地方審計(jì)機(jī)關(guān)獨(dú)立性研究
發(fā)布時(shí)間：2018-11-05 17:35
【摘要】： 獨(dú)立性是開(kāi)展審計(jì)監(jiān)督的必要條件,是審計(jì)監(jiān)督的“生命線(xiàn)”。沒(méi)有獨(dú)立性,客觀公正的審計(jì)監(jiān)督便無(wú)從談起。重視并追求審計(jì)監(jiān)督的獨(dú)立性是各國(guó)政府的共識(shí),世界各國(guó)根據(jù)本國(guó)國(guó)情選擇了不同的國(guó)家審計(jì)體制模式,都注意在國(guó)家審計(jì)機(jī)關(guān)的組織地位、審計(jì)人員的任免、審計(jì)經(jīng)費(fèi)的保障等方面通過(guò)法律切實(shí)保障國(guó)家審計(jì)的獨(dú)立性。 我國(guó)的國(guó)家審計(jì)機(jī)關(guān)分為國(guó)家審計(jì)署和地方各級(jí)審計(jì)機(jī)關(guān),根據(jù)《中華人民共和國(guó)憲法》第一百零九條規(guī)定:“縣級(jí)以上的地方各級(jí)人民政府設(shè)立審計(jì)機(jī)關(guān)。地方各級(jí)審計(jì)機(jī)關(guān)依照法律規(guī)定獨(dú)立行使審計(jì)監(jiān)督權(quán),對(duì)本級(jí)人民政府和上一級(jí)審計(jì)機(jī)關(guān)負(fù)責(zé)”,地方各級(jí)人民政府于1983年起設(shè)立了審計(jì)機(jī)關(guān)。應(yīng)該說(shuō)地方審計(jì)制度在建立初期適應(yīng)了我國(guó)政治、經(jīng)濟(jì)體制的運(yùn)行要求,促進(jìn)了我國(guó)地方政治、經(jīng)濟(jì)的發(fā)展。地方審計(jì)機(jī)關(guān)在維護(hù)國(guó)家財(cái)經(jīng)紀(jì)律,保護(hù)國(guó)有資產(chǎn),保證地方各部門(mén)、單位的財(cái)政、財(cái)務(wù)收支合法性、真實(shí)性和效益性方面做出了重要貢獻(xiàn)并成為社會(huì)主義經(jīng)濟(jì)監(jiān)督的重要形式。隨著改革開(kāi)放的深入,這一體制不可避免地暴露出缺陷和不足,特別是2004年“審計(jì)風(fēng)暴”后,出現(xiàn)了中央與地方審計(jì)工作差距顯著增大等新情況。地方審計(jì)機(jī)關(guān)雙重領(lǐng)導(dǎo)體制嚴(yán)重制約了地方審計(jì)機(jī)關(guān)工作的獨(dú)立性,人、財(cái)、物都受制于地方政府,在工作中既要服從上級(jí)審計(jì)機(jī)關(guān)的業(yè)務(wù)指導(dǎo),又要服從地方長(zhǎng)官的意志。特別是在地方自主權(quán)不斷擴(kuò)大的情況下,這種審計(jì)體制不可避免地會(huì)袒護(hù)地方利益,有時(shí)為了地方利益和部門(mén)利益甚至不惜損害和放棄國(guó)家和人民利益,致使地方審計(jì)機(jī)關(guān)的獨(dú)立性、客觀性、公正性受到嚴(yán)重侵犯,從而也在很大程度上增加了審計(jì)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。如何保持地方審計(jì)機(jī)關(guān)的獨(dú)立性將極大地影響到地方審計(jì)機(jī)關(guān)的權(quán)威性、公正性,也是制約地方審計(jì)機(jī)關(guān)發(fā)展的重要因素。本文從公共管理理論的角度,通過(guò)對(duì)國(guó)外審計(jì)獨(dú)立性的發(fā)展及影響因素的研究,以及本地區(qū)相關(guān)人員的問(wèn)卷調(diào)查,對(duì)地方審計(jì)機(jī)關(guān)獨(dú)立性影響因素進(jìn)行分析,提出了地方審計(jì)機(jī)關(guān)保持獨(dú)立性的建議。維護(hù)地方審計(jì)機(jī)關(guān)獨(dú)立性最主要的措施就是改革目前的地方審計(jì)管理體制,最可行、有效的方法是對(duì)省及以下地方審計(jì)機(jī)關(guān)實(shí)行垂直領(lǐng)導(dǎo),包括人權(quán)、財(cái)權(quán)、事權(quán)三方面全部歸口國(guó)家審計(jì)署管理,切斷地方審計(jì)機(jī)關(guān)與地方政府和部門(mén)的利益聯(lián)系,強(qiáng)化地方審計(jì)機(jī)關(guān)的獨(dú)立性,真正發(fā)揮地方審計(jì)機(jī)關(guān)審計(jì)監(jiān)督的作用。同時(shí),賦予地方審計(jì)機(jī)關(guān)屬地管轄權(quán),獨(dú)立地對(duì)屬地的單位進(jìn)行審計(jì)監(jiān)督。在相關(guān)法律規(guī)定下,地方審計(jì)機(jī)關(guān)可以自行公告審計(jì)結(jié)果,并提高審計(jì)處理處罰力度,適時(shí)推動(dòng)審計(jì)問(wèn)責(zé)制。
[Abstract]:Independence is the necessary condition of audit supervision and the lifeline of audit supervision. Without independence, objective and impartial audit supervision is impossible. It is the consensus of governments to attach importance to and pursue the independence of audit supervision. Countries all over the world have chosen different national audit system models according to their national conditions. They all pay attention to the organizational status of national audit institutions and the appointment and removal of auditors. The protection of audit funds and other aspects through the law to effectively protect the independence of state audit. The state audit organs in China are divided into the State Audit Office and the local audit organs at various levels. According to Article 109 of the Constitution of the people's Republic of China, "Local people's governments at or above the county level shall establish audit organs. Local audit institutions at all levels shall independently exercise the right of audit supervision in accordance with the provisions of the law and shall be responsible to the people's governments at the corresponding level and to the audit institutions at the next higher level. "the local people's governments at various levels have established audit institutions since 1983. It should be said that the local audit system adapted to the requirements of our country's political and economic system at the early stage of its establishment, and promoted the development of our local politics and economy. Local audit institutions maintain the state's financial and economic discipline, protect state-owned assets, and ensure the