【摘要】： 2001年8月16日,中國(guó)證監(jiān)會(huì)頒布《關(guān)于在我國(guó)上市公司建立獨(dú)立董事制度的指導(dǎo)意見(jiàn)》,標(biāo)志著獨(dú)立董事制度在我國(guó)正式確立。獨(dú)立董事制度引進(jìn)我國(guó),其主要目的就是期望獨(dú)立董事能在我國(guó)上市公司中發(fā)揮獨(dú)立客觀判斷的作用,維護(hù)公司整體利益,保護(hù)中小股東合法權(quán)益不受損害。近年來(lái),我國(guó)一些上市公司會(huì)計(jì)信息失真,盈余管理現(xiàn)象十分嚴(yán)重,管理者和大股東侵犯中小股東利益的事例時(shí)有發(fā)生。獨(dú)立董事制度是上市公司內(nèi)部治理結(jié)構(gòu)的重要組成部分,審計(jì)是健全上市公司外部治理機(jī)制的有效手段,注冊(cè)會(huì)計(jì)師發(fā)表的審計(jì)意見(jiàn)對(duì)會(huì)計(jì)報(bào)表的合法性、公允性提供合理保證,兩者均作用于上市公司披露的會(huì)計(jì)信息。因此,研究獨(dú)立董事制度對(duì)非標(biāo)準(zhǔn)審計(jì)意見(jiàn)的作用機(jī)制并合理評(píng)價(jià)獨(dú)立董事制度在我國(guó)的實(shí)施效果,以此對(duì)我國(guó)上市公司的公司治理改革提供經(jīng)驗(yàn)證據(jù)和理論支持具有重要意義。 本文從審計(jì)意見(jiàn)的角度對(duì)獨(dú)立董事制度進(jìn)行理論分析和實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)。以滬深兩市1129家A股上市公司2001—2007年數(shù)據(jù)為樣本,選擇獨(dú)立董事比例、獨(dú)立董事年薪、獨(dú)立董事參加會(huì)議次數(shù)、上市公司是否設(shè)立審計(jì)委員會(huì)、獨(dú)立董事受教育背景、獨(dú)立董事與上市公司工作地點(diǎn)一致性作為自變量,注冊(cè)會(huì)計(jì)師對(duì)上市公司出具的審計(jì)意見(jiàn)類(lèi)型為因變量構(gòu)建模型,運(yùn)用Logistic回歸分析法實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)獨(dú)立董事制度各相關(guān)因素對(duì)我國(guó)上市公司被出具非標(biāo)準(zhǔn)審計(jì)意見(jiàn)的影響。研究得出的結(jié)論是:獨(dú)立董事制度與非標(biāo)準(zhǔn)審計(jì)意見(jiàn)之間存在一定相關(guān)關(guān)系,獨(dú)立董事設(shè)立前后,審計(jì)意見(jiàn)類(lèi)型差異顯著。設(shè)立獨(dú)立董事的上市公司收到標(biāo)準(zhǔn)無(wú)保留審計(jì)意見(jiàn)的概率高于未設(shè)立獨(dú)立董事的上市公司。獨(dú)立董事比例、上市公司是否設(shè)立審計(jì)委員會(huì)、獨(dú)立董事受教育背景等均對(duì)審計(jì)意見(jiàn)的出具存在較為顯著的影響。獨(dú)立董事制度在我國(guó)發(fā)揮了一定作用,對(duì)完善我國(guó)上市公司治理結(jié)構(gòu),改善會(huì)計(jì)師事務(wù)所選聘機(jī)制,凈化審計(jì)市場(chǎng),提高會(huì)計(jì)信息質(zhì)量,為上市公司獲得更加真實(shí)和公允的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)審計(jì)意見(jiàn)做出了貢獻(xiàn)。通過(guò)從審計(jì)意見(jiàn)的角度考察獨(dú)立董事制度對(duì)公司治理的影響,豐富了對(duì)獨(dú)立董事制度的研究。只有在完善獨(dú)立董事制度本身的同時(shí),積極推動(dòng)上市公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)的改革,改善公司內(nèi)外部監(jiān)督機(jī)制,獨(dú)立董事制度在我國(guó)才能發(fā)揮積極作用。
[Abstract]:On August 16, 2001, CSRC promulgated the guidance opinion on the Establishment of Independent Director system in listed companies in China, which marked the formal establishment of the Independent Director system in China. The main purpose of the independent director system introduced into our country is to expect the independent director to play the role of independent objective judgment in the listed company of our country, to safeguard the whole interests of the company and to protect the legitimate rights and interests of the minority shareholders from being harmed. In recent years, the accounting information of some listed companies in China is distorted, the phenomenon of earnings management is very serious, managers and large shareholders encroach on the interests of minority shareholders from time to time. The independent director system is an important part of the internal governance structure of the listed company. Audit is an effective means to perfect the external governance mechanism of the listed company. Fairness provides reasonable assurance that both act on accounting information disclosed by listed companies. Therefore, to study the mechanism of the independent director system on the non-standard audit opinion and to evaluate the effect of the independent director system in our country. It is of great significance to provide empirical evidence and theoretical support for the corporate governance reform of listed companies in China. This paper carries on the theoretical analysis and the empirical test to the independent director system from the angle of audit opinion. In Shanghai? The data of 1129 A-share listed companies in Shenzhen and Shenzhen from 2001 to 2007 are as follows: the proportion of independent directors, the annual salary of independent directors, the number of meetings attended by independent directors, whether the listed companies set up audit committees, and whether the independent directors are educated. The consistency between the independent director and the working place of the listed company is regarded as the independent variable, and the type of audit opinion issued by the CPA to the listed company is dependent variable to construct the model. The Logistic regression analysis is used to test the influence of the independent director system on the non-standard audit opinions issued by listed companies in China. The conclusion is that there is a certain correlation between the independent director system and the non-standard audit opinion, and there are significant differences between the types of audit opinion before and after the establishment of the independent director. A listed company with an independent director is more likely to receive a standard unqualified audit opinion than a listed company without an independent director. The proportion of independent directors, whether the listed company set up an audit committee, and the education background of independent directors have a significant impact on the audit opinion. The independent director system has played a certain role in improving the governance structure of listed companies in China, improving the selection and employment mechanism of accounting firms, purifying the audit market, and improving the quality of accounting information. For listed companies to obtain a more true and fair standard audit opinion to make a contribution. By examining the influence of independent director system on corporate governance from the angle of audit opinion, it enriches the research on independent director system. Only by perfecting the independent director system and actively promoting the reform of the governance structure of the listed company and improving the internal and external supervision mechanism of the company can the independent director system play an active role in our country.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：湖南大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2008
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：F271;F239.4;F224

【引證文獻(xiàn)】

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相關(guān)碩士學(xué)位論文 前1條

1 孫娜;非標(biāo)準(zhǔn)審計(jì)意見(jiàn)與外部監(jiān)管有效性研究[D];吉林財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué);2011年

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本文編號(hào)：2383796