【摘要】：在經(jīng)濟(jì)市場(chǎng)中基于委托代理理論,注冊(cè)會(huì)計(jì)師第三方審計(jì)制度的作用越來(lái)越不容忽視,審計(jì)制度對(duì)于加強(qiáng)被審計(jì)單位財(cái)務(wù)信息的真實(shí)性、完善信息披露制度、保障市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)運(yùn)行的公正和公平和促進(jìn)市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)的健康發(fā)展都有十分關(guān)鍵的推動(dòng)作用。但是,隨著我國(guó)不斷浮現(xiàn)出的審計(jì)失敗事件反映出我國(guó)注冊(cè)會(huì)計(jì)師審計(jì)質(zhì)量存在很大的缺陷。在審計(jì)質(zhì)量的影響因素中“異常審計(jì)收費(fèi)”逐漸引起學(xué)者們的注意,近幾年相關(guān)文獻(xiàn)有所增多成為研究熱點(diǎn)。為了監(jiān)督企業(yè)的經(jīng)營(yíng)以保護(hù)利益相關(guān)者的權(quán)益,同時(shí)為了激勵(lì)注冊(cè)會(huì)計(jì)師能夠提供有效的監(jiān)督服務(wù),審計(jì)收費(fèi)制定的合理性就成為根源問(wèn)題。異常審計(jì)收費(fèi)在相關(guān)的研究領(lǐng)域凸顯出來(lái)主要由于下列理由:一方面是在審計(jì)制度方面,公司決策者在審計(jì)報(bào)告不利于滿(mǎn)足自身利益時(shí)高價(jià)購(gòu)買(mǎi)審計(jì)意見(jiàn)進(jìn)行財(cái)務(wù)舞弊,造成審計(jì)失實(shí),審計(jì)質(zhì)量下降;另一方面,面對(duì)日趨激烈的行業(yè)內(nèi)競(jìng)爭(zhēng),審計(jì)收費(fèi)偏低已是普遍的趨勢(shì),為了彌補(bǔ)低審計(jì)收費(fèi)帶來(lái)的損失,注冊(cè)會(huì)計(jì)師和會(huì)計(jì)師事務(wù)所減少了應(yīng)有的審計(jì)程序以節(jié)省審計(jì)時(shí)間和人力成本的投入,影響審計(jì)質(zhì)量。因而本文的研究重點(diǎn)是異常審計(jì)收費(fèi)對(duì)我國(guó)上市公司審計(jì)質(zhì)量的影響。本文以委托代理理論、經(jīng)濟(jì)人假設(shè)理論和成本收益理論等為分析基礎(chǔ),提出三條假設(shè),以2013年至2015年A股上市公司的財(cái)務(wù)數(shù)據(jù)為樣本進(jìn)行系統(tǒng)地實(shí)證分析研究。本文實(shí)證部分主要有兩點(diǎn),一是運(yùn)用多元回歸模型的方法,分析異常審計(jì)收費(fèi)對(duì)審計(jì)質(zhì)量的的影響情況,其中關(guān)于異常審計(jì)收費(fèi)既對(duì)整體進(jìn)行實(shí)證分析,也對(duì)其子樣本分別進(jìn)行分析;二是根據(jù)實(shí)證結(jié)論提出規(guī)范審計(jì)收費(fèi)的建議。研究結(jié)果表明:對(duì)于全體財(cái)務(wù)樣本數(shù)據(jù)(數(shù)據(jù)取絕對(duì)值),異常審計(jì)收費(fèi)與審計(jì)質(zhì)量存在負(fù)相關(guān)關(guān)系且關(guān)系顯著;但是,在考慮異常審計(jì)收費(fèi)方向的情況下,正向異常審計(jì)收費(fèi)與審計(jì)質(zhì)量呈負(fù)相關(guān)且關(guān)系顯著,而負(fù)向異常審計(jì)收費(fèi)對(duì)審計(jì)質(zhì)量不產(chǎn)生顯著影響,說(shuō)明其不損害審計(jì)質(zhì)量。因此,本文站在會(huì)計(jì)師事務(wù)所的角度提出會(huì)計(jì)師事務(wù)所應(yīng)利用審計(jì)定價(jià)模型規(guī)范審計(jì)收費(fèi)定價(jià)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)、有效抑制正向異常審計(jì)收費(fèi)的形成和合理保持對(duì)負(fù)向異常審計(jì)收費(fèi)的關(guān)注程度等建議,以達(dá)到規(guī)范會(huì)計(jì)師事務(wù)所審計(jì)收費(fèi)進(jìn)而提高被審計(jì)單位審計(jì)質(zhì)量的目的。
[Abstract]:Based on the principal-agent theory in the economic market, the role of the CPA third-party audit system can not be ignored. The audit system can enhance the authenticity of the financial information of the audited units and perfect the information disclosure system. It is very important to ensure the fair and equitable operation of market economy and to promote the healthy development of market economy. However, with the continuous emergence of audit failure events in China, there are great defects in the audit quality of CPA in China. Among the influencing factors of audit quality, "abnormal audit fee" has gradually attracted the attention of scholars. In order to supervise the operation of enterprises to protect the rights and interests of stakeholders, and to encourage CPA to provide effective supervision services, the rationality of audit fees has become the root problem. Abnormal audit fees are highlighted in the relevant research areas for the following reasons: on the one hand, in the audit system, when the audit report is not conducive to meeting their own interests, the company decision-makers purchase audit opinions at a high price to carry out financial fraud. The audit is false and the audit quality is declining; On the other hand, in the face of increasingly fierce competition in the industry, low audit fees have become a common trend. In order to compensate for the losses caused by low audit fees, CPA and accounting firms reduce due audit procedures to save audit time and labor costs and affect audit quality. Therefore, this paper focuses on the impact of abnormal audit fees on the audit quality of listed companies in China. On the basis of principal-agent theory, economic man hypothesis and cost-benefit theory, this paper puts forward three hypotheses, which are based on the financial data of A-share listed companies from 2013 to 2015. There are two main points in the empirical part of this paper. One is to analyze the influence of abnormal audit fees on audit quality by using the method of multiple regression model. The sub-samples are also analyzed separately. The other is the suggestion of standardizing audit fees according to the empirical conclusion. The results show that there is a negative correlation between abnormal audit fees and audit quality for all financial sample data (absolute value of data), and the relationship between abnormal audit fees and audit quality is significant. However, considering the direction of abnormal audit fees, the positive audit fees are negatively correlated with audit quality, while negative abnormal audit fees have no significant impact on audit quality, indicating that they do not damage audit quality. Therefore, from the perspective of accounting firms, this paper proposes that accounting firms should use the audit pricing model to standardize the pricing standards of audit fees. In order to standardize the audit fees of accounting firms and improve the audit quality of the audited units, we can effectively restrain the formation of positive abnormal audit fees and reasonably maintain the attention to negative abnormal audit fees.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：東北農(nóng)業(yè)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：F239.4

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