financial and financial revenue and expenditure legitimacy of various local departments and units, Authenticity and efficiency made important contributions and become an important form of socialist economic supervision. With the deepening of reform and opening up, the system inevitably exposes defects and deficiencies, especially after the "audit storm" in 2004, the gap between central and local audit work has increased significantly. The dual leadership system of the local audit institutions has seriously restricted the independence of the work of the local audit institutions. People, money and things are all subject to the local government. In their work, they should not only serve the professional guidance of the higher audit institutions, but also the will of the local governors. In particular, in the context of increasing local autonomy, such audit systems inevitably favour local interests, sometimes for the benefit of local and sectoral interests, even at the expense of the interests of the State and the people, As a result, the independence, objectivity and impartiality of the local audit institutions are seriously violated, thus increasing the audit risk to a great extent. How to maintain the independence of the local audit institutions will greatly affect the authority and impartiality of the local audit institutions, and it is also an important factor that restricts the development of the local audit institutions. From the perspective of public management theory, this paper analyzes the influencing factors of the independence of local audit institutions by studying the development of foreign audit independence and the influencing factors, as well as the questionnaire survey of relevant personnel in the region. The suggestion of maintaining the independence of local audit institutions is put forward. The most important measure to safeguard the independence of local audit institutions is to reform the current local audit management system. The most feasible and effective method is to exercise vertical leadership over local audit institutions at and below the provincial level, including human rights and financial power. All three aspects of the authority are under the management of the State Audit Office, cutting off the interests of the local audit institutions and local governments and departments, strengthening the independence of the local audit institutions, and giving full play to the role of the audit supervision of the local audit institutions. At the same time, local audit institutions are given territorial jurisdiction and independent audit supervision over territorial units. Under the relevant laws and regulations, the local audit institutions can announce the audit results on their own, improve the punishment of audit processing, and promote the audit accountability system at the right time.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：西北大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2008
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：F239.227
本文編號(hào)：2312805
[Abstract]:Independence is the necessary condition of audit supervision and the lifeline of audit supervision. Without independence, objective and impartial audit supervision is impossible. It is the consensus of governments to attach importance to and pursue the independence of audit supervision. Countries all over the world have chosen different national audit system models according to their national conditions. They all pay attention to the organizational status of national audit institutions and the appointment and removal of auditors. The protection of audit funds and other aspects through the law to effectively protect the independence of state audit. The state audit organs in China are divided into the State Audit Office and the local audit organs at various levels. According to Article 109 of the Constitution of the people's Republic of China, "Local people's governments at or above the county level