, lack of reasonable exercise conditions design and scientific performance evaluation system, find out the existing problems and analyzes the reasons. Finally, this paper combined with the status quo of A the development of the company and ownership particularity, put forward the proposal for the effective countermeasures in the future if the implementation of equity incentive plan, provide a reference for the implementation of equity incentive of similar enterprises, improving the equity incentive design.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：北京交通大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F272.92;F279.26

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