shall establish audit organs. Local audit institutions at all levels shall independently exercise the right of audit supervision in accordance with the provisions of the law and shall be responsible to the people's governments at the corresponding level and to the audit institutions at the next higher level. "the local people's governments at various levels have established audit institutions since 1983. It should be said that the local audit system adapted to the requirements of our country's political and economic system at the early stage of its establishment, and promoted the development of our local politics and economy. Local audit institutions maintain the state's financial and economic discipline, protect state-owned assets, and ensure the financial and financial revenue and expenditure legitimacy of various local departments and units, Authenticity and efficiency made important contributions and become an important form of socialist economic supervision. With the deepening of reform and opening up, the system inevitably exposes defects and deficiencies, especially after the "audit storm" in 2004, the gap between central and local audit work has increased significantly. The dual leadership system of the local audit institutions has seriously restricted the independence of the work of the local audit institutions. People, money and things are all subject to the local government. In their work, they should not only serve the professional guidance of the higher audit institutions, but also the will of the local governors. In particular, in the context of increasing local autonomy, such audit systems inevitably favour local interests, sometimes for the benefit of local and sectoral interests, even at the expense of the interests of the State and the people, As a result, the independence, objectivity and impartiality of the local audit institutions are seriously violated, thus increasing the audit risk to a great extent. How to maintain the independence of the local audit institutions will greatly affect the authority and impartiality of the local audit institutions, and it is also an important factor that restricts the development of the local audit institutions. From the perspective of public management theory, this paper analyzes the influencing factors of the independence of local audit institutions by studying the development of foreign audit independence and the influencing factors, as well as the questionnaire survey of relevant personnel in the region. The suggestion of maintaining the independence of local audit institutions is put forward. The most important measure to safeguard the independence of local audit institutions is to reform the current local audit management system. The most feasible and effective method is to exercise vertical leadership over local audit institutions at and below the provincial level, including human rights and financial power. All three aspects of the authority are under the management of the State Audit Office, cutting off the interests of the local audit institutions and local governments and departments, strengthening the independence of the local audit institutions, and giving full play to the role of the audit supervision of the local audit institutions. At the same time, local audit institutions are given territorial jurisdiction and independent audit supervision over territorial units. Under the relevant laws and regulations, the local audit institutions can announce the audit results on their own, improve the punishment of audit processing, and promote the audit accountability system at the right time.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：西北大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2008
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：F239.227
【引證文獻(xiàn)】
相關(guān)碩士學(xué)位論文 前1條
1 于飛;我國(guó)地方審計(jì)體制研究[D];復(fù)旦大學(xué);2010年
，本文編號(hào)：2312805
本文鏈接：http://www.sikaile.net/jingjilunwen/sjlw/2312805.html
最近更新
教材專(zhuān)